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This doctoral research explores the ways in which UK law engages with 
embryonic processes, namely under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (as amended).  
 
The research offers a fuller understanding of these elusive and evolving 
biological processes, and in particular, how they can, in turn, allow us to 
understand legal process and legal regulation more deeply. To do so, the 
thesis employs an anthropological concept - liminality - coined by Arnold 
van Gennep, which is itself concerned with revealing the dynamics of 
process. Liminality may be described as being concerned with the spaces in 
between distinct stages of human experience or with the process of 
transition between such stages. With this framing of liminality in mind - 
which is often characterised as a three-stage process of human experience 
- the research is divided into three parts, broadly reflecting the three parts of 
van Gennep’s liminal schema: into, through, and out of liminality.  
 
It is argued herein that in regulating the embryo – that is, a processual 
liminal entity in itself - the law is regulating for uncertainty. Tracing the legal 
governance of the early stages of human life, from its inception to today’s 
regulatory frameworks, the research diagnoses a ‘legal gap’ between the 
conceptual basis for regulation, and practical ‘realities’ of the 1990 Act (as 
amended). In particular, this ‘gap’ is typified by uncertainty surrounding 
embryos in vitro, and what this thesis diagnoses as ‘legal stasis’.  
 
In order to situate this novel liminal analysis within existing paradigms, 
however, the thesis first frames embryos in vitro as ‘gothic’, building upon 
emergent analytical responses to postmodern forms of categorisation. This 
framing helps to articulate the nature of, and the reasons for, the 




a liminal lens, as it draws our attention to the dynamics of the processes 
occurring within this ‘gap’. It is argued that considering the ‘problem’ in this 
manner enables us to move beyond conceptualisation, towards realisation.  
  
The gothic, and the liminal are thus used to critically assess legal 
representations of the embryo, and suggests that there are ways in which 
the law might better embrace the multiplicity of environments through which 
the embryo in vitro can travel, that is, either towards reproductive or 
research ends. It is argued that full recognition of these variable, relational 
liminal states of the embryo is important for the future of artificial 
reproduction and embryo research, and that this does not currently happen. 
In order for the law to reflect better the uncertain nature of embryonic 
processes, and the technologies that create them, the thesis posits a 
nuanced, contextual reframing of the embryo that captures the multiplicity of 
embryonic ‘pathways’ available within the 1990 Act (as amended).  
 
The overarching objective of this work is to consider a more coherent and 
robust intellectual defence of the ways in which we justify different 
treatments of in vitro embryos. It thus proposes a ‘context-based approach’ 
that embraces the variable, relational pathways already facilitated by the 
1990 Act (as amended) in order to lead the embryo (and itself) into, through 







At the embryonic stage of human life, development and change happens 
more rapidly than in any other stage of growth. In the UK, human embryos 
may be created outside of a woman’s body (in vitro), and used either for 
reproductive purposes (i.e. IVF), or for scientific research. The legal 
framework governing these practices and processes has been in place for 
almost three decades.  
 
This thesis argues that the embryo may therefore be described as a 
processual entity, that is something going through evolution and change; 
leaving one state of being, and becoming another. This thesis asks: to what 
extent does UK law embrace embryos’ processual nature? 
 
In order to understand these processes and their regulation more deeply, 
this thesis uses a concept derived from anthropology: liminality. Arnold van 
Gennep coined this term in the early 1900s in his study of human ritual 
ceremonies, for example those that take a child from ‘boyhood’ to 
‘manhood’. Its importance lies in the fact that it can be applied more widely, 
and in particular as an analytical lens to understand processes more deeply. 
The argument is made that the law governing the regulation of embryos 
created and used in vitro does not properly reflect the processes that 
embryos go through a) biologically, and b) within the various ‘pathways’ they 
can be led through our current legal framework. For example, the ‘research 
embryo’ has a very different end to the ‘IVF embryo’. The thesis exposes the 
full implications of recognising this, and ultimately advocates an approach 
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‘The embryo’ is not the same embryo it was 28 years ago. As medical 
science marches forward, commonly held constructions of the embryo are 
becoming increasingly problematic. The physical contexts in which the 
embryo can exist are growing and changing, as are its possible teleologies.1 
The politics of fertility have been extended to new heights 2  with the 
harnessing, control and enhancement of reproductive genetic procedures in 
the biotechnology industry.  In recent years, the processes of reproduction 
have been given “unprecedented forms of scientific assistance,”3 none of 
which would have been possible without the research that came before it. In 
1978, Louise Brown was the first child to be born through in vitro fertilisation 
(‘IVF’). 4  Since then, the embryo in vitro, born from an assemblage of 
biological and technological matters, generated complex ontological and 
moral questions for the law.5  
 
                                            
1 For the purposes of this thesis, this term is used to highlight the reproductive and research 
ends for regulated embryos in vitro. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
2 Sarah Franklin, ‘Postmodern Procreation: A cultural account of assisted reproduction’ in 
Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp (eds), Conceiving The New World Order: The Global 
Politics of Reproduction (University of California Press, 1995) 326. 
3 Ibid.   
4 The procedure whereby an egg is fertilised by a sperm outside of the body.  
5 While this thesis does not claim that law is necessarily the solution, or answer to these 
moral questions, this work explores ways in which law might address these questions in a 






The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (‘the 1990 Act’) is the key 
piece of legislation on the embryo in vitro. Yet, because of the changes and 
opportunities facilitated by the 1990 Act, reproduction and research have 
been defined and redefined,6 in legal, cultural, social, political and even 
economic senses.7 Arguably, its influence on our spheres of understandings 
in this domain can be grouped under three broad headings:  
 
1. On the embryo in vitro itself; 
2. On science (persons and practices e.g. research practices and 
researchers); and  
3. On the family (in the broadest sense e.g. donors, potential parents, 
hypothetical mothers, and hypothetical children).  
 
The regulation of emerging technologies may be described as the 
governance of processes in persistent flux, and in some cases, it is the 
regulation of what we do not yet know or fully understand. Reconciling 
process with progress, therefore, has not been easy. Nonetheless, the 
regulation of the embryo in vitro, and all the practices that law currently 
allows is, in essence, regulating for processes of change.8 Considering that 
it has been over 27 years since the 1990 Act was passed in its original form, 
is it time to legally reconceive ‘the embryo’?  
 
This thesis, carried out as part of a five-year Wellcome Trust funded 
interdisciplinary project entitled ‘Confronting the Liminal Spaces of Health 
                                            
6 Franklin ‘Postmodern Procreation’ (n2).  
7 There is much contemporary debate surrounding the commodification of, and accessibility 
to fertility treatment. For more on this, see: Donna Ferguson, ‘IVF and the NHS the parents 
navigating fertility’s postcode lottery’ (Guardian, 10 May 2014)  
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/may/10/ivf-nhs-fertility-postcode-lottery-cut-
costs accessed 29 January 2018. 
8 Samuel Taylor-Alexander et al, ‘Confronting the Liminal Spaces of Health Research 
Regulation: Beyond Regulatory Compression’ (2016) 8(2) Law, Innovation and Technology 
149. 






Research Regulation,’9 seeks to explore the ways in which UK law engages 
with embryonic processes, and with the scientific processes to which in vitro 
embryos are subject. While its focus is on the first strand of the tri-partite set 
of considerations laid out above, it also recognises the law’s regulation of 
embryos invariably has an effect on the second and the third headings.10 
Embryos created in vitro sit at the core of modern reproductive and 
scientific life. They are uniquely transformative, as regulated biological 
entities, and for that reason they move between normative delineated legal 
spaces, and beyond them, for example, from creation in the laboratory into 
the human gestational environment or from creation in the laboratory to 
controlled destruction in that same sterile environment. Embryos’ 
processual nature, for this thesis, lies in their growing, changing, and 
transforming nature.11 Embryonic evolution is the most rapidly fluctuating 
biological process in human life.12  This complexity is mirrored in legal 
frameworks that are simultaneously detailed and ambiguous. In the eyes of 
the law that governs these entities - the 1990 Act (as amended) - embryos 
are neither subject (in a strict legal sense of being a legal person), nor mere 
object (in the strict sense of being only a ‘thing’),13 yet, as we will see, the 
self-same law often supports their treatment as both at the same time. 
 
More granularly, this doctoral research argues that in regulating this 
processual, liminal entity, law is regulating for uncertainty. It assesses the 
extent to which law incorporates and makes use of embryonic legal-
                                            
9 Award No: WT103360MA. 
10 These, as this thesis’ conclusion discusses, may be distinct areas of future enquiry for 
research, building upon the findings of this work. 
11 Scott Gilbert, ‘An Introduction to Early Developmental Processes’ in Scott Gilbert 
Developmental Biology (6th ed, Sinauer Associates, 2000). 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK9992/ accessed 29 January 2018.  
12 Ibid.   
13 Marie Fox, Pre-persons, commodities or cyborgs: the legal construction and 






ontological boundaries.14 In Part One, this work calls particular attention to 
the legal boundedness of embryos in vitro, which, I argue, are in contrast to 
the processes it leads embryos through. To explain, I use ‘legal 
boundedness’ here to refer to law’s tendency to put the objects of its 
regulation in ‘silos’, which can result in “largely disconnected ecosystems.”15  
I argue that this has contributed to a ‘legal gap’ between the conceptual 
basis of the 1990 Act (as amended), and the ‘pathways’ it has made 
available to the embryo. 
 
Further, I claim that embryo regulation, as it stands, is ill equipped to deal 
with the multifaceted, relational16 nature between embryos in vitro, and the 
variable contexts that the law (itself) takes the embryo into, through and out 
of. I thus call for, and consider, the basis for a more coherent and robust 
intellectual defence of the ways in which we justify the different manners in 
which law treats different types of embryos created purposively towards 
different ends. The main question that this thesis seeks to answer is the 
following: Overall, does law reflect and embody processual regulation, if so, 
what does this look like?; and if not, what form could it take if reform were 
thought to be desirable?   
 
1.2 Analytical framework 
 
In order to answer my overall research question, above, this research 
employs a socio-legal analysis that draws on the abovementioned 
anthropological concept of ‘liminality’. The term, coined by anthropologist 
                                            
14 Here meaning the ontologies of an entity drawn out in law. Discussed further in Chapters 
3-4. 
15 Graeme Laurie, ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research Regulation: What Are 
We Missing in the Spaces In-between?’ (2016) Medical Law Review 47, 50.  
16 Relational to persons who create, use and gestate them. Discussed further in Chapters 6 
and 7. 






Arnold Van Gennep,17  may be described as being concerned with the 
spaces in between distinct stages of human experience or with the process 
of transition between such stages. It is often utilised to understand, and 
examine, those who occupy, and often transgress delineated spaces; it is 
inherently concerned with better comprehension of the processual nature of 
becoming. This research, which seeks to understand these processes, thus 
employs this concept in order to explore how we can better apprehend legal 
process and legal regulation more deeply with respect to embryos that are 
created to become particular types of entity, that is, a possible future person, 
or an object of research, or indeed possibly other ends.  
 
To explain further, even though the law has made considerable effort to 
clarify bio-ontological categories of being (for example, distinguishing 
between gamete and embryo), these lines are still blurred. This is 
demonstrated by on-going debates, for example, concerning the nature, 
scope, and limits of embryo research, time-limits on abortion, and indeed in 
UK and European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) case law about whether, 
when and how protections might be given to the ‘unborn’. A liminal lens 
emphasises the processual nature of biological growth in early human life; 
that is, a continuous process from conception to birth and beyond. Part of 
the research problem, is, therefore, that there is a mismatch between 
present and evolving scientific and social understanding and legal 
approaches, when considered along ontological lines. This has significant 
moral and social implications, and thus begs a question about how well 
regulation in this area operates and whether it can, or should, be improved. 
Further, the tripartite liminal process (into, through, and out)18 mirrors the 
process embryos go through under the 1990 Act (as amended). It highlights 
                                            
17 Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (University of Chicago Press 1960). 






(as shown in a Diagram 1 in Chapter 7)19 the various thresholds embryos are 
led to, and beyond. For example, embryos are led into, through, and out of 
research, the processes of which (especially ‘through’) may be prolonged by 
activities such as embryo freezing.  
 
Overall, this lens enables thinking to move beyond purist legalistic 
approaches in a field that is especially non-legal. It implies that law requires 
more than legal reasoning to adequately reflect that which it regulates, 
especially when it comes to embryos. It also enables the analysis in this 
thesis to move between and beyond delineated legal spaces.  
 
While liminality is central to this work, I also argue that, as a lens, it does not 
wholly allow us to assess the nature of, and the reasons for the ‘legal gap’ 
(identified in Part One). Building on the works of others,20 I argue that 
embryos in vitro fit well within a framing that has emerged in response to 
postmodern categorisations of the ‘Other’: principally, the ‘gothic’.21 As a 
response to the ‘Othering’ of those who do not fall into law’s liberalist norms 
(a sovereign, self-sufficient subject,22 or an object), it helps us to understand, 
more deeply, the embryo’s uncertain nature, and law’s responses to it 
therein.23   
 
                                            
19 Also see Appendix 1. 
20 Namely the works of Mary Ford (now Mary Neal), and Isabel Karpin. See Mary Ford, 
‘Nothing and Not Nothing: Law’s Ambivalent Response to Transformation and 
Transgression at the Beginning of Life’ in Stephen Smith and Ronan Deazley (eds) The 
Legal, Medical and Cultural Regulation of the Body: Transformation and 
Transgression (Routledge, 2009); Isabel Karpin, ‘The uncanny embryos: Legal limits to the 
human and reproduction without women’ (2006) 28(4) Sydney Law Review 599. 
21 More on this in Chapter 5. See, for example: Kelly Hurley, Gothic Body (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Victor Sage and Allan Lloyd Smith (eds), Modern Gothic 
(Manchester University Press, 1996); and Fred Botting, Gothic (Routledge, 1996). 
22 See Ford (n20) 
23 Ibid.  






1.3 Thesis Structure  
 
This thesis has been divided into three parts: 1) Into Liminality; 2) Through 
Liminality, and 3) Out of Liminality. This division emphasises the embryonic 
processes that law begins, regulates, and ends, and further, reflects the 
tripartite stages of van Gennep’s processual understanding of human liminal 
experience. Each of these Parts has its own abstract, detailing the aims and 
key arguments. These may be found on the title pages for Part One, Part 
Two, and Part Three. The structure of this thesis, and each Part, is briefly 
summarised below.  
 
1.3.1 Part One  
 
In ‘Part One: Into Liminality’, this work argues that the law governing embryo 
research and IVF has led the embryo in vitro, and itself (the law), into a form 
of (what this thesis diagnoses as) ‘legal stasis’. Notably, the thesis starts 
with the premise of the embryo as a processual entity, rapidly transforming 
from one biological state to another. In other words, it is quintessentially 
liminal 24  (the meaning of which is discussed in Chapter 6). It is law’s 
reflection of these processes, within its framework, that this thesis is 
interested in. It begins by asking: to what extent does law, in fact, reflect 
these processes?  
 
Chapter 2 provides a doctrinal tracing of law’s engagement with the embryo 
from its early construction in law to the modern day. It does so with a view 
to demonstrating law’s evolution alongside scientific and societal 
understandings of the embryo. Notable from this legal history is the law’s 
                                            
24 This framing has already been used in a different context, see Susan Squier, Liminal lives: 






persistent efforts to engage with the embryo’s uncertain, processual nature. 
This chapter situates the embryo within its legal context by tracing the 
inception of the embryo in law, and the evolution of its regulation. It aims to 
show that throughout its relatively short legal history, the regulation of the 
early stages of human life has attempted (to one extent or another) to 
engage with the processual and uncertain nature of the early stages of 
human life. To this end, the chapter provides a doctrinal and analytical 
history of ‘the embryo’ in UK law. This analysis is important for this thesis in 
order to show that process matters for law making in this context. This 
framing also sets up Chapter 3’s discussion of the contemporary context in 
which we regulate the embryo in vitro, and serves as a stark counterpoint 
because, as will be shown in Chapters 3 and 4, the processual now seems 
to be lost or overlooked.  
 
Chapter 3 also adopts a doctrinal approach to look at the embryo-in-law in 
the present day, the basis of which was set by the Warnock Report25 and 
the 1990 Act (as amended). One of the primary ways in which the law has 
engaged with the embryo is through affording it an ethico-legal ‘special 
status’.26 The chapter assesses current laws in relation to this, particularly 
regarding the law’s engagement with embryonic processes.  
 
In Chapter 4 it is then argued, building upon recent critical literature on the 
regulated embryo, that in the context of the present day, the law is 
inadequately engaging with the embryo’s uncertain, processual nature. 
Despite regulating a multiplicity of embryonic processes, and pathways 
through the law (for example, a ‘research pathway’, or a ‘reproductive 
pathway’), all embryos are (at least per the intellectual basis of the 1990 Act) 
                                            
25 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Cmnd 9314, 
1984) (‘The Warnock Report’). 
26 Ibid 11.18.   






regulated under a singular ‘special status’. It is at this stage that this work 
makes a marked move from referring to ‘the embryo’ to ‘embryos’ in order 
to reflect this multiplicity. Overall, the ossification of legal development in 
this area is diagnosed as a ‘legal stasis.’ The chapter finishes by asking two 
questions: 1) Why might this be? And 2) How might we move law past this 
stasis, assuming it is desirable to do so?   
 
Overall, the analysis from Part One reveals a clear juxtaposition between law, 
as an institution that creates clear-cut boundaries, and the embryo, as a 
processual, changing and rapidly evolving liminal entity. This is not to say 
that the law is not processual to some extent, which in fact, as this Part’s 
analysis shows, it always has been. If process has always been central to 
law making in this field, however, as the end of Chapter 4 argues, there is 
room for its further incorporation into our legal framework, again, assuming 
it is desirable to do so.  
 
1.3.2 Part Two 
 
‘Part Two: Through Liminality’ explores a hitherto underexplored connection 
between a response to the postmodern that has emerged – namely, ‘the 
gothic’ - and the anthropological lens used in this thesis, that is, liminality. 27 
Based on this, and building upon previous analysis regarding the static 
nature of the regulation of the embryo in vitro, Chapters 5-6 aim to 
understand legal responses to embryos, and processual regulation therein, 
more thoroughly. This Part’s overarching question is thus: ‘How can we 
understand legal process, and legal regulation more deeply?’ 
 
                                            
27 ‘Liminality’ is occasionally referred to in gothic literature, but the link between the two 






With a view to answering question 1) above (‘why might this be?’), Chapter 5 
explores parallels that may be drawn for embryos, from a concept that has 
evolved as a response to the ‘Othering’ of certain sectors of society. This 
concept, namely the ‘gothic self’, is closely linked to the ‘monstrous’,28 and 
explores the ways in which we respond to persons (and entities) that are not 
self-sovereign (something that law arguably presupposes). In exploring this 
framing, this chapter draws on the work of Mary Ford29 and Isabel Karpin30 
and frames the regulated embryo in vitro as paradigmatic of ‘the gothic’, 
and emphasises the utility, for law, in recognising the parallels between this 
concept and embryos.  
 
This work argues that framing embryos in vitro as ‘gothic’ is undoubtedly 
useful for understanding the nature of, and the reasons for our current 
framework more deeply. Nonetheless, I also argue that, as a frame of 
analysis, ‘the gothic’ alone does not address the ‘legal gap’ fully. This is 
because it does not directly deal with understanding the dynamics of 
process in a deeper sense, which, as Part One shows, is required in order to 
answer its second question: 2) How might we move law past this, assuming 
it is desirable to do so? It thus leaves the question for this thesis as: how 
might we regulate embryos more processually? Chapter 6 therefore 
introduces, and discusses the anthropological concept of liminality,31 which 
– as already noted - is concerned with the dynamics of processes and 
states of in-betweenness. After Van Gennep developed liminality, in the 
context of tribal societies, others, including Victor Turner, 32  have since 
developed liminality to encompass several dimensions within modern 
                                            
28 Ford (n20).   
29 Ibid. 
30 Karpin ‘Uncanny embryos’ (n20).   
31 van Gennep (n17). 
32  Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Cornell University 
Press, 1967). 






societies.33 For this thesis, then, liminality can be used as a tool to help 
show us how law, along with the embryo, can emerge out of the regulatory 
purgatory they are in today. Indeed, current law may arguably be described 
as reflecting many of the major symptoms of ‘permanent liminality’, a 
modern theory of liminality concerned with that which does not emerge out 
of the ‘other side’ of processes/change. This chapter will first introduce the 
concept, before going on to apply it as a lens to embryos in vitro, and the 
framework governing them in the UK. It argues that both embryos in vitro, 
and the law that governs them, have features of ‘permanent liminality’.34 
Finally, it will draw on lessons from Chapter 5 in order to consider what ‘the 
gothic’ and liminality, combined, might tell us about how we can close the 
above discussed ‘legal gap.’ 
 
By the end of Part Two, the thesis will have shown that there are ways that 
law can better (in terms of processuality) navigate and capture the contexts 
that it is leading the embryo through. It finishes by asking: How can law 
better reflect the uncertain nature of embryonic processes, and the 
technologies that create them? 
 
1.3.3 Part Three 
 
In ‘Part Three: Out of Liminality’, this research explores how lessons learned 
from a gothic analysis, and liminal lens (per Part Two) may be taken from 
conceptualisation to realisation. It will be argued that if the law were to take 
process seriously (as it has done in the past), and that if liminality teaches us 
about the permanent liminality of law in this area, then it is perhaps time for 
                                            
33 For example, see Squier (n24).  
34 Árpád Szakolczai, ‘Permanent (Trickster) Liminality: The Reasons of the Heart and of the 






the law to explicitly recognise the separate contexts that it is leading the 
embryo into, through, and out of.  
 
Chapter 7 explores what processual regulation could look like, as a 
framework for governing the use and production of embryos in vitro. Given 
that liminality, as a lens, enables us to understand more deeply the 
multiplicity of contexts in which embryos are used and created, it shall be 
argued that if law wants to continue accounting for process, as it has done 
in the past, then it might consider what this thesis calls a ‘context-based 
approach.’ This approach, which explicitly attempts to recognise the 
separate contexts that law is leading embryos into, through, and out of, is 
not prescribed per se, but rather is offered as a way of legally embracing a 
processual approach (if that is indeed what we want for law).  
 
Finally, in Chapter 8, this thesis concludes by considering some of the 
broader implications that a context-based approach might have. It takes two 
examples: 1) the potential implications for the ‘legal gap’ identified in Part 
One, and 2) contemporary debates surrounding the 14-day rule. Importantly, 
this Chapter is not assessing what we should do, but what some of the 
things that the law could possibly do via this approach. Rather, it 
emphasises that the analysis of this thesis can add to legal, ethical, and 
social discussions on the embryo in vitro. 
 
Before this work commences, the rest of this introduction will clarify and 
discuss certain key premises for this research. First, it asks ‘what is an 
embryo?’ (for the purposes of this research), a question to which law, 
science, and other disciplines each have their own answers. 
 










This subsection clarifies the meaning of “embryo” and “embryos” for the 
purposes of this research. First, I acknowledge the undecidable, 
unknowable nature of ‘the embryo’ (or ‘embryos’) in definitional terms. There 
is undoubtedly some disparity within the scientific communities themselves, 
as well as between science and the social sciences with regards to their 
definition.35 Navigating the biological definition, or purporting to define the 
embryo in general, is not this thesis’ aim.  
 
Second, this thesis is primarily concerned with embryos in vitro. The thesis 
does not extend as far as to discuss the research upon and/or use of foetal 
or abortus tissue. Nonetheless, due to the nature of tracing the legal history 
of governing this early stage of human life, Chapter 2 does not exclusively 
focus on embryos (of which there was very little mention until the 20th 
Century), and thus uses embryo/foetus interchangeably until a concrete 
legal distinction emerges in the chronology.  
 
Third, it is clear that the embryo, however defined in law, has no objective 
definition (like many things). This thesis shall not attempt to provide one for 
law. Rather, it will look at the law’s navigation of these 
actual/possible/multiple definitions, as they have changed throughout 
history, and as they are used today. I argue that this navigation is important 
for the future of human health, as affected by the governance of the use of 
                                            
35 See Marie-Andrée Jacob and Barbara Prainsack, ‘Embryonic Hopes: Controversy, 
Alliance, and Reproductive Entities in Law and the Social Sciences’ (2010) 19(4) Social 






embryos for reproduction and research. As stated, this work will focus on 
the embryo in vitro as a cornerstone to the regulation of reproduction and 
research under the 1990 Act (as amended). Thus, for the purpose of this 
thesis’ references to the entity, when referring to embryos in vitro, it is 
referring to entities created within the rubric of the 1990 Act (as amended), 
in line with the legal definition of embryo given in the legislation under s1.  
 
This definition has been used because this is the primary legislation with 
which this research is concerned. By taking this definition for the purposes 
of this thesis’ reference, this work is not necessarily supporting its use within 
law. The above described of what the 1990 Act (as amended) calls 
‘permitted embryo’ (i.e. a ‘human’ embryo) is human and anything else is not; 
but it is nonetheless unclear on what ‘human’ entails. How we should define 
embryos, or indeed ‘human’ embryos is a matter beyond the ambit of this 
work, the reasoning for which is discussed briefly below, and further in 
Chapter 7. It was nonetheless important to clarify this up front and in 
advance of the discussion which follows.  
 
In sum, herein when this work refers to ‘the embryo’, it is primarily referring 
to the embryo-in-law (as opposed to ‘the embryo’ in other contexts). 
Notably, at the end of Chapter 4, this work makes a marked shift from 
referring to ‘the embryo’ to ‘embryos’, in order to reflect the findings of Part 
One (the multiple ‘embryos’ governed under the 1990 Act’s singular ‘special 
status). Exceptions are made to this when discussing the works of others. 
 
 
1.4.2 The embryo’s ‘moral status’ and ‘legal status’  
 
This work refers to ‘moral status’ and ‘legal status’ throughout the text in 
reference to embryos and occasionally foetuses. In this thesis, ‘moral status’ 






is primarily taken to mean the moral standing of embryos within society.36 
While the latter is mentioned throughout, it is not the focus of this work per 
se. Nonetheless, this work recognises that neither the embryo’s moral 
status,37 nor value, 38 is either fixed or unfixed; there is no objective truth in 
this regard. ‘Legal status’ is used to refer to the status afforded to embryos 
in vitro in law, by the 1990 Act (as amended), and underpinned reflection of 
the Warnock Report’s recommendations. 39  Legal status is of course 
inherently moralistic, but the key differences for the purposes of this work 
are: a) embryonic ‘status’ in ethical and societal deliberation more generally, 
and b) law’s interpretation, and reflection of this. As explained further in the 
next section, this thesis, as a thesis in law, is only concerned with assessing 
(b). What is legally appropriate, or what we should do, which arises out of 
analysis of (b) is of course a separate debate. No particular stance is taken 
in this regard because it is not necessary to do so for the purposes of 
making the original contribution that is claimed in this thesis. In addition to 
the above, I also acknowledge that there is a crucial legal difference 
between the legal status of the embryo for IVF and research, and the legal 
status of the embryo in an abortion context. Of course, this difference in 
moral status was not set out in law (albeit not explicitly articulated) until the 
1990 Act.  
 
Overall, it is important to emphasise that primary point of interrogation in 
which this thesis is interested is the way in which law navigates embryonic 
                                            
36 See Agnieszka Jaworska, and Julie Tannenbaum, ‘The Grounds of Moral Status’ (The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 10 Jan 2018)  
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grounds-moral-status/ accessed 29 January 2018.  
37 Ibid.  
38 See Schroeder, Mark, ‘Value Theory’ (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2016 
Edition), Edward Zalta (ed) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/value-theory/ 
accessed 20 January 2018.  
39 The meaning of, or contours of which were not described within the Warnock Report. See 






moral status, as that focused upon in the Warnock Report, rather than moral 




As mentioned above, this thesis starts with the premise that ‘the embryo’ is 
a processual entity. This subsection explains what is meant by ‘process’ for 
the purposes of this work. 
 
There is not one definitive way in which we can talk about process, generally 
speaking. For the purposes of this thesis, process is a focal point for two 
reasons: the inherently (perhaps undeniably) processual, transformational, 
and rapidly changing nature of embryos in vitro; and the regulation of 
multiple scientific processes (for example implantation, research, or cloning) 
under the framework of the 1990 Act (as amended).  
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘process’ as: “going on, continuous 
action, proceeding” and, philosophically, as “the course of becoming as 
opposed to static being.”40 This thesis employs the term ‘process’ in line 
with the above definitions, and the term is relied upon in order to highlight 
the importance of the different steps taken in achieving (potential) 
embryonic ends. As mentioned above, process is an integral part of the 
liminality literature, which refers to it in a similar manner (albeit dependent on 
context). Arnold van Gennep began by using it to highlight the transitional 
aspects of tribal rites of passage,41 and much later Susan Squier discussed 
the cultural impact(s) that relatively new processes of becoming that 
                                            
40 ‘process, n.’ (OED Online. January 2018) 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/151794?rskey=eUDGoU&result=1&isAdvanced=false 
accessed 20 February 2018. 
41 See van Gennep (n17). 






embryos (amongst other entities, e.g. foetuses) can go through as a result of 
the transformation of medicine.42 Integral parts of these (liminal) processes 
are thus a sense of transition, transformation, and becoming, from one state 
to another. All of this is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
1.5 Thesis Dimensions 
 
This section draws out the contours of this thesis by, first, delineating what it 
is not about, and second, emphasising the key dimensions of this enquiry.  
 
1.5.1 This work is not about… 
 
How we ought to treat embryos, legally or otherwise. 
 
To echo the above section, as a legal thesis, this work does not make 
claims regarding moral correctness. As Emily Jackson concludes in 
Regulating Reproduction, “law is not capable of divining any absolute truths 
about the moral status of the embryo.” 43  While law cannot distil any 
objective truths, it arguably still needs to divine some sort of ‘right’ based on 
social consensus, and if it is to do so, as it has done, it has to go forth in a 
legally appropriate44 manner. It should therefore be noted that this thesis 
does not intend to directly discuss what the embryo’s moral status should 
be, but rather the aspects of its regulation that liminality (and the gothic) 
calls into question. This helps us to critique the law as it is. It is suggested 
                                            
42 Particularly, as they are affected (and ‘reconfigured’) by the relationship between 
biomedicine and science fiction. See Squier (n24). 
43 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction (Hart, 2001) 229. 
44 By ‘legally appropriate’, I mean appropriate for the pathways or processes it enables 






that if the law is not as well justified, as it seems, then it becomes 
problematic for society and for those affected by it (as the debate 
mentioned above shows). Neither a gothic framing, nor liminality, necessarily 
provides a concrete answer to this contentious issue. Nonetheless, this 
thesis contends that, as an analytical framework, they can enable us to think 
about more justifiable ways to regulate embryos, in their various states of 
becoming.  
 
Thus, this work is primarily interested in how law deals with the reality of a 
plurality of entities – embryos – created with different purposes in mind. It is 
concerned with law’s creation of possible pathways and with how it 
regulates those entities in question as they proceed along the respective 
pathways. It is thus more of a forensic analysis of law’s role in challenging 
and acknowledging these pathways, and providing appropriate structure 
around them (‘appropriate’ here meaning that it is suitable for that pathway, 
and the end to which each pathway leads). 
 
1.5.2 Dimensions of this thesis 
 
With all of the above in mind, the bullet points below delineate the key areas 
of enquiry for this thesis, broken up into three parts:  
 
• Part One: In what ways does UK law engage with embryonic 
processes, if at all? 
• Part Two: How can we understand legal process, and legal regulation 
more deeply?  
• Part Three: How can law better reflect the uncertain nature of 
embryonic processes, and the technologies that create them? 






• Overall, this thesis asks: Does law reflect and embody processual 
regulation, if so, what does this look like?; and if not, what form could 
it take if reform were thought to be desirable?  
 
Now, to Part One of this thesis, which begins by exploring the ways in which 
law has engaged with the embryo, as a biological entity of unclear and 















Part One: Into Liminality 
 
Part One of this thesis draws out the contours of the research problem. In 
doing so, it asks: how consistently does, and can, law treat the embryo? It 
will show that the answer is that law has treated the embryo inconsistently, 
and this is because law has changed relatively regularly, historically 
speaking, to reflect changing knowledge and perceptions of the early stages 
of human life. In other words, I argue that process has been central to law 
making.  
 
With a view to demonstrating this, Chapter 2 provides a historical account of 
law’s engagement with embryonic (and foetal) processes. Building on this, 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the development of law since the advent of IVF 
and the regulatory framework imposed by legislation such as the 1990 Act 
(as amended). The point is made that, while we persist in talking about ‘the 
embryo’ in lay and legal circles, law has in fact created a multiplicity of 
embryos, for example as future persons and as research “artefacts,”45 to 
name just two. 
 
By the end of Part One, this thesis will show 1) that process is important for 
law-making in this field, and relatedly that 2) there is a ‘legal gap’ between 
the intellectual basis, and practical ‘realities’ of the present framework. This 
‘problem’ then becomes the basis for consideration of alternative 
conceptualisations explored in Part Two.  
                                            
45 John Kenyon Mason, Human Life and Medical Practice (Edinburgh University Press, 
1988) 94. 












2.  The Evolution of ‘the Embryo’ in 
Law: A Matter of Process 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Reproductive law in the UK has developed against a background of 
competing and changing interests. These interests include a morass of 
moral and religious values, and, further the perceived interests of the 
embryo, the mother, and medical professionals. As time has passed, and 
our biological understandings of the early stages of human life have evolved, 
the law has attempted to recalibrate the balance of these interests in one 
way or another. Although reproductive technologies and embryo research 
have only been available for a handful of decades, legal protection of the 
embryo (and the foetus) dates back several hundred years.  
 
The following sections provide a brief historical tracing of the presence of 
the embryo in statute and case law in the UK (or lack thereof). This chapter 
has been written as a precursor to a central contribution of this thesis: if the 
law wants to continue on to reflect the processual nature of the embryo, this 
thesis offers a frame of legal analysis that captures the embryo’s uncertain, 
processual nature that can inform policy responses to its existence and use. 
This frame of analysis shall be discussed in Part Two.    
 
This chapter chronologically traces past legal engagement with the human 
embryo, from the 13th century, to the end of the 20th century. It does so with 
a view to demonstrating that a historical perspective is required to 





understand that process is a key facet of law making in this area. Notable 
from this legal history is the law’s persistent efforts to engage with the 
embryo’s uncertain, processual nature. We cannot fully understand our 
present position without understanding the social, moral, and legal context 
from which it was born. By looking at the past ‘legal embryo,’ we can see 
how the law has reached today’s ‘legal embryo’. Before this tracing begins, 
however, some points of clarification should be noted. 
 
First, while this account focuses on legal history in reference to governance 
of the early stages of human life, there are other aspects of this history that, 
for example, direct us to consider the gendering effects on women’s lives, 
and it is thus important to note that there are different ways in which history 
can be told.46 This research tells history from the perspective of law’s 
engagement with the embryo, with a view to exploring the origins of the 
legal embryo (i.e. the embryo in law), as an entity distinct from the legal 
foetus; the beginnings of which are intertwined with evolving understandings 
of the early stages of human life at the time.  
 
Second, it is important to be clear, at this stage, that the legal demarcation 
of ‘stages’ of human life might be seen as categorical, and thus anti-
processual. 47  This is not untrue. Nonetheless, a key point about the 
development of these ‘categories’, for this thesis, is that it (eventually) 
moved law towards recognising, increasingly, the transformative nature of 
gestation, and embryonic growth. Another key point, for this chapter, is that 
to some extent the processual nature of the embryo (in vivo) has historically 
been central to law and legal development. As the next section shall discuss, 
                                            
46 To echo Sheelagh McGuinness and Michael Thompson ‘Medicine and abortion law: 
complicating the reforming profession’ (2015) 23(2) Medical Law Review 177, 199.  
47 See Chapter 1, subsection 4.3 for the definition of ‘process’ for the purposes of this work. 






the origins of legal demarcation between different ‘stages’ of development 
go as far back as the 13th century in the UK.  
 
Third, ‘the embryo’, as an entity, was relatively rarely mentioned in law until 
the inception of the 1990 Act, although prior laws did govern what we would 
now call ‘the embryonic stages of life’. For these reasons, the following 
section looks at the law’s navigation of changing scientific and social 
perceptions of what we might term ‘embryos’ and ‘foetuses’ today, until a 
legal distinction was made between these two entities emerged. While this 
work recognises that ‘embryos’ and ‘foetuses’ are commonly considered 
different biological 48  entities, legally, socially, and scientifically, the 
demarcation lines between the two remain somewhat blurred, particularly 
historically. Thus, with the absence of a historical distinction between the 
two, where both were often referred to as ‘the child’, in this first section I use 
these terms interchangeably where historical legal distinction has not been 
made, and where such fluid terminology was also used. Relatedly, it is 
important to note that the embryo in utero is relevant for the purposes of this 
chapter in order to provide a holistic overview of the frameworks from which 
our present one was borne. Nonetheless, as this thesis is primarily 
concerned with the embryo in vitro and the regulation of the earliest stages 
of human life, in later sections the working definition of ‘embryo’ (at least in 
terms of demarcating it from a foetus) shall be the early stages of human life 
as regulated by the 1990 Act.49  
 
                                            
48 This may be considered as different from whether or not considers embryos and foetuses 
to be morally distinct entities.  
49 It is important to note the purpose of this is not to imply that a clear differentiation should 
be made between the two stages of growth, but to provide some descriptive clarity for the 
reader. Biologically, there may be some crossover with current definitions of the foetus, but 
as there is no clear legal distinction between the two entities, it would not be useful for this 
thesis to attempt to make one at this juncture.   
 





Fourth, while this chapter discusses process, and the development of 
regulatory frameworks therein, the use of this word should not be taken to 
imply that these developments were a form of progress, or indeed, 
‘progressive’. As the below shall show, many legal developments 
throughout history may be described, for some, as anti-progressive, 
particularly for the reproductive rights of women.  
 
Thus, overall, Chapter 2 shows: 
 
• That looking purely at contemporary debates in this field would give 
an incomplete picture of processual regulation and;  
• That we need a historical perspective to understand that process 
matters for the regulation of the early stages of human life.  
 
Before we turn to the chronological tracing, the next subsection provides a 
brief background on ‘quickening’, a key biological moment for law from the 




The basis of English and Scots laws governing the early stages of human life, 
in both civil and criminal contexts, may be found in a concept used in early 
Christian religious philosophy, ‘quickening.’ To explain, the term 
‘quickening’, per its use in law, was derived from the ecclesiastical 
distinction between an embryo formatus, and an embryo informatus;50 based 
on the belief that there is a difference between embryos that had ‘animated’ 
                                            
50 Bernard Dickens, Abortion and the Law (MacGibbon and Kee, 1996); Glanville Williams, 
The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Knopf, 1957). 






(began to move within the womb), and thus had a ‘soul’ (and could therefore 
be baptised) and those that had not. ‘Quickening’, a term still used today, 
refers to the point in pregnancy at which the foetus became ‘animated’; in 
other words when the woman first felt the foetus’ movements in her womb. 
Throughout much of history, this stage of pregnancy has been of huge 
philosophical and practical importance to pregnant women: “in the days 
before blood tests and First Response kits, the quickening often provided 
the first reliable sign of a woman’s pregnancy.”51 For centuries, quickening 
remained as a legal and moral dividing line for when interference (resulting in 
termination) may (or may not) occur. The law thus started off, in reference to 
the embryo/foetus, by treating pregnancy in two stages.52 This is mirrored in 
Bracton’s distinction between a ‘formed’ foetus, and a ‘quickened’ foetus, in 
2.3 below. 
 
It is worth noting that, at a similar time to the development and use of 
‘quickening’ in UK law, ‘preformation’, a theory of the beginnings of human 
life, was commonly touted by scientists, particularly in the 18th century.53 The 
theory of preformation, in its original form, held that a ‘homunculus’ (pre-
formed person) was ‘planted’ in the woman during sexual intercourse, which 
then grew in size over nine months in her womb. 54 For preformationists, 
                                            
51 Ruth Graham, ‘The quickening: the momentous pregnancy event that became a relic’ 
(Slate, 29 May 2015) 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2015/05/the_quickening_the_momentous_
pregnancy_event_that_became_a_relic.html Accessed 30 August 2017. 
52 For clarificatory purposes: considering that mothers usually cannot feel movement until 
the 16-20 week stage, in the following sections reference to ‘quickening’ refers to a stage 
which we, today, would call the early stage life in the mother’s womb a ‘foetus’ and not an 
‘embryo’. 
53 Jane Maienschein, ‘Epigenesis and Preformationism’, (The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, first published 11 October 2015) 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/epigenesis/ Accessed 01 September 
2017. 
54 Alice Baxter, ‘Edmund B. Wilson as a Preformationist: Some Reasons for His Acceptance 
of the Chromosome Theory’ (1976) 9(1) Journal of the History of Biology 29, 30.  





biological growth was thus a matter of physical growth, not biological 
process. This contrasts with epigenesis:  
 
For Aristotle, the causes lie internal to the combined fluids rather than 
outside. An individual life begins when the male and female semen 
are brought together. This is an external action and it starts the 
individual developmental process in motion. From that point on, the 
process is internal and driven by internal causes. The process then 
leads to development of form of the individual’s type.55 
 
Thus, to contrast the theories, in one the woman is essentially an incubator, 
whereas the other recognises (at least more so) the essential role of the 
woman in embryonic process: with “[p]reformation, stability, and 
predictability stood on one side, with epigenesis, dynamic process, and 
change on the other.”56 While this theory is not referenced in Hansard at any 
point in parliamentary discussions on the embryo,57 it is highly possible that 
the rise and fall of preformation had a direct effect on the law. As we shall 
see below, the return of epigenesis in the 19th century coincided with the 
removal of the quickening distinction; in its place came a more processual 
legal approach.  
 
Moreover, it was not until the late 18th century that doctors started to learn 
more about the nature of the embryo/foetus pre-quickening,58 and eventually 
their cellular processes became clearer in the 19th century with advances in 
microscopy. Interestingly, Aristotle is also credited with the theory of 
                                            
55 Maienschein (n53). 
56 Ibid. 
57 This was researched via the Hansard website. The term was not present in any of the 
search results. This may be explained by the fact that the online records only go back to 
1803, by which time epigenesis was becoming more the commonly held scientific theory 
anyway.  
58 See below.   






epigenesis (the theory that an embryo evolves from cell differentiation), 59 the 
cellular theory commonly held today (albeit in a different form than 
Aristotle’s). Thus, preformation and epigenesis stood in stark contrast, until 
the latter was proven biologically60 accurate through experiments in the 19th 
century. 61  Until then, the law addressed scientific (and perhaps moral) 
uncertainty surrounding how we should treat embryos by providing no 
sanction against interference at this stage.  
 
2.3 Pre- 19th Century 
 
Henry of Bracton62 made one of the earliest recorded references to the 
relationship between early human life and the law in the UK. Writing in the 
13th Century, he posited that where a foetus had formed or quickened, 
terminating it while en ventre sa mere (‘in the mother’s womb’) was murder:63 
 
If one strikes a pregnant woman or gives her poison in order to 
procure an abortion, if the fetus is already formed or quickened, 
especially if it is quickened, he commits homicide.64 
 
It seems that for Bracton, causing the miscarriage of a foetus that had 
began moving was more morally and legally criminal than terminating a 
foetus that had formed, which occurs several weeks before quickening 
                                            
59 Maienschein (n53). 
60 Philosophically and/or metaphysically speaking, it is more complicated. See Maienschein 
(n53). 
61 Baxter (n54).  
62 Also known as Henry Bretton, Henry Bratton, and Henry de Bracton. 
63 Samuel Thorne (tr), Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, vol 2 (Belknap, 1968); 
Andrew Grubb, ‘Abortion law in England: the medicalization of a crime’, (1990) 18(1-
2) Journal of Law and Medical Ethics 146, 147. 
64 Thorne (n63) 341. 





(around week 8).65 Here lies once of the first instances of an attempt to 
account for process in law. While this was of course not explicit, one can 
infer from the use of quickening as a legal ‘marker’ that there was some 
degree of recognition of rapid growth and development of the early stages 
of life in utero. It might be counter argued that this was a matter of legal 
utility rather than an attempt to recognise process; as discussed above, it 
would have been difficult to know at this time whether or not a woman was 
pregnant before quickening. Nonetheless, I argue that ‘processual law’66 
here, and described below, does not have to be intended, or created with 
the purpose of being processual. Nor was it always entirely processual. 
Notably, it is the importance of the process of development for making, and 
amending law, that this thesis wishes to highlight.    
 
In 1641, Sir Edward Coke wrote that while the abortion of a foetus was a 
“great misprision,” it was “no murder.”67 He did, however, consider abortion 
worthy of criminal punishment:68  
 
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it 
in her wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the child dyeth in her 
body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is great misprision, 
and no murder; but if he childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, 
battery, or other cause, this is murder: for in law it is accounted a 
reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive. 
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In other words, at this time, terminating an unborn embryo/foetus was not 
‘murder’ at common law, yet still a punishable criminal offence. As of yet, 
‘the embryo’ had not emerged as a legally recognised entity. It was not 
granted legal protection at this stage, nor was it commonly referred to in law. 
It seems that the legal ‘marker’ at this time was based on what they ‘relied’ 
on as evidence (at least, what they thought they could rely on). It is unclear 
what was meant here by ‘born alive’, but from his discussion of the status of 
the ‘child’ in the womb in the sentence beforehand, we can glean that Coke 
was referring to ex utero, or ‘born’ children. This is interesting, for the 
purposes of this research, because this type of approach, to some extent, 
accounts for the processes that need to take place in utero before an 
embryo/foetus can be ‘born alive’. 
 
One of the earliest direct legal references to an ‘embryo’ in the UK may be 
found a short time after Coke’s writings, but in Scots law, in the case of The 
Town of Stirling v the Unfreemen in Falkirk and Kilsith from 1672:69  
 
That there is a great difference to be made between a law that never 
attained observance, and a law that once was observed, but has long 
lain in desuetude; the second is, indeed, a law, because it had once a 
perfect and a consummate being; the first is no better than an 
embryo, and deserves not the name of a law; and of this kind be the 
acts founded upon by the pursuers. That the regalities have 
possessed all these privileges immemorially.70 
 
To provide some context, the question before the court was whether a 
posthumous son could benefit from an estate, even if he was not included in 
the deceased’s will. Interestingly, it was held that he could. The above 
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phrase “no better than an embryo”71  arguably suggests that the court 
regarded embryos as less deserving of legal recognition than one that had 
been ‘observed’ (i.e. the pregnancy was visible). Growth in utero, to the 
point of physical visibility, had to have been observed, then, for the law to 
observe the foetus as deserving of its attention (here, retrospectively). 
Furthermore, it exemplifies understandings of embryonic/foetal growth’s 
effect on the physical, legal limits of proof at that time, where quickening still 
applied as both a civil and criminal law test.72 
 
Writing almost a century later, William Blackstone traced the historical 
evolution of abortion in common law, confirming the writings of those before 
him. Although his works were predominantly written in relation to civil rights 
and civil immunities, under the heading of the right of security, his 
commentary provides more insight into the legal status of the embryo at that 
time, and the preceding years: 
 
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every 
individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant 
is able to stir in the mother’s womb. For if a woman is quick with child, 
and by a potion, or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat 
her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a 
dead child; this, though not murder, was by the antient law homicide 
or manslaughter. But at present it is not looked upon in quite so 
atrocious a light, though it remains a very heinous misdemeanour. An 
infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother’s womb, is supposed in law 
to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a 
surrender of a copyhold estate made to it. It may have a guardian 
assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, 
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and to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually 
born. And in this point the civil law agrees with ours.73 
 
Stages in growth process, however demarcated, were thus important for 
criminal purposes. At this time (1765), and in contrast to earlier years, while 
the abortion of a quickened foetus was a criminal offence, it was not murder.  
 
Moreover, quickening evolved as a bright moral-legal line for other areas of 
criminal sanction, too. A few years later, in 1770, Blackstone wrote: 
 
Life begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir 
in the mother’s womb...to be saved from the gallows a woman must 
be quick with child- for barely with child, unless he be alive in the 
womb, is not sufficient.74 
 
The firm sanctions provided by criminal law thus intertwined with civil law to 
depict the physically apparent, quickened foetus as if it were ‘born’ for many 
legal purposes.75 Indeed, before the invention of ultrasound technology (in 
the 20th century, discussed below) it would be hard to know that an embryo 
was there, and in order to be guilty of procuring, or attempting to procure an 
abortion, mens rea was necessary.76 Similarly, intent to leave inheritance 
could not be presumed at that time where quickening had not occurred. In 
fact, at this time the law was more commonly concerned with the unborn 
‘child’ as a potential inheritor, than as a potential ‘victim’; the majority of 
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case law on unborn children at this time fell within the civil realm.77 The 
underlying presence of the criminal law remained nonetheless. Although 
Blackstone noted that abortion was no longer a very serious offence, the 
common law continued to take it as a lesser criminal, yet still “heinous”78 
criminal offence. In this manner, the more uncertain, less visible stage of life 
was not covered in law at this time. It seems that at this time, before early 
stage pregnancy was ascertainable by medicine, law’s way of dealing with 
uncertainty with regards to the embryo/foetus was not to attach any criminal 
offence. Only when the foetus’ presence was certain could an offence have 
occurred.  
 
To summarise the findings detailed above, the origins of legal protection of 
the early stages of human life in the UK date back as far as the 13th century, 
with ‘quickening’ acting as a bright legal and moral boundary. For centuries 
afterwards, this distinction stood fast, and became crystallised in our legal 
system through common law, and then through statutes. This crystallisation 
may be attributed to the low technical and physical visibility of the 
embryo/foetus during these times. The distinction between pre- and post-
quickening was evidently a demarcation that was important for law in the 
UK during the 17th and 18th centuries; it was treated as a bright moral and 
legal boundary. Although partus formatus was less commonly referred to at 
this time, pre-quickening and pre-partus formatus were thought to occur at 
a similar time, when the ‘whole body’ of the foetus has formed, usually in the 
third month.   
 
But how do these boundaries interact with processes? It seems, from the 
below (and Chapters 3 and 4), that legal boundaries, based on 
understandings of embryonic/foetal processes, were tallied with law’s 
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requirement for some sort of certainty with regards to what we can and 
cannot do (both criminally, and civilly).  
 
2.4 The 19th Century 
 
The early 1800s saw the introduction of stricter criminal sentences against 
interference with embryos/foetuses in vivo. It also witnessed the introduction 
of statutory frameworks on the matter, which provided more legal detail than 
previously. The sanctions attached to the pre- and post- quickening 
distinction of the 17th and early 18th centuries were reinstated by one of the 
first Acts of English law which gave status to what we would now refer to as 
the foetus (then ‘child’), Lord Ellenborough’s Act 1803 (‘the 1803 Act’).79 
While causing the termination of a pregnancy did not constitute murder in 
and of itself under the statute, it rendered an indented act of causing or 
performing an abortion one that was punishable by death.80 Under s1, a 
death penalty was prescribed where an abortion was attempted or 
performed post-quickening. Otherwise, s2 prescribed ‘transportation’81 for 
fourteen years. In other words, the 1803 Act differentiated between 
procurement, or attempts to procure an abortion, before and after 
‘quickening’.  
 
The Offences Against the Person Act 1828 (‘OAP Act 1828’)82 repealed the 
1803 Act in its consolidation of offences against the person, and once again, 
prescribed the death penalty for post-quickening abortions83 (pre-quickening 
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abortions were still not deemed an offence). While s2 of the 1803 Act 
punished only to procure abortion via the use of instruments or tools, the 
OAP Act 1828 extended this prohibition on post-quickening abortion to 
include efforts carried out by any means. Sir Robert Peel, who steered 
Lansdowne’s Act through the House of Commons, declared that the 
purpose of the Bill was to clarify and simplify the frameworks, and that its 
contents were considered desirable by “persons whose knowledge of the 
subject and experience entitled their opinions to credit and respect.”84 Thus, 
as (relatively) modern medicine grew as a discipline, law seemingly turned 
its attention to it increasingly.85  
 
Capital punishment for attempting to procure or causing post-quickening 
abortions was not repealed until the OAP Act 1837. The objective of the 
OAP Act 1837 was to render the law relating to offences against the person 
more lenient, thereby facilitating enforcement.86 Interestingly, this Act also 
revoked the enduring distinction between pre- and post-quickening 
abortions. Section 6 of the OAP Act 1837 replaced this section of the OAP 
Act 1828, and abolished the death penalty for abortions ‘post-quickening’. 
While an offence under the new Act no longer prescribed capital punishment, 
the penalties remained harsh. Section 8 of the OAP Act 1828 prescribed 
hard labour, and solitary confinement as punishments. Now, ‘causing 
miscarriage’ at any stage of pregnancy was a punishable offence. Thus, as 
technological perceptions of the foetus became clearer (visibly and 
physically), quickening was gradually replaced by other, earlier stages of 
pregnancy.  For example, the stethoscope was invented a few years 
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beforehand by Laennec, and became widely adopted by physicians; it was 
used to perceive movement, and the heartbeat of the foetus, within the 
mother’s womb. 87  In the dissolution of the pre- and post-quickening 
distinction, it seems that legal protection had been extended to all stages of 
pregnancy, including what we would call ‘the embryo’ today. Thus, the early 
stages of human life in vivo were protected in law from conception (as long 
as it could be proved that the woman was pregnant, see Rex v Scudder 
182888). Apparently the reasoning behind this change was the subjectivity of 
the criterion for ‘quickening’,89 which as aforementioned is based on the 
woman’s first perception of foetal movement. 
 
To provide some analysis, as pregnancy became a more medicalised 
process90 (and less of a religious ‘event’), which seemingly resulted in the 
medicalisation of abortion law, quickening dissolved as a bright moral and 
legal limit, and the law began to move toward the (relatively) more gradualist 
approach we have today. The medicalisation of pregnancy coincided with 
increased visual knowledge of early stages of human life (e.g. post-mortem 
experimentation revealed that male and female embryos do not develop at 
different rates in 1723).91 Nonetheless, as we have seen, while the harshness 
of sanctions against the termination of pregnancy declined with the rise of 
medicine, the law became increasingly restrictive at the same time. The 
disappearance of ‘quickening’ from the OAP Act 1837 suggests that the 
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appeals of obstetricians and doctors at the time did not go unnoticed.92 
Remarkably, a survey revealed that there was no accepted consensus that 
quickening marked the start of foetal life in the areas of obstetrics and 
medical jurisprudence.93 As far back as 1794, there have been recorded 
medical claims that there is no difference between pre- and post-quickening 
‘child’, aside from its growing size.94 Medical opinion at that time, and 
preceding it, thus undermined the significance which law (and lay opinion) 
ascribed to quickening.95 Nonetheless, as shown below, the law eventually 
caught up with this approach.  
 
Several years later, the OAP Act 1861 wholly repealed the OAP Act 1837. 
Until the OAP Act 1861, it was unclear whether it constituted an offence for 
a woman to commit self-abortion. The new Act confirmed the tripartite 
features of the ruling in R v Goodhall (1846):96 (1) that pregnancy was not 
necessary for an offence to have occurred where committed by a third party; 
(2) the prohibition of self-abortion; and (3) the offence of obtaining or 
supplying means commonly known as intended to procure a miscarriage.97 
The law had thus gradually developed in a manner that increased its 
restriction on abortion through the medium of criminal law, following the 
incorporation of predominant medical consensus of the time. 98  While 
punishments were relatively less ‘extreme’, the breadth of sanctions, and 
possible perpetrators (including the woman herself), broadened.  
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Medical professional interests and development have significantly shaped 
the landscape of abortion law in England, Wales, and Scotland.99  The 
medicalisation of pregnancy 100  thus became consolidated through the 
criminal law. But was the advance of the medical profession the most 
prevalent drive for legislative changes over the years? And what does this 
have to do with processual law, if anything? Do medicine and process go 
hand-in-hand? I argue that while this is not necessarily the case, medicine 
(to some degree) furthers our understanding of process. Whether these 
understandings are correct, or further, interpreted in law ‘progressively’ is 
another thing. One might say that as the boundaries of proof in this area 
have changed, so too have our attitudes toward the foetus and embryo. Or 
are these changes singularly associated with advances in medical 
understandings? Perhaps, but considering apparent lack of medical 
consensus in the late 1700s and early 1800s on quickening being the 
defining moment in becoming ‘with child’, it must be questioned whether 
there is more to this. Whilst the embryo/foetus has been set against the hard 
sanction that the criminal law represents, the criminal law, whether 
attempting to consolidate and clarify (like Ellenborough and Lansdowne), 
facilitate prosecution (1837), or consolidate and confirm the common law 
(1861), has increased levels of punishment (albeit while removing capital 
punishment) against intent to procure, or successfully procure abortion.  
 
While the years preceding the 20th century gradually extended laws 
governing the embryo/foetus, and attached the criminal law to the regulation 
of the early stages of human life, it has arguably laid a path for legal process, 
and made way for the incorporation of social considerations into the law. 
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Arguably, we have seen evidence that law began to leave behind the 
question of ‘when does life begin to matter?’ and started to think about the 
broader network of actors in early-life processes (importantly, the perceived 
interests of women, albeit in a relatively minor way). It is of particular 
significance to reiterate that process and progress are not synonymous. 
Indeed, the increasingly severe range of punishments for termination of 
pregnancy was not necessarily progressive.101 While it may be described as 
such in one sense, in that capital punishment was removed as a sanction, 
the growth of criminal law (and thus range of crimes and possible 
perpetrators) in this area may not necessarily be seen as ‘progress’. Process 
and progress thus do not necessarily make easy bedfellows. Nonetheless, a 
move away from a legal boundary with quickening, toward legally 
encompassing all stages of pregnancy is, in and of itself, processual. On the 
other hand, one boundary was just replaced with another; binding the early 
stages of human life seems to have been the predominant legal response to 
embryonic processes from the outset. While this might sound 
counterintuitive per a ‘processual’ approach, delineating stages of growth 
undoubtedly recognises development.  
 
As mentioned above, towards the end of this century, preformationism was 
abandoned in favour of epigenesis, given the rapid advances in microscopy 
that occurred at that time. 102  While the law had not yet reached the 
‘gradualist’ approach of the amended Abortion Act 1967, and the 1990 Act 
(as amended) today, the removal of the quickening distinction arguably 
reflected increased awareness that pregnancy, and embryonic/foetal growth 
was a process, not a sudden (and perhaps not even divine) ‘event’. New 
modes of visibility, beyond foetal movements (such as some of the first 
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post-mortem experimentations on pregnant women, and the discovery that 
male and female embryos develop at the same rate) drove law to react to 
new understandings of embryonic/foetal processes. Overall, it seems that 
law began to change rapidly with the explosion of experimental science, and 
new technologies in the late 19th and (as we shall see next) 20th centuries. 
Until then ‘quickening’, preformation, (and other theories of 
conception/growth that we do not rely on today, such as formation)103 stood 
as moral, legal, and scientific navigators of the uncertainty that went with 
conception and embryonic/foetal growth. The use of experimental 
techniques and the advances in microscopy (and the increased knowledge 
of embryonic/foetal development that came with that) in the 19th century 
were arguably mirrored in law with amendments to the way that stages of 
embryonic/foetal growth were depicted in law.  
 
2.5 The 20th Century 
 
As we have seen, the common law’s insistence upon only extending 
protection to a “reasonable creature in being”104 limited the old criminal 
law’s protection of the foetus/embryo.105  Up until the late 20th century, 
Parliament added to the common law through a patchwork of statutory 
provisions, and in doing so provided “some semblance of protection for the 
fetus at various stages in development.”106 
 
With the advancement of science, ‘quickening’ was gradually used less and 
less in civil and criminal legal rhetoric, and replaced by other markers such 
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as viability, the ‘moments’ of which have become far more ‘visible’. Under 
the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (‘ILP Act’),107 procuring or attempting 
to procure an abortion was no longer a criminal offence, as long as it was 
carried out for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother, and in good 
faith. Nonetheless, it was deemed illegal in all other circumstances to 
terminate a viable foetus ‘capable of being born alive.’ Viability,108 as a legal 
boundary was thus enshrined in the ILP Act at 28 weeks, 4 weeks later than 
previous law (as advances had been made in science at the time, meaning 
the foetus was presumed viable at a later stage).109 
 
In 1939, the landmark case of R v Bourne, marked the way for the later 
Abortion Act 1967 (‘1967 Act’). Here it was held that a doctor might lawfully 
perform an abortion, despite s58 of the then OAP Act 1861.110 In this case, a 
young girl was raped and became pregnant. Her doctor, Bourne, performed 
an abortion on her and then turned himself into the police. In the trial, 
Macnaughten J upheld Bourne’s defence that the indictment for abortion 
should be altered to include the word ‘unlawful’, so that the Crown would 
have to establish that the defendant’s use of an ‘instrument’ was ‘unlawful’. 
In his summary, Macnaughten J distinguished between a skilful surgeon 
performing openly and “charitably,” and the private termination of 
pregnancy for gain by an “unskilled operator.”111 He also rejected the view 
that there was a clear line between health and danger to one’s life; that life 
could be greatly hindered by one’s health.112 The law at the time has been 
described as lying between those who wanted women to be able to have 
abortions, and religious views that it should never be performed, to which 
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end it was only allowed in order to preserve the mother’s life. Here we can 
see an incorporation of social justice aims into a judgment, which the law 
has continued to do.113 It should be noted that although Bourne is widely 
regarded as having carved the legal landscape in this area, there is 
disagreement amongst legal commentary on the extent to which Bourne can 
be read as a momentous liberalisation on the law on abortion.114 It has thus 
not been lauded by all as a victory for social considerations, per the 
perceived interests of the woman. 115  While an explicit provision for 
‘therapeutic abortion’ may have been absent from the OAP Act 1861, in 
reality this procedure was regularly performed on women at the time 
nonetheless, and precedent for this gradually extended in case law up until 
its cementation in the Bourne case. Here we see the introduction of 
gradated approach to criminal sanctions at early stages of human life, 
gradating the process of embryonic/foetal evolution in utero. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it does not say anything about embryo in vitro (thus 
far), but, importantly; it informs us about the nature of law’s evolution with 
regards to incorporating the processes of the early stages of human life.  
 
After Bourne, the scope of therapeutic abortion was extended further in R v 
Bergmann and Ferguson,116 and R v Newton and Stungo,117 to respectively 
include the honesty of a doctor’s belief as a defence, and considerations of 
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the woman’s physical and mental health. Nonetheless, the effect of these 
cases, and the ILP Act was that the termination of an embryo/foetus was a 
criminal offence, save in certain circumstances where the life or health of the 
mother was at stake. The strongest legal protection was given to a viable 
foetus under the ILP Act, the termination of which was a criminal offence in 
any circumstance. 
 
Physiological visibility was eventually replaced by technical visibility when 
engineer Tom Brown and obstetrician Ian Donald developed the first 
ultrasound machine, first used in Glasgow in 1956.118 Further advances were 
made in the 1950s in molecular biology, when the DNA helical structure was 
discovered.119 This led to the emergence of developmental biology, which 
studies the correlations between genetics and the embryo’s morphological 
development.  
 
Some years later, the 1967 Act cemented the Bourne,120 Bergmann,121 and 
Newton122 cases, as the first statute relating to the early stages of human life 
to have territorial extent over Scotland, in addition to England and Wales. 
The grounds for abortion are set out in ss1(1) and (2) of the 1967 Act. Similar 
to before, no explicit reference was made to the ‘embryo’ in this statute, 
which clearly maintained that the termination of an embryo/foetus at any 
stage was illegal, save in certain prescribed circumstances.123 It is worth 
noting that while the 1967 Act has clearly been shaped by evolving medical 
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opinion,124 the extent to which the 1967 Act, even in its updated form, acts 
as a permissive piece of social legislation has been questioned by some. For 
example, Sheldon argues that the primary purpose and consequence of the 
1967 Act was not to promote the reproductive autonomy of women, but 
instead to found a more “rigorous and subtle system of medical control over 
women’s fertility.”125  
 
At this time, a link still existed between this Act and the ILP Act, and from 28 
weeks, the foetus was legally protected in almost all circumstances.126 It is 
worth noting that in terms of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 
1976,127 the law provided a degree of retrospective protection to the embryo 
in vivo. Under this law, damages could be awarded as a result of injury to 
the embryo/foetus in utero caused by the negligent actions of third party 
(although ‘embryo’ was not explicitly mentioned in this Act either). This was 
part of a network of frameworks at play, a facet of the law that remains 
today with the co-existence of frameworks like the 1967 Act and the 1990 
Act, notwithstanding the case law (all discussed in Chapter 3). 
 
Overall, up until the end of the 20th century the term ‘embryo’ had little 
mention in law. Despite this, it was protected for much of history, 
particularly after the quickening distinction was dissolved in the 19th century. 
Quickening thus acted as a legal limit, which reflected knowledge of the time 
around the way in which embryos/foetuses in utero evolve. 
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This chapter has shown that process is a central facet of regulating the 
embryo in the UK, historically speaking. It is nonetheless worth noting that 
the scientific, visual experiences of the embryo that were relayed to society 
shaped the law throughout medico-legal history. It is important to consider 
that visibility will not have been the only factor in legal change here. Religion 
and politics, amongst other things, are likely to have played a significant role. 
These, however, do not necessarily detract from the fundamental role of the 
embryo’s scientific visibility (i.e. the relative visibility of its developmental 
processes) in shaping all of this. 
 
From the above, we can see that the processual nature of law lay in the fact 
that regulation commenced by asking ‘when does life begin to matter?’ Over 
history, the goal posts marking out legal boundaries on this have shifted in 
accordance with scientific, religious, and social changes. These posts might 
have shifted based on a number of things, however the issue for this work is 
not what caused the shifts in posts, but more where these limits shifted to. 
Law always became processual, relative to the social, scientific and religious 
limits at the time, having made judgment on what ‘matters’ based on what 
was known at the time, i.e. they believed that at the ‘quickening’ stage of 
the process, a mother can feel foetal movement and/or the pregnancy is 
physically visible. 
 
With the rise of science and technical visibility, the legal boundary of 
quickening was removed. No longer did the law only protect the foetus after 
the woman first felt its movements; instead the whole process of pregnancy 






fell within the ambit of its protection.128 The above frameworks have not 
necessarily been hailed as historical advances in the law, but rather a step 
back that further criminalised women, and gave protection to the very early 
stages of human life in the womb. Therefore, a key aspect of the relation 
between law and process that this change in law articulates, for the purpose 
of this thesis, is the turbulent relationship between process and progress. 
Nonetheless, the changes beyond the original framework for ‘quickening’ 
was certainly progress towards what we have now; the ILP Act was the first 
time in the UK’s legal history that embryonic stages in vivo were protected in 
law (although not by name).  
 
To summarise, further advances in medicine began to change legal 
boundaries even further. Quickening was replaced by foetal viability, which 
was enshrined in law by the ILP Act 1929, at 28 weeks (later reduced to 24 
weeks in the 1990 Act’s amendments to the 1967 Act). By the 1950s, 
science had advanced even further; ultrasound had been invented and the 
helical structure of DNA was discovered. With these advances, the 
processual nature of the early stages of human life was more visible than 
ever. For the first time, we could see images of the embryo/foetus growing 
within the mother’s womb. Shortly after these advances came the 1967 Act, 
which, despite its flaws was a socially progressive piece of legislation 
relative to the laws of its kind that had come before it. While this Act did not 
explicitly recognise ‘the embryo’ (at this stage in time, there was probably 
little need to), as a progressive piece of legislation it was more processual 
than those that had come before it. Here, the relative moral value of the 
foetus was reflected in law, as a factor directly intertwined with the physical 
and/or mental health of the woman (or its hypothetical future health). To 
explain, the law’s processual nature lay in the fact that it made persistent 
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effort to account for the processual nature of embryos/foetuses, although, 
as we have seen, this has not necessarily always resulted in ‘progressive’ 
law.  
 
Overall, such a tracing has demonstrated how much the embryo’s 
‘visibility’129 has affected what it ‘is’ over time (socially, and legally). Visibility 
has been a key link to social and biological understanding of process, and 
the law has evolved at relatively regular intervals in history to reflect this. 
While the very early stages of human life are not visible to the human eye, 
modern science has allowed us to see and understand early life more than 
ever. Medical professional, legal, and social attitudes have thus changed. 
The law has evolved from protection of the embryo/foetus at a later stage, to 
protecting the embryo/foetus throughout gestation, to similar protections 
with exceptions based upon ‘social considerations’, to the present legal 
governance and protection of the embryo that starts where an egg is in the 
process of fertilisation (albeit only in vitro). This reveals an interesting feature 
of embryo governance: with the emergence of technological ‘visibility’ of the 
embryo, the criminal limits to proving pregnancy have changed, and 
eventually ebbed away. There is something curious about the concurrent 
relative increase in legal protections for the early stages of life, and 
increasing incorporation of ‘social considerations’ into the same laws. The 
criminal and civil laws in this area has thus been relative to our 
understanding; that is, a relative reflection of our knowledge of biological 
process, to some extent.  
 
To summarise the findings and arguments within this first chapter, brief 
analysis of historical legal developments in this field reveal deeper 
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understandings of law and society’s relationship with embryos in vitro, 
namely that: 
 
• Process has been historically important for law, regarding the 
regulation of embryos/foetuses. Historically doing something of 
course does not always mean we should continue doing it, but if 
one sees it as a positive facet of law making in this area, and 
enabling the symbiotic relationship between law, science, and 
society, then law ought to reflect this appreciation of processes. 
 
As revealed further by analysis in the next chapter, key elements can be 
distilled, from law’s evolution in this area, that appear in the framework we 
have now. This history was arguably an important precursor to the 1990 
regime, particularly with regard to law’s ‘boundary work’130 surrounding the 
early stages of human life. 
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3.   ‘The Embryo’ in Law Today 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
As the previous chapter has shown, law making and process have evolved 
hand in hand with respect to the early stages of human life. This Chapter 
continues from the last, and in doing so it argues two claims: 1) That the 
1990 Act (as amended) has processual aspects, yet 2) There are ways in 
which it could further embrace process. To build the case for these claims, 
this chapter summarises the present regulatory framework governing the 
embryo in vitro, with particular reference to its legal status. It traces some of 
the key arguments put forward in the Warnock Report relating to the 
embryo’s status, their enactment in law, and subsequent amendments of 
the framework. It finds that, like its historical counterparts,131 elements of a 
processual legal approach may be found.  
 
3.2 The Warnock Report 
 
In 1984, the Warnock Committee published the Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 132  also known as the 
Warnock Report. The following subsections summarise the key issues 
tackled by the Committee in relation to the embryo’s ethico-legal status. 
This has been done with a view to demonstrating the ethical and legal 
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deliberation that took place as a precursor to regulating the embryo in vitro. 
This deliberative process, though not necessarily without flaw,133 was an 
essential part of law making in this area. It arguably brought legal and 
scientific practice out of uncertainty (i.e. due to the lack of a statutory 
framework for IVF pre-1990), to a new state of being where embryos can be 
used, legally, for reproductive and research purposes under certain 
prescribed circumstances.  
 
3.2.1 Background: the ethics of regulating the embryo in vitro 
 
In the late 1970s, the embryo was thrust into legal, bioethical, and public 
debate when Louise Brown became the first child born because of in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF). Science could now track and observe some of the earliest 
stages of human life entirely outside of the human body. Embryos, newly 
visible134 to scientists and society, also became clearly visible as existing at 
the margins of what we commonly conceive to be ‘human’. Embryos in vitro 
thus embodied different hopes and fears for people.135 As a result, new 
horizons in the fields of reproduction and research were revealed, and 
diverse perspectives took shape around these possibilities. 
 
While embryo research created new realms of possibility for some, this 
advancement came coupled with concerns over the rapid advance of 
science, and the ‘slippery slope’ to morally undesirable practices. 136 
Scepticism about the moral acceptability of assisted conception, and, in 
particular, research on embryos – necessarily involving the creation and 
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destruction of embryos for such purposes – led to several attempts at 
barring embryo disposal.137  
 
In 1982, against this backdrop of public emotion and uncertainty, the UK 
government established the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology (‘The Warnock Committee’). Baroness Mary Warnock, a 
philosopher, headed the Warnock Committee, which consisted of 
academics, legal, and medical professionals. They were assigned by the 
government to consider: 
 
Recent and potential developments in medicine and science related to 
human fertilisation and embryology; to consider what policies and 
safeguards should be applied, including consideration of the social, 
ethical, and legal implications of these developments; and to make 
recommendations.138  
 
This Committee was the first of its kind to consider the legal, social, and 
ethical implications of scientific developments in human fertilisation and 
embryology. In particular, its remit was to consider the permissibility of 
using embryos in such techniques, as well as the nature of the embryo itself. 
To provide some background, the Report’s foreword begins with the 
following: 
 
Our Inquiry was set up to examine, among other things, the ethical 
implications of new developments in the field. In common usage, the 
word “ethical” is not absolutely unambiguous. It is often used in the 
context, for example, of medical or legal ethics, to refer to 
professionally acceptable practice. We were obliged to interpret the 
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concept of ethics in a less restricted way. We had to direct our 
attention not only to future practice and possible legislation, but also 
to the principles on which such practices and such legislation would 
rest.139 
 
In their Foreword, the Committee gave a clear nod to the potential for future 
change in the uses of embryos in vitro, and the regulation of those practices 
in this area. Interestingly, the Committee made clear here that they aimed to 
set up the fundamental pillars that would endure throughout these scientific 
and legal changes, without reference to potential change in ‘ethics’ (in their 
reference to the principles on which future legislation would rest). Whether 
this was intentional is unclear. The Foreword then refers to the social 
consensus at the time, which was that the law requires governance by 
“some principles or other,”140 and that some lines should be drawn in this 
field which must not be crossed. They emphasise the societal sentiment at 
the time, that there should be limits to these practices, without which, we 
would be “a society without moral scruples.”141 The Committee thus stated 
that:  
 
People generally want some principles or other to govern the 
development and use of the new techniques. There must be some 
barriers that are not to be crossed, some limits fixed, beyond which 
people must not be allowed to go.142 
 
In order to alleviate concerns surrounding where such techniques may lead 
in the future, the committee recommended that a licensing body be 
established to monitor embryo research. In answer to this, the Human 
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Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) was later established under 
the 1990 Act, an independent regulator of the use of gametes for 
reproduction, and embryos for treatment and research.143 This body ensures 
that those whom they have licensed144 may store and use embryos in a 
manner that is consistent with the 1990 Act. While it has the authority to 
make these licensing decisions, it does not have the power to license any 
practice clearly outwith their remit, as provided by the same Act. Today, it 
represents the longest established regulator of human embryo research in 
the world.145 
 
3.2.2 How to regulate the embryo in vitro 
 
The Report was evidently written with an absence of moral consensus in 
mind, as the Committee was careful to emphasise early on that consensus 
was near impossible to reach. Nonetheless, in answer to this problem they 
also recognised the importance of legislation as a benchmark for societal 
moral standards. To quote extensively from the Warnock Report’s foreword: 
 
In recognising that there should be limits, people are bearing witness 
to the existence of a moral ideal of society. But in our pluralistic 
society it is not to be expected that any one set of principles can be 
enunciated to be completely accepted by everyone. This is not to say 
that the enunciating of principles is arbitrary, or that there is no 
shared morality whatever. The law itself, binding on everyone in 
society, whatever their beliefs, is the embodiment of a common moral 
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position. It sets out a broad framework for what is morally acceptable 
within society. Another philosopher put it thus: “The reasons that lead 
a reflective man to prefer one…legal system to another must be 
moral reasons: that is he must find his reasons in some order of 
priority of interests and activities, in the kind of life that he praises and 
admires”. In recommending legislation, then, we are recommending a 
kind of society that we can, all of us: praise and admire, even if, in 
detail, we may individually wish that it were different. Within the broad 
limits of legislation there is room for different, and perhaps much 
more stringent, moral rules. What is legally permissible may be 
thought of as the minimum requirement for a tolerable society. 
Individuals or communities may voluntarily adopt standards that are 
more exacting. It has been our business, however, to recommend 
how the broad framework should be established, within our particular 
area of concern.146  
 
Herein lies one of the key issues for this thesis. Indeed, there is no untruth to 
the above; the law sets out a broad framework for what is morally 
acceptable in society, 147  and it did so with this Act. But how, legally 
speaking, is it practical to continue with a legal framework centred around a 
singular ‘special status’ for the embryo, when it implicitly morally 
demarcates types of embryos, namely those used for reproduction and 
those used for research? As this thesis aims to show over Parts 2 and 3, a 
case may be made for legally harnessing the processual nature of embryo 
regulation (with its multiple, not unitary, processes). This is not to critique 
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the approach of the report at the time; indeed, the text specifically 
recognises the unpredictability of future science.148   
 
Notably, before the 1990 Act came into force, the human embryo had no 
legal status per se.149 It did not have legal personhood, nor did it have a right 
to life. Nonetheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, certain laws 
were in place, such as the 1967 Act, which accorded the embryo/foetus in 
utero certain protections. The Report noted this, and suggested that while 
they did not recommend that embryos be afforded the same status as 
children or adults:  
 
11.17...The status of the embryo is a matter of fundamental principle 
which should be enshrined in legislation. We recommend that the 
embryo of the human species should be afforded some protection in 
law… 
11.18 That protection should exist does not entail that this protection 
may not be waived in certain specific circumstances. Having 
examined the evidence presented to us about the types of research 
which might be carried out on human embryos produced in vitro, the 
majority of us hold that such research should not be totally prohibited. 
We do not want to see a situation in which human embryos are 
frivolously or unnecessarily used in research but we are bound to 
take account of the fact that the advances in the treatment of 
infertility, which we have discussed in the earlier part of this report, 
could not have taken place without such research; and that continued 
research is essential, if advances in treatment and medical 
knowledge are to continue. A majority of us therefore agreed that 
research on human embryos should continue. Nevertheless, because 
                                            
148 Warnock Report (n25) 1.5.  
149 Ibid 11.16. 





of the special status that we accord to the human embryo, such 
research must be subject to stringent controls and monitoring.150 
 
The Report did not explain, however, what this ‘special status’ entails, nor 
did it signify its philosophical source.151 This is not to say that this ‘status’ 
was not justified at the time, on some level, as a kind of ‘comfort blanket’ in 
the socio-political climate of the time. The status was seemingly put forward 
as a safeguard upon the slippage of that research into ‘frivolous’152 territories. 
The committee refers to this in the next section of their report, where they 
emphasise that a precise time limit of the development of an embryo in vitro 
was required “in order to allay public anxiety.”153 They took the view that the 
‘primitive streak’154 was the best marker in development to place a time limit, 
as it “marks the beginning of individual development of the embryo.”155 
Interestingly, on the creation of embryos for research, some members felt 
that there was a “clear moral distinction between the research use of 
embryos available by chance… and embryos brought into being for the 
purposes of research alone and where there is no question of their being 
transferred into a woman.”156 The Committee nonetheless recommended 
that, as this should be controlled by legislation, an embryo in vitro may be 
the subject of research “whatever its provenance”, up to the 14 days after 
fertilisation took place.157 At the time, most authorities put the development 
of the streak at about fifteen days after fertilisation.158 The Committee also 
noted that they were satisfied that ‘spare’ embryos “may be used as 
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subjects for research”, as long as informed consent was gained from the 
couple for whom the embryo was generated. 159  Here, we see the 
introduction of a new boundary, joining the other boundaries attributed to 
the embryo/foetus in law up to this time.160 In some ways, the ‘primitive 
streak’ is the Committee’s own version of ‘quickening’. After all, law has 
replaced one boundary with another to reflect changing consensuses 
(medical, ethical, social, and so on) regarding the early stages of human life. 
Perhaps unwittingly, this seems to follow previous legal trends toward 
delineating stages in the growth process with bright legal lines. 
 
In the end, the Report took, broadly speaking, a utilitarian approach to its 
recommendations and deliberations.161 Baroness Warnock later spoke of 
this approach in 2007, where she observed: 
 
At the centre of the moral thinking behind the 1990 Act was broad 
utilitarianism…As legislators, parliamentarians have to be utilitarian in 
the broadest possible sense…On the committee, we thought that 
utilitarianism in this broad sense was the philosophy that must lie 
behind any legislation- weighing up harms against benefits.162 
 
The Report did not explicitly answer the question of “when does life begin to 
matter morally,” but rather considered the viewpoints submitted and 
“provide[d] the human embryo with a special status without actually defining 
that moral status.”163 Nonetheless, the Committee can be understood as 
implicitly having answered the latter question, by allowing research up to a 
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certain stage in development.164 In other words, they prescribed that “as the 
embryo develops, it should receive greater legal protection due to its 
increasing moral value and potential.”165 This policy, known as the gradualist 
approach, is somewhat in line with the Abortion Act 1967, which affords 
more protection to the foetus as it reaches later stages in development166 
(although in other ways these laws do not align at all). This in and of itself 
may be described as recognising the processual (albeit not necessarily 
progressively so, see 2.1 above). It seems that it was important for the 
Committee that such an approach continue. This was not mentioned 
explicitly, but is implicit in its efforts to replicate a somewhat gradualist 
approach that recognises embryonic development (and any ‘significant’ 
markers within it).  
 
The rhetoric of the Warnock Report was processual in many ways. Further, 
with its reconsideration of law, and its underpinning principles, it brought the 
embryo in vitro (and its uses) out of the uncertainty it had previously been 
shrouded in, in the 1970s. The Report, operationalised within the resulting 
1990 Act (discussed below), provided boundaries and parameters on 
reproductive and research practices concerning the embryo. Yet, as the rest 
of this chapter will show, notwithstanding the processual legal efforts of the 
past, the processuality of law (whether reconsidering it, evolving, or moving 
boundaries) has slowly halted, particularly after the 2008 amendments.167 
Now, over 30 years since the Warnock Report was published, its influence 
remains strong within our legislative framework on human fertilisation and 
embryology.168 
It is evident that an issue for the Committee was how to regulate such a 
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controversial field, where a plurality of views exists on the matter. The 
Committee thus reviewed a wide range of evidence from a variety of groups, 
bodies, and persons. In her 2015 article, Natasha Hammond-Browning 
explored and discussed this evidence, upon which the Committee’s 
recommendations (and thus subsequent law) were based.169 This article was 
one of the first of this kind on this topic. From Hammond-Browning’s 
examination of the evidence submitted,170 she found that two central ethical 
questions emerged: “When does life begin to matter morally”? and “Should 
we permit research upon human embryos?”171 It seems that both fed into 
their central query: how should we regulate embryos? Noting that there was 
little consensus in the submissions, and notwithstanding that consensus is 
unlikely to ever be reached on this matter; Hammond-Browning divided the 
evidence in favour of or in opposition to embryo research into nine different 
headings (each of which she discussed in turn).172 On this basis, she found 
that the diversity of views on the matter, contained in submitted evidence, 
made reaching consensus a serious challenge for the Committee.  
 
The Report was quite explicit that it was not going to tackle questions of the 
meaning of human ‘life’ or ‘personhood’. Instead, it articulated its remit as 
“how it is right to treat the human embryo.”173 The Report examined the 
arguments for and against the use of human embryos for research. Here, the 
Committee noted the plethora of views on the embryo’s status, evidenced 
by the submissions received prior to the Report.174 They discussed each 
position in turn, before concluding that while the embryo deserves some 
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protection in law, this protection should not be absolute.175 Notably, the 
source of this protection is not entirely clear from the Report. It cited the 
state of law at the time, which afforded some protection to the embryo, but 
not absolute protection. 176  Nonetheless, one can glean from their 
recommendations that this protection is sourced (at least in part) by virtue of 
being a member of the human species.177 Further, any recognition of the 
embryo as morally recognisable from the moment of creation would have 
been a huge step back from the recognition of the bodily integrity and 
autonomy of women with regards to reproduction, brought about in law (at 
least relatively speaking) by the 1967 Act.178 
 
What can we learn from this? To take stock, so far we have seen that law 
has responded to new understandings of the early stages of human life, as 
the process of pregnancy became more ‘medical’ and less of a religious 
event. Throughout this evolution in understanding, from the 13th to 20th 
centuries, the key question in law (framed in one way or another), seemed to 
be: how should law treat the early stages of human life? Considering the 
relative ‘boom’ in new understandings that occurred in the late 20th century, 
culminating in the use of IVF and birth of Louise Brown, a considerably new 
amount of knowledge (and public concern) needed to be navigated in law. 
The Warnock Report’s ambit was nonetheless no different to previous 
iterations of law in this area. The key question was almost the same: how 
should we treat the embryo, legally? Within that, while not explicitly, the 
Report tackled (to some extent), the question of where in the embryonic 
process the state should delineate legal limits (as law has always done in the 
past), by recommending a ‘limit’ on research based on the development of 
the primitive streak at 14 days. Again, this was arguably a reflection of 
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process, by delineating a stage in the process that has been determined as 
important by those charged with law-making, or informing law-making.  
 
I thus argue that process remained important, at least to some extent, for 
the Committee, and we have seen that through the above summation of 
their deliberations. The Report did not refer to previous iterations of legal-
moral lines, neither quickening, nor viability (presumably because these 
were much later stages in the process and thus not relevant to them). Yet, 
there are similarities between the Committee approach and previous 
iterations of laws governing the early stages of human life. The Committee, 
tasked with deliberating on how the UK ought to treat the embryo in law, 
dealt with moral uncertainty by providing boundaries at a stage in the 
process deemed ‘appropriate’ in accordance with the socio-medical climate 
of the time. While they met the task by providing a ‘compromise’, the 
societal response to the resulting bill still reflected the moral uncertainty 
navigated in their report. Gothic themes of Frankenstein179 and the ‘mad 
scientist’ permeated public debate. This is the subject of the next 
subsection.  
 
3.3 The embryo post-Warnock: 1985-1990 
 
Six years after the Report was published, the Government enacted 
legislation, which was closely based upon its recommendations:180 the 1990 
Act. As Michael Mulkay has pointed out, the delay between publication of 
the Report and enactment of the 1990 Act was caused by a political ‘tug of 
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war’ between ‘pro-research’ and ‘pro-life’ groups.181 Before and after the 
production of the Report, there was rather vociferous objection to assisted 
conception from the pro-life movement, particularly groups such as Life and 
the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child. These groups were active 
in the organisation and briefing of MPs and peers opposed to the proposals 
for regulation laid out in the Warnock Report. 182  At this time, these 
organisations appeared to have both parliamentary and public opinion on 
their side.183 As Mulkay noted, this conservative lobby was “well organised, 
virtually unopposed and in control of a large section of parliamentary 
opinion.”184 In 1985, their efforts nearly succeeded with Enoch Powell’s 
Unborn Children (Protection) Bill 1985 (‘UCP Bill’),185 which passed at first 
reading. It only failed to go any further because “an alliance of scientists and 
Members of Parliament succeeded in talking it out of time.”186 The UCP Bill 
did not explicitly purport to ban research, but instead proposed the banning 
of embryo disposal, which would have rendered research impossible, but 
embryo research is a crucial antecedent to infertility treatment. 187  As 
Baroness Warnock stated in the Progress Educational Trust’s 2016 
conference:188 “…if we are to have IVF, we need research. The two very 
much go hand in hand.”189 
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Yet, despite the abovementioned concerns about ‘slippery slopes’,190 the 
Warnock Report had previously emphasised the importance of “…keeping 
the temporal perspective short, and reliance on imagination to a 
minimum”:191 
 
The pace of scientific discovery is unpredictable. Indeed, a number of 
major developments have taken place during the lifetime of the 
Inquiry. The changes, which take place in society itself, are also 
difficult to predict. The impact of scientific discoveries on the society 
of the future is therefore doubly hard to predict. We took the 
pragmatic view that we could react only to what we knew, and what 
we could realistically foresee. This meant that we must react to the 
ways in which people now see childlessness and the process of 
family formation, taking into account the range of views 
encompassed by our pluralistic society, the nature and value of 
clinical and scientific advances and the benefits of research.192 
 
Here, we see a recognition that this type of law is temporally limited, given 
the manner in which science, family, and society’s views of them (and thus 
their hopes for law in relation to them) can evolve relatively rapidly. Perhaps 
even the Committee itself would not have intended for all of its 
recommendations to stand the test of time in the way that they have. As 
discussed below, durability is not necessarily a productive “hope” for law in 
this field,193 where rapid scientific and social changes take place. 
 
Between 1984 and 1990, the scientific and medical community continued to 
campaign, and eventually swayed parliamentary and public opinion, chiefly 
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by emphasising the potential benefits of embryo research to human 
health. 194  For example, the Progress Educational Trust (established in 
November 1985) arranged for families affected by genetic disease to visit 
members of the House of Lords prior to the debates on the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill.195  
 
Uncertainty surrounding how we should morally and legally treat embryos, 
and what this law might lead to in the future, permeated debates throughout 
the 1990 Act’s inception and beyond. From this we can see that that the 
only certainty when it comes to the embryo is that its status is heavily 
contested. Regular reference to fictional genre in the news media expressed 
widespread fears about the advance of technology and science. As Mulkay 
concludes, while those against research predominantly used this imagery, it 
paradoxically ended up weakening their campaign because of its fictional 
connotations. 196  There was thus an imaginative thread throughout the 
debate;197 an “extended temporal perspective”198 into the unknown future, 
and these gaps were thus filled with premonitions of possibility. It “created 
interpretive space in which to exercise their critical imagination.”199 Indeed, 
the unregulated embryo of the 1970s and 1980s may be described as what 
liminal scholars would call a “condition of possibility,”200 typical of a space 
‘in between’ that the embryo of the time certainly occupied, i.e. between a 
space of scientific and public consciousness, and legal regulation.  
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As briefly highlighted above, in discussing the embryo, its nature, and its 
potential legal status, the Report and the resulting 1990 Act arguably 
brought the embryo out of this particular liminal condition (the unregulated 
possibilities of which caused great concern), into a new, bounded condition 
where these concerns were allayed. Law’s response to public uncertainty, 
and the unknown, was to enact boundaries based on the Warnock’s 
reflection of embryonic processes. Despite all of these difficulties, the Bill 
passed, and the 1990 Act came into force on 1st November 1990.  
 
3.4 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990  
 
This section briefly summarises some of the key features of the original 1990 
Act (many of which stand today) for the purposes of this PhD research. It 
does so with a view to marking out both the processual and anti-processual 
elements of this law. Much of the 1990 Act incorporated the 
recommendations of the Warnock Report, so the following discussion will 
not go into unnecessary detail on the reasoning behind the provisions.   
 
3.4.1 The 1990 Act 
 
The 1990 Act was introduced to regulate IVF, embryo research, and provide 
a statutory basis for the HFEA. As mentioned above, it also acted to expand 
the permitted circumstances for abortion under the 1967 Act, and thus (for 
many, but not all) 201  solidified therapeutic abortion in law. 202  There are 
several sections of the original 1990 Act that are worth noting for the 
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purposes of this analysis. First, in s1, the 1990 Act defined the embryo as 
follows: 
 
1. Meaning of ‘embryo’, ‘gamete’, and associated expressions 
(1) In this Act, except where otherwise stated—  
(a) embryo means a live human embryo where 
fertilisation is complete, and  
(b) references to an embryo include an egg in the 
process of fertilisation, and, for this purpose, fertilisation 
is not complete until the appearance of a two cell 
zygote. 
 (2) This Act, so far as it governs bringing about the creation of 
an embryo, applies only to bringing about the creation of an 
embryo outside the human body; and in this Act—  
(a) references to embryos the creation of which was 
brought about in vitro (in their application to those 
where fertilisation is complete) are to those where 
fertilisation began outside the human body whether or 
not it was completed there, and  
(b) references to embryos taken from a woman do not 
include embryos whose creation was brought about in 
vitro.  
(3) This Act, so far as it governs the keeping or use of an 
embryo, applies only to keeping or using an embryo outside 
the human body.  
 
Thus, in a somewhat revolutionary swoop, the 1990 Act provided for the first 
time a statutory definition of the ‘embryo’. Interestingly, for the purposes of 
this research, it made use of the word ‘process’, and in some ways, it might 
be argued as having recognised the processual quality of the embryo. 






Section 1(b) seemingly accounted for the fact that fertilisation is not a 
‘moment’, but a transition from one state (two separate gametes) to another 
(a two-cell zygote). Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that these legal 
provisions were (and still are) simultaneously anti-processual. The law-
markers took the word ‘process’ and then entirely contradicted what the 
ordinary meaning of this word might arguably entail, by including multiple 
cellular, zygotic and embryonic stages under one heading (for the purposes 
of the 1990 Act): ‘embryo’. This, in and of itself, is not necessarily 
problematic; it was a legal tool used to capture all embryonic processes in 
vitro. This definition was later proven incomplete by the Quintavalle203 case 
(discussed below). Under the 1990 Act, a ‘human’ cellular entity was thus an 
‘embryo’ as soon as fertilisation is complete, which it defined as being 
marked by the presence of a two-cell zygote. This stage happens as a result 
of mitosis204. When an embryo is fertilised in vivo, both of these latter stages 
occur before implantation into the uterine wall. Section 2(3) of the 1990 Act 
prescribed that a woman is not ‘pregnant’ until implantation has taken place.  
 
The 1990 Act is thus governed (and still governs) the embryo, in a sense, 
before pregnancy might hypothetically take place if it were in utero. This was 
in stark contrast to the pre-20th century laws, which did not protect early 
human life until well after implantation generally takes place (at least 16 
weeks). A further contrast to the laws that came before the 1990 Act is that 
this framework now allowed for a multiplicity of technological processes to 
create and use the embryos it regulates. In the past, embryos could only 
ever be in vivo, and thus the only outcomes possible were either termination 
or birth. These outcomes have not changed under the 1990 Act, but the 
processes by which they reach these ends have multiplied. Under this new 
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framework, for example, embryos could be: led through implantation, frozen, 
tested on through PGD, or researched upon. Even when on a reproductive 
pathway through the law,205 many embryos still end up being destroyed as 
part of the IVF process, as often more are created than needed for 
implantation. Further, there is no complete programme of donation to other 
women. Surplus frozen embryos may be destroyed, particularly if stored 
close to their time limit, and a degree of surplus embryos are donated for 
research. Many of the processes legislated within the framework of the 1990 
Act thus result in termination of the embryo.  
 
Furthermore, research embryos do not necessarily have to be entirely 
‘human.’ A new process was thus legislated for. Yet on this pathway 
through the law, there is only one available end to the process (at the 
moment): termination. The 1990 Act did not explicitly mention what is meant 
by ‘human embryo’, except what can be inferred by its explicit ban on 
keeping an animal egg fertilised by human sperm, in order to test the 
sperm’s fertility or normality, beyond the two-cell stage.206 Furthermore, in 
s3, the Act specifies certain prohibitions in connection with embryos: 
 
3. Prohibitions in connection with embryos 
(3) A licence cannot authorise—  
(a) keeping or using an embryo after the appearance of 
the primitive streak,  
(b) placing an embryo in any animal,  
(c) keeping or using an embryo in any circumstances in 
which regulations prohibit its keeping or use, or  
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(d) replacing a nucleus of a cell of an embryo with a 
nucleus taken from a cell of any person, embryo or 
subsequent development of an embryo. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(a) above, the primitive 
streak is to be taken to have appeared in an embryo not later 
than the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the day 
when the gametes are mixed, not counting any time during 
which the embryo is stored. 
 
This section of the 1990 Act also introduced the subsection that famously 
embodies the Warnock Report’s ‘compromise position’: the 14-day rule. 
Thus, for the first time it was legal to carry out scientific research on human 
embryos, but within a limit of fourteen days. 207 While the 1990 Act enacted 
most of the proposals put forward by the Warnock Report, it remained silent 
on the key issue of ‘respect’ for the embryo. 208  The 14-day rule’s 
embodiment in this Act was essentially an operationalisation of the ‘respect’ 
called for by the Warnock Committee, as were other limits on the use and 
storage of embryos, such as prohibiting their placement into an animal. 
From this we can see that only one particular embryonic context was truly 
protected by law, with regards to where it may be placed and who may 
place it in utero, amongst other things. 
 
The provision of the 14-day rule aimed to provide a compromise between 
the competing aims of research and those who are ‘pro-life’, by providing a 
cut off for research at the point in embryonic development where it begins to 
develop the structure that will eventually become the spinal cord. There are, 
however, calls for this rule to be revised after recent studies published in the 
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scientific journals Nature209 and Nature Cell Biology210 have revealed that, the 
first time, the embryo has been kept in vitro for as long as 13 days. Shortly 
after, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics announced plans to explore a review 
of this limit.211 This shall be explored further in Chapter 8.  
 
Yet what do we make of this in light of a processual analysis? It seems that 
quickening (Chapter 2) has been removed as a stark legal-moral boundary, 
but only to be replaced by others (the 14-day rule being a good example of 
this). As our understandings of developmental processes have changed, so 
have the legal boundaries that attempt to reflect those processes: first, 
quickening, then viability in the early 20th century, and now, for certain 
embryos, the 14-day rule. Each process, in its own way, has become ‘the 
new quickening.’ It thus seems that law’s boundaries have fluctuated, 
historically, in accordance with what we believe we know (to a degree). This, 
then, is the element of law that reflects process in part.  
 
In a research context, however, the placement of the embryo in utero was 
strictly forbidden (see s3). In s3(3)(d) (above) we can see one of the 
preemptive rules of the 1990 Act,212 which explicitly outlawed human cloning 
(which had not been developed at the time but was later inserted by the 
2008 Act), for any purpose, as per the Warnock Recommendations. 
Nonetheless, the science in this area developed in unforeseen ways, as 
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discussed further in the next subsection. It is arguable that from the 1990 
Act’s conception, the law has inexplicitly demarcated between ‘types’ of 
embryos, namely reproductive embryos and research/therapeutic embryos. 
‘Research embryos’ must always, and ultimately, be disposed of; thus to 
say they are as ‘protected’ as reproductive embryos, or more so embryos in 
utero, would arguably be logically incoherent.  
 
Notably, s37 of the 1990 Act later significantly amended s1 of the 1967 Act, 
and extended the permitted circumstances.213 While it did not explicitly 
differentiate between the different ‘stages’ of pregnancy, the 1990 Act’s 
amendments broke the connection between the 1967 Act and the ILP Act by 
inserting the 24-week time limit in s1(1)(a). With these amendments, the law 
included more facets of (perceived) women’s interests, in addition to those 
included under the original version of the 1967 Act. Under this new 
amended version, abortions may be carried out after 24 weeks/‘viability’ if 
the woman meets certain circumstances. Notably, at the time the insertion 
of the 24-week limit was of practical insignificance, as very few abortions 
were then carried out after this stage, as at this point the foetus was 
presumed ‘viable.’214 Nonetheless, while the medicalisation of abortion law 
(i.e. medical knowledge shaping the substance of law) has muted the anti-
abortion lobby,215 it may still have unanticipated consequences. By this time, 
with advances in medicine, the timeline of foetal viability shortened from 28 
weeks per the ILP Act, to 24 weeks.  
 
When discussed in the House of Commons, it was noted that advances in 
science since the ILP Act mean that foetal viability can begin as early as 24 
                                            
213 See Abortion Act 1967 (as amended) s1(1)(a)-(d).  
214 See Sheldon, Beyond Control, (n114) Chapter 6. 
215 Jackson, Regulating reproduction (n43) 83. 





weeks.216 Although foetal viability may make sense as a biological/legal 
boundary for many, scientific progress in this area is progressively reducing 
the age at which a premature baby can survive (although there are biological 
limits to this without ectogenesis, i.e. artificial wombs outside of the 
woman’s body).217 This begs questions about how these lines will be drawn 
if prospective technologies such as ectogenesis become feasible.218 There 
has already been academic debate on the drawing of somewhat ‘arbitrary’ 
lines in this area of regulation, for example the 24-week limit sits in 
juxtaposition to embryo research laws, as we see later, where a line of 
‘respect’ is drawn at 14 days.219 
 
To return to the historical tracing, between 1990 and 2000, the 1990 Act 
remained steadfast.220 One of law’s main roles is to provide certainty to its 
subjects, and arguably the 1990 Act did just that by dictating what we can 
and cannot do with regards to in vitro reproduction and research, thus 
bringing law out of the uncertainty of the 1970s and early 1980s. As we have 
seen, this uncertainty did not just stem from not knowing what the law is, 
but also from societal disagreement regarding how we ought to treat 
embryos. The latter did not disappear with the 1990 Act, of course, but by 
providing a framework with a ‘compromise’, it did navigate this second kind 
of uncertainty in some sense. This uncertainty arguably returned, however, 
when the soundness of the 1990 Act was brought into question after 
concerns were raised about the ‘slippery slope to human reproductive 
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cloning’ several years after the first successfully cloned mammal was born in 
1997, Dolly the sheep.221 Further, in 2000 legislation was passed to extend 
the purposes for which embryos may be used for research, including 
increasing knowledge about serious disease and developing treatments for 
such disease.222 The foundations of the 1990 Act were called into question in 
2001 when the legality of a new form of cloning was called into question. 
This case, and the reactionary laws pushed through after it provide prime 
example of how advances in scientific processes may require a change in 
law to reflect those processes. We turn to this case next.  
 
3.4.2 Case law: Quintavalle (2001-2003) 
  
This subsection summarises the proceedings in this case, before going on 
to provide analysis. In Quintavalle, 223  the issue before the Courts was 
whether embryos created by Cell Nuclear Replacement (‘CNR’) fell under 
the 1990 Act. CNR is the procedure through which the “nucleus of an 
oocyte [is replaced with] with a nucleus taken from a somatic cell of another 
person”. 224 Interestingly, as previously noted, the 1990 Act tried to pre-empt 
cloning, in s3(d). Nonetheless, while CNR is technically a process of 
cloning,225 at the time the 1990 Act defined an embryo as “a live human 
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embryo where fertilisation is complete”, 226  but CNR does not involve 
fertilisation. The court’s navigation of this issue proved important for the 
1990 Act, the landscape of which changed following this series of 
judgements. Quintavalle thus raised important questions about the function 
of the judiciary in statutory interpretation in reference to the status of the 
embryo in law today. While the court’s role in making (and unmaking) law is 
not the direct subject of this thesis, it is important to note the part they have 
played in the law we have today.  
 
The case was first brought to the High Court, where it was held that a CNR 
embryo did not fall under the 1990 Act, as it was not “an embryo where 
fertilisation is complete.”227 Although the Secretary of State argued that a 
purposive approach should be taken in this case, the judge decided that 
such an approach would “involve an impermissible rewriting and extension 
of the definition.” 228 In response to Crane J’s judgement in the first instance 
of this case, the UK government rapidly produced law that criminalised the 
placing of an embryo that has been created by any method other than 
fertilisation in the womb of a woman,229 under the Human Reproductive 
Cloning Act 2001 (‘HRC Act’).  
 
The case was then taken to the Court of Appeal,230 where the appeal was 
upheld. The Court held that an embryo created by CNR, and embryos 
created by IVF were ‘morphologically and functionally indistinguishable’.231 
The Court’s decision was made on the basis that both entities had the 
capacity to develop into a human being, and, further, that the policy of the 
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1990 Act was intended to cover all embryos created outside of the body.232 
This judgment thus confirmed the HFEA’s capacity to license the creation of 
cloned organisms.233 
 
Finally, the case was appealed to the House of Lords, who, in a rather 
strongly worded ruling that effectively shut down the debate on cloning, 
unanimously sustained the decision of the Court of Appeal.234 The Court 
held, in dismissing the appeal, that section 1(1) of the 1990 Act should be 
given a purposive construction, and that it should be interpreted in the 
context of the 1990 Act as a whole, rather than based on specific 
wording.235 As the 1990 Act was created to regulate live human embryos 
created outside of the human body, it was held that no activity in this field 
was intended to be left outwith its ambit.236 It was also held that since 
Parliament could not have envisaged the creation of an embryo by any 
method other than fertilisation at the time of enactment,237 the 1990 Act 
could not have intended to distinguish between an embryo created in this 
way and one produced by fertilisation. Furthermore, it was held that 
embryos created by CNR, and those created by IVF are ‘similar organisms’, 
and thus ‘fell within the same genus of facts’ as those whereby the policy of 
the 1990 Act was formulated by Parliament.238 They also held that CNR did 
not fall within s3(3)(d) of the 1990 Act. The manner in which the embryos 
were created was not the main issue, according to the House of Lords, but 
rather the fact that Parliament had intended to cover all embryos created 
                                            
232 Morgan and Ford (n229) 524. 
233 Callus (n224) 1-2. 
234 Regina (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13. 
235 Ibid [8]. 
236 Ibid [14] 
237 Ibid [7] 
238 Ibid [15]. 





outside the human body with the 1990 Act. 239  As Quintavalle and the 
resulting legislation demonstrated, CNR was a huge scientific advancement 
that the 1990 Act had failed to anticipate, even though it was mentioned in 
the Warnock Report. As a result of the successful High Court challenge to 
cloning regulations,240  the government quickly introduced the HRC Act, 
which ended up being entirely repealed by the 2008 Act. The HRC Act acted 
to ban human reproductive cloning entirely; however, the statute left a 
legislative gap with regard to therapeutic cloning until the House of Lords 
authoritative decision in 2003, where the distinction for legal purposes, was 
reintroduced. As a result of Quintavalle, the 1990 Act was later amended to 
include any process capable of resulting in an embryo, as seen in s1(1)(b), 
and thus the debacle over cloned embryos was effectively drawn to a close. 
However, licences for treatment cannot be legally awarded where cloned 
embryos have a reproductive end and a distinction between therapeutic and 
reproductive cloning was thus introduced into the law. 
 
 Why this decision? As aforementioned, perhaps disallowing CNR to fall 
under the section may have opened a ‘can of worms’. Yet, this begs the 
question: how useful is the implicit regulatory distinction between 
therapeutic and reproductive cloning?241 Will it withstand the test of time? It 
is not within the ambit of this research to discuss the moral pros and cons of 
dissolving such a distinction (and thus allowing reproductive cloning), but it 
is evident that the standing of this distinction is precarious. As Laurie et al 
remark: “We suspect that the days of the outright prohibition on 
reproductive cloning are numbered.”242  Martin Johnson argues that the 
current law captures embryonic process to some extent with the 
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introduction of the reproductive/therapeutic distinction, by distinguishing 
between two ‘classes’ of embryo. Nonetheless he also argues that it could 
also do more: “What is being proposed here is a generalizing extension of 
this concept to reproductive and therapeutic ‘processes in general’ and to 
reproductive and therapeutic ‘embryos’ in particular”243  (discussed further 
below). Nonetheless, these types of demarcations were discarded as a 
regulatory solution by the 2005 House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee (‘HCSTC’) report (see below).  
  
Arguably, Quintavalle244 has demonstrated that we can alter the embryo’s 
explicit, legal definition under certain circumstances. Further, the case 
inexplicitly widened the reproductive/therapeutic distinction. It is not 
unforeseeable that a similar amendment to those made in 2008 may recur if 
required. Nonetheless, while important, none of the policy discussions post-
Quintavalle have addressed the nature and extent of the embryo’s legal 
status. Notably, when definition and status are addressed holistically, it 
becomes clear that they are not entirely distinct; a change in one has 
implications for the other. For example, by introducing clarification regarding 
the definition of the embryo, as noted above, the 2008 amendments 
consolidated the (inexplicit) legal distinction in status between reproductive 
and therapeutic cloning. 245  It seems that the legislative response to 
uncertainty here, as we have seen, was initially a knee-jerk ban on 
reproductive cloning, but even this law did not cover all forms of cloning; it 
left a gap regarding therapeutic cloning, which the courts eventually filled on 
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appeal.246 This case arguably cemented different ‘types’ of embryo in law 
(previously mentioned). Thus, the legal wedge between ‘reproductive’ and 
‘therapeutic’ embryos grew. As a correlative, the types of processes, and 
the network of pathways available for embryos under law, also grew.  
 
Overall, however, it is arguable that the Quintavalle case, and the resulting 
2008 amendments to the 1990 Act, also brought the embryo out of legal 
uncertainty, if not out of a ‘dangerous’ moral and legal space. In this space, 
certain research practices are going on unregulated and/or research 
practices have been left open to legal challenges through a gap in the law. 
In this way, we were brought out of legal uncertainty regarding how we can 
treat embryos under law (i.e. what was and was not legal), and we saw this 
again here with regards to cloning for research purposes.  
 
It is worth noting, briefly, the (non) role of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) on UK law governing the embryo/foetus. Generally speaking, 
the ECtHR has avoided ruling definitively on the legal status of the 
embryo/foetus, but has considered whether they have a right to life under 
Article 2 of the Convention,247 holding that this point falls under countries’ 
margin of appreciation.248 It has recognised that the health and interests of 
the mother implicitly limit the embryo/foetus’ rights. 249  These cases, 
nonetheless, have arguably had little (if any) effect on the UK’s governance 
of the embryo in vitro. It is also worth noting that in Brüstle,250 a patent case, 
the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) laid down a legal definition of 
                                            
246 Quintavalle [2003] (n234). 
247 See, for example Vo v France (2005) 40 EHRR 12; Evans v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 34. 
248See Brüggemann and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany [1977] EHRR 113 on 
state interference with reproduction and margin of appreciation per Article 8; and Vo (n247) 
[82] regarding margin of appreciation per Article 2.  
249 See Paton v UK (1980) EHRR 408 [415]; and Vo (n247) [80].  
250 Brüstle v Greenpeace (C-34/10) [2012]  All ER EC 809. 






‘embryo’.251   
 
These examples are all connected through the different ways in which 
courts will/will not intervene to define/protect the embryo. Yet, at the same 
time it is also important to acknowledge that there are very different policy 
considerations at play. In the UK, the focus has been on the 
research/‘therapeutic’ use of embryos and their use for reproduction; ECHR 
case law has focused more on access to abortion services and the legal 
status (personhood) of the embryo/foetus therein; and finally, the ECJ has 
engaged in this debate to an extent, regarding acceptable commercial 
practices, monopolies, and patents. Nonetheless, underlying all of this, for 
the UK there is this floating vague notion of the ‘special status’ of the 
embryo and the extent to which it should be recognised and taken into 
account in law. Despite evolving distinctions within our framework as 
amendments (and decisions) are made, the singular ‘special status’ has 
remained.  
 
3.4.3 Post-Quintavalle: Redefining ‘the embryo?’ (2005-2008) 
 
In 2005, the HCSTC produced their fifth annual report. Post-Quintavalle, one 
of the main issues at hand was how to define the human embryo under the 
1990 Act. Citing the House of Lords’ judgment in Quintavalle, the report 
stated that:  
 
This purposive approach to the definition of an embryo could be seen 
as resolving the definition of the embryo. Nonetheless, in its evidence, 
the HFEA suggests that the definition contained in the HFE Act is 
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unsatisfactory and proposes that “An amended definition of ‘embryo’ 
and ‘gametes’ might clarify that the remit of the Act also extends to 
embryos that have been created by other means than ‘fertilisation’ 
(CNR, parthenogenesis), and to artificially created gametes”.252 
 
It thus suggested an expanded meaning, but meanwhile the 
reproductive/therapeutic distinction stood fast. Interestingly, while this 
report emphasised that attempts to define the embryo based on mode of 
creation or its capabilities should not be made (quoted below), the 1990 Act 
later developed to demarcate and define embryos in a manner which 
arguably derives precisely from the manner of their creation.  
 
The HCSTC report then went on to describe different ways in which this 
problem might be solved, based on evidence put forward by academics and 
professionals, and concluded that defining the embryo would not be 
suitable. To quote extensively from the HCSTC report:  
 
52. There are three ways in which the perceived problem of the 
definition of an embryo can be addressed: 
a)  By redefining an embryo, at least defining those types of embryo 
that fall under legislation, according to the way in which they were 
created. This has the advantage of clarity but it fails to embrace any 
future technique that might be developed. For example, it might 
become possible to reprogramme an adult cell to behave like an 
embryo. Vivian Nathanson from the BMA says: “The question, really, 
is whether it is possible to find a simple definition that would capture 
not only all current scientific possibilities but the ones that people 
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speculate might happen within the next 10-15 years […] but if one 
cannot find an acceptable phrase for that then we would still 
commend putting in the concept of cell nuclear replacement because 
it is so important”. If this approach were to be adopted, the legislation 
would need to be sufficiently flexible to allow new forms of embryo to 
be included. An alternative approach would be to distinguish between 
fertilised embryos and what Professor Kenyon Mason of Edinburgh 
Law School termed “laboratory artefacts”. Dr Veronica van Heyningen, 
a geneticist who contributed to our online consultation, also made 
this distinction: “I would not […] think that laboratory experiments 
where you transplant a nucleus for entirely laboratory purposes into 
an oocyte [egg […]] is an embryo”. By making this distinction, as the 
Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001 does, it would be possible to 
provide that only embryos for which fertilisation had taken place 
could be implanted. The disadvantage of this would be that some of 
these “laboratory artefacts” may have benefits, both for infertility 
treatment and avoiding genetic diseases. 
b)  By defining an embryo by its capabilities. For example, it could 
embrace any diploid cell (two sets of chromosomes) with the 
potential to differentiate. However, Professor Lee M Silver from 
Princeton University describes a broader definition: ‘There’s a word 
biologists use to describe a cell, or group of cells, that by itself can 
develop into a whole animal or person: That word is “embryo”. Each 
random bunch of eight to 10 human ES [embryonic stem] cells is 
nothing more or less than a “naked” human embryo - that is, an 
embryo without its pre-placental “coat”’. This comment illustrates the 
danger that embryonic stem cells might be swept up by such a 
definition. This problem might be solved by including the provision 
that the cell(s) must have the potential to develop in the womb in 
order to be defined as an embryo. However, the cells’ potential might 





be open to debate and subject to technological advances. The 
Scottish Council on Human Bioethics cites German legislation in 
which any totipotent cell (capable of developing into a complete 
organism or differentiating into any of its cells or tissues), which has 
been extracted from an embryo which may divide and develop into 
an individual human being once the necessary further conditions are 
provided, is considered to be an embryo. 
c)  A final option would be to avoid any definition, as is the case in the 
2001 Human Reproductive Cloning Act. Using this approach, the 
term “embryo” would cover the normal usage of the word. We 
understand that this approach has been taken by the French in recent 
legislation. 
53. We are concerned that any legal definitions of the embryo based 
on the way it was created or its capabilities would either be open to 
legal challenge or fail to withstand technological advance. The 
attempt to define an embryo in the HFE Act has proved counter-
productive, and we recommend that any future legislation should 
resist the temptation to redefine it. We consider that a better 
approach would be to define the forms of embryo that can be 
implanted and under what circumstances. Using this approach, only 
those forms of embryo specified by the legislation, such as those 
created by fertilisation, could be implanted in the womb and thereby 
used for reproductive purposes. Other forms of embryo would be 
regulated insofar as they are created and used for research 
purposes.253 
 
This issue of definition, while not the central concern at hand, raises some 
interesting considerations for the purpose of this thesis. The HCSTC 
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contended that defining the embryo would be counterproductive. Defining 
the forms of embryo that can be implanted, and banning all others, might be 
logically and practically appealing. It ensures that anything that might be 
generally held as morally undesirable cannot be implanted (at least not 
without first having public/legal consultation and subsequent legal change). 
Nonetheless, legal loopholes cannot be completely avoided, as Quintavalle 
has shown. This approach thus comes with its own problems. Writing in the 
same year (2005), Catherine Stanton and John Harris argued that: “…the 
need for clarification of terms such as ‘embryo’ is important, not solely in the 
ethical debate, but also to ensure clarity in areas of regulation.”254 They 
recognised that there are those who do not share this view, and argued that 
it can render law “rigid and inflexible,”255 and consequently that law should 
just outline what is to be illegal.256 Stanton and Harris said that while this 
might sound appealing, it would not work for two reasons. First, it is 
impossible to predict what advances we will have, and therefore whether we 
should outlaw them. Secondly, they pointed out that avoiding definitions like 
‘human embryo’ leaves uncertainty,  as it did with CNR in 2005257 (until the 
1990 Act was changed in 2008). They argued that in a post-Dolly era, the 
status of embryos created by CNR, and the difficulties caused by advances 
in science, means we need to alter our terminology. They went on to say: 
“…drafting less prescriptive legislation in areas of technological 
development may not be the panacea it initially appears. Particularly in 
cases where the criminal law is at issue, legislation should err on the side of 
clarity, putting present-day certainty ahead of possible future uncertainty.”258 
Of course, shortly after this was written the law did alter its terminology, but 
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science has continued to advance since the 2008 amendments, and while it 
was a step in the right direction, arguably did not go far enough (for 
some).259 Even post-2008 amendments, some confusion still remains.  
 
It is certainly questionable whether the law is even able to define something 
so complicated, but if the law were to be reconsidered, is there anything to 
be said for a definition based upon creation or capabilities (paras 52(a)-(b) 
above)? Further, is there anything to be said for an approach that combines 
both? The answers to the latter questions are also explored further in 
Chapter 7. Interestingly, paragraph 53 also refers to “other forms of embryo” 
and their regulation “insofar as they are created and used for research 
purposes.” This PhD research’s approach is not in opposition to this 
perspective. In fact, it agrees with the HCSTC report that the embryo should 
not be defined, per se (for they thought it might be open to challenge or fail 
to withstand technological advances). Nonetheless, as also discussed 
further in Chapter 7, it does advocate a reconsideration of the embryo’s 
legal ontological constitution(s), with processuality (as central to law making 
here) in mind.  
 
Paragraph 52(b) is not necessarily illogical; unwanted entities may be caught 
up in definitions based on capabilities. While this thesis does not necessarily 
propose that the embryo should be terminologically defined,260 critiques 
such as this are arguably symptomatic of the embryo’s ‘legal status’ (and 
definition’s) opacity. As discussed briefly below and further in Chapter 7, the 
law cannot be expected to withstand all technological advances; it is thus 
important to revisit it. Some might believe that where there are new 
technologies, law has to be absolutely ‘bullet proof’, or even ‘future proof’. 
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On the contrary, if the law is too ‘bullet proof’, and thus rigid, it cannot revisit 
and/or be flexible in light of scientific or social changes. Further, with 
regards to paragraph 53, presumably the legal challenge that they fear might 
be something similar to the Quintavalle scenario. Nonetheless, this 
paragraph did not note the arguably positive legal solution that came from 
the evolution of this law (positive in terms of enabling the aims of the 1990 
Act, which the HCSTC support). Further, it is arguable that, looking at the 
wording in (c) and 53, we can see a focus on end-point. It is essentially 
saying, ‘here are the processes we allow and thus here are the end points 
we allow’, (to be born you have to be genetically ‘human’ and not cloned). It 
allowed cloning, but only based on one particular end-point (disposal). For 
this thesis, an integral feature of taking a processual approach is that one 
needs to know what that process is leading to (see Chapter 6). The HCSTC 
thus seem to have engaged with process, but only to some extent, because 
they did not account for the features of embryonic transformation and 
evolution (although perhaps they did not want to, given the post-Quintavalle 
climate of the time).  
 
A year after the HCSTC report, the 2006 Department of Health White Paper 
on the review of the 1990 Act continued in similar vein, and concluded that 
the legal status quo regarding human embryos should remain: 
 
The Government has concluded that the foundations of the current 
law remain sound, and provide an effective and appropriate model of 
regulation for the development and use of human reproductive 
technologies. This echoes the findings of the recent inquiry by the 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, which 
similarly concluded that the approach taken to the status of the 





human embryo remained appropriate.261 
 
It is unclear what ‘foundations of the current law’ meant, although it seems 
likely that it referred to the philosophical basis of the framework, i.e. a 
‘special status’, taken from the recommendations of the Warnock Report. 
Although the approach advocated by both reports has resulted in somewhat 
desirable legal and technological outcomes (for those who support IVF and 
research, regulated through a ‘compromise position’), its adequacy after 
having stood as a pillar of the 1990 Act (as amended) for 27 years 
nonetheless needs to be subjected to on-going scrutiny. As the Quintavalle 
saga has shown, and the critiques of the law that have surfaced in recent 
years (for example the 14-day rule) confirm, opening up the embryo debate 
runs risk of research being ‘shut down’, which is undesirable to those who 
support it.  
 
Overall, a main message for this subsection is that law needs to be adaptive. 
What happened here, instead, is that it has continued to create multiple 
legal embryos with the deepening of the reproductive/therapeutic distinction, 
and that in doing so has not accounted for the multiplicity of embryonic 
processes it leads embryos through (and indeed ends it leads them towards) 
as identified earlier. That is, the current legal framework, under the rubric of 
a ‘special status’, is masking these processes. We thus arguably need to 
consider the way in which we can manage this in a more transparent and 
coherent manner.262 
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3.4.4 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 and 
Beyond (2008 – 2017) 
 
The subsection briefly explores the 1990 Act (as amended), as it stands 
today, before going on to engage with the critical literature surrounding the 
evolution and status of the embryo under the 1990 Act (as amended) in the 
next section.  
 
The recommendations in the above white paper (2006) eventually became 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, after scrutiny by a Joint 
Committee of both houses. This Bill received Royal Assent in November 
2008, and became the 2008 Act. Some of the key amendments it made to 
the 1990 Act (some of which have already been discussed) included:  
 
• The meaning of ‘embryo’. It is no longer defined as one “where 
fertilisation is complete.” Instead, it is still a “live human embryo,” 
which can include an egg in the process of fertilisation, but it may 
also include an egg “undergoing any other process capable of 
resulting in an embryo.”263 This section also explicitly excludes 
human admixed embryos from the meaning of ‘embryo’.264 This is 
a nod to human cloning, another technique of creating an embryo 
not foreseen in the original 1990 Act. Interestingly, the HFEA 
website refers to this as “ensuring that the creation and use of all 
human embryos outside the body – whatever the process used in 
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their creation – are subject to regulation”, 265  rather than the 
introduction of governance of CNR techniques to the 1990 Act.  
• The 2008 Act inserts s3ZA, which details permitted embryos, 
gametes, etc. for placement in a woman.266 This section explicitly 
excludes embryos where nuclear or mitochondrial DNA have been 
altered being placed in a woman. Nonetheless, section 26 of the 
2008 Act also inserts s35A, which provides that modifications may 
be made in respect to the latter, which indeed later took place in 
2015.267 It also explicitly excludes embryos created by cloning 
techniques being placed in a woman; and 
• The 2008 Act also inserts s4A, which allows for the licensed 
keeping and use of human admixed embryos for up to 14 days, as 
long as they are not placed in a woman. 268  Here the legal 
construct of ‘the embryo’ has changed within the confines of the 
1990 Act, as driven by advances in science. This change arguably 
brought the embryo out of a condition of uncontrolled flux 
(highlighted by the Quintavalle case), into the boundedness of the 
law. Nonetheless, in making this change Parliament was careful 
not to revisit the embryo’s ‘special status’.  
 
Regarding the first bullet point, it is worth noting that this amendment thus 
moved us to the stage where law, to some extent, recognises processes 
needed for an embryo to be eventually born (as we have seen). Now, 
because of technology, the law also recognises new processes that can 
result in embryos. Further, the amendments specifically forbid that certain 
embryos appear in certain contexts, e.g. implantation in a woman’s 
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womb.269 The legal response to the many transformative possibilities of 
embryos has been to prohibit them at the earliest stage, including human 
cloning, human chimeras, and ‘enhanced’ humans. As Karpin argues: 
 
 …it is through the enactment of prohibitory legislation that (legislative) 
life is given to entities that are yet to be made. In so doing, the law 
gives reality to the fantasy of the very beings that it seeks to deny. 
Law through both regulation and prohibition carries us forward in the 
imaginary leap that is necessary to take us from the embryonic being 
to the post-human being.270 
 
In this way, the law considers the possibilities and possible teleologies for 
embryos that we do not want. Yet, it arguably provides a way of thinking 
about it in a more processual way. Whether we want these embryos, is, of 
course, another question.  
 
Despite the (remaining) underlying ‘special status’ of the embryo in the 1990 
Act (as amended), the word ‘status’ (or any other of similar meaning) does 
not appear once in the 1990 Act (as amended) in reference to the embryo. It 
is clear, however, that the recommendations of the Warnock Report, made 
in light of its proposal for a ‘special status’, are reflected here, 
operationalised through provisions such as the 14-day rule and s4A. The 
1990 Act adopted the precise time limit recommended in the 
aforementioned report, and also criminalised many of the activities in 
alignment with the report’s recommendations. Admixed embryos, CNR and 
mitochondrial donations, three of the biggest changes to the original 1990 
Act, were all referred to in Chapter 12 (‘Possible Future Developments in 
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Research’) of the Warnock Report. Cloning was mentioned, but not advised 
for or against, as it was not technically possible at the time.271 Admixed 
embryos were discussed in more depth, as the technique was available at 
the time. The Warnock Committee took the view that this was justified and 
should be subject to licensing and termination at the two-cell stage.272 This 
was enacted within Schedule 2 of the original Act, and clarified further in the 
2008 amendments. The Warnock Committee also noted the potential for the 
prevention of genetic defects, and the insertion of “a replacement gene 
which will remedy the defect.”273 On this, they believed that developments in 
this field would be precluded by the controls they recommended, but also 
envisaged that the guidance on this may be reviewed in the future to “take 





In the above, we see law’s development to reflect the changing boundaries 
of what is ‘certain’ and ‘uncertain’. New uncertainties arise275 and some old 
ones remain.276 We have thus moved, in some ways, from one type of 
uncertainty to another when it comes to embryo regulation, and this is 
because what we are dealing with is an inherently processual entity; that in 
and of itself has not changed. This is not necessarily a ‘bad’ thing for law, 
for uncertainty can be used positively. Nonetheless, as also discussed 
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further in the next chapter, ineffectively capturing that uncertainty can be 
problematic. This thesis is thus not necessarily advocating that we create 
absolute certainty in the law, or indeed absolute processuality (arguably 
neither of which are possible), but rather that we navigate the uncertain, 
processual nature of the embryo and that the law that governs it in a way 
that enables us to navigate that liminality, and emerge out of the other side, 
where deemed appropriate.  
 
While the 1990 Act has been subsequently amended, these amendments do 
not stray from the Report’s original recommendations with respect to any 
future possible technique that they strongly recommended should be 
precluded by law.277 Indeed, Chapter 12 of the Warnock Report addressed 
several “possible future developments in research,” some of which are 
indeed now possible today: trans-species fertilisation, ectogenesis, cloning, 
nucleus substitution, and the gestation of human embryos in other 
species.278 For some, the Committee merely described what the technique 
might involve, whilst for others (especially the gestation of human embryos 
in other species), they emphatically recommended that they should be a 
criminal offence. Overall, then, law has not strayed far (if at all) from the 
Report’s recommendations published in 1984. Nonetheless, it has arguably 
evolved, from 1990 to 2008 to 2015, beyond the Warnock Committee’s 
original vision. 
 
Yet, what was the embryo’s legal status throughout these processes? We 
have also seen that the human embryo seems to hover legally between 
several cultural and moral categories, notwithstanding biological categories, 
too. While it clearly does not have a legally articulated ‘status’ under the 
1990 Act, it occupies a legal (and for some, moral) threshold between all of 
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these aforementioned categories. Thus, while there is no explicit legal status 
of the embryo, what we have, legally, is still something. By virtue of giving 
the embryo in vitro legal recognition, with attached allowances and limits, it 
arguably has a status of sorts. Furthermore, bearing in mind that the law 
adopted most of the Warnock Report’s recommendations, its status may 
indeed be described as ‘special’, as the Report prescribed. It is “not 
nothing,”279 yet not a ‘person’. From what we have seen, its status remains 
‘special’, the meaning of which is unclear except that it is afforded ‘respect’ 
of sorts. Beyond that, we can glean little regarding what is the extent or 
nature of this from domestic law. It does not have an explicit legal status, 
but, as some argue, it may have one implicitly.280 This begs the question: 
what does it mean to have ‘legal status’? Is it enough to be protected by law? 
Recognised by law? Entitled to something through law?  
 
On this matter, Ford has asked: even if the ‘special’ status has a justifiable 
source, how can we ‘value’ it in practice except by avoiding harm and/or 
destroying it? If those who want to accord the embryo this status, but not 
make termination of pregnancy illegal, then ‘special respect’ seems 
meaningless in practical terms.281 It is difficult to enable a ‘middle position’; 
we either allow embryos to be destroyed, or we do not. For Ford, the 
embryo’s ‘special status’ is thus, arguably, purely rhetorical; it does not 
oblige us to “act or refrain in any way.”282  
 
Yet this is not necessarily the case. Time is an essential component of legal 
boundaries within the 1990 Act (as amended). To explain, either one can 
research the embryo for less than 14 days, or one cannot. This means that 
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we cannot research the embryo for any longer period of time, for example 
30 days or 60 days. But there is another facet to this. One might counter-
argue that rhetoric aside, the concept of the ‘special status’ is still very 
powerful and has acted as a tool to ‘stop us in our tracks’ with regards to 
research on embryos. It is arguably a precautionary position, which reflects 
that we as a society afford a degree of value to embryos, and thus the 
special status caveat requires us to proceed cautiously, to reflect, to justify 
fully, to revisit, to revise, and to continue to monitor as we progress 
scientifically. If we did not value the embryo at all, then we would have carte 
blanche to treat it however we wished. If that were the case, research at 30 
or 60 or 180 days would not present a problem. Therefore, the embryo’s 
special status need not be an all-or-nothing brake on research, nor a green 
light position. It thus means something in that sense, however (admittedly) 
meaningless. The ‘special status’, then, is (in a way) not a ‘compromise’, but 
what this research would term a legal and ethical ‘comfort blanket’. 
Nonetheless, ultimately underlying the initial ideal of the singular ‘special’ is 
essentially ‘reproductive’, embryos on one side (who only ever are on the 
receiving end of that status to the extent that they cannot be admixed) and 
research on the other which, for all intents and purposes, are treated as 
‘artefacts’. There is thus an intellectual mismatch here. That is, there is an 
incoherence, or ‘gap’ between the set-up of the law, and the realities of the 
processes for which the framework legislates. Perhaps this gap has only 
been widened by the deepening of the reproductive/therapeutic distinction 
in Quintavalle (above). 
 
Moreover, it seems that law has continually navigated two types of 
uncertainty with regards to embryos (and indeed foetuses): 
 
1. Uncertainty regarding how we ought to treat them in law; and  





2. Sometimes, uncertainty regarding what the law governing 
embryos is (i.e. in the 1970s, and early 2000s).  
 
As we have seen above, one aspect of the law’s navigation of embryonic 
uncertainty (regarding how we ought to treat them) does not disappear, nor 
is this work necessarily saying that it should. What we can conclude from 
the above, however, is that it returns to the fore where the second type of 
uncertainty (legal uncertainty) arises, as we saw with Quintavalle.   
 
The first type of uncertainty is particularly interesting for this thesis’ enquiry, 
because the legal response to it seemingly correlates with processuality. 
The Warnock Committee, tasked with navigating moral uncertainty with 
regards to how we ought to treat embryos-in-law, met this uncertainty by 
proposing a ‘compromise’ (whether or not it was a compromise is another 
matter). This compromise was met by affording all embryos in vitro a 
‘special status’, recognising embryos’ unquestionably human origins, and 
the (perceived) value we thus afford them (to whatever extent). Yet the 
above has also taught us that this ‘special status’ is singular, all 
encompassing, for all embryos. But as we have seen, the 1990 Act has 
multiple embryos, and multiple processes, arguably further entrenched by 
the 2008 amendments. As an interim conclusion, therefore, I posit that there 
is an intellectual gap between the intellectual basis of the 1990 Act (a 
singular, all encompassing, and vague status), and the practical realities of 
the multiplicity of pathways (and ends) embryos are led through under this 
framework. The dimensions of this gap shall thus be discussed further in the 
next chapter.  
 
To summarise this Chapter’s arguments:  
 






• There is not necessarily a disjunction between the 1990 Act (as 
amended) and the historical development of the early stages of 
human life, but, with the history of process in law in mind;  
• The intellectual basis of the law treats embryos singularly as ‘the 
embryo’, by virtue of according one ‘special status’. In reality, the 
1990 Act (as amended) creates multiple categories of, and 
pathways for, embryos in vitro (with seemingly multiple statuses). 
 
Chapter 4, the last chapter of Part One, shall now examine how the literature 
has responded to the embryo’s special status, and the formation of that as a 
legal device in order to explore further the dimensions of this ‘gap’. From 
what this research has found, these critiques may be separated into two key 
themes: 1) contestation of the nature of the embryo’s status, particularly, 
what this thesis terms its ‘legal stasis’, and 2) pleas to further ‘contextualise’ 
the embryo in vitro in accordance with their female and technological origins. 
The two main sections of Chapter 6 draw out and discuss these themes, 
respectively.  












4. From Process to Purgatory: 




Since the 1990 Act’s inception, and especially after its subsequent 
amendment in 2008, it has been subject to a considerable amount of 
academic discussion, particularly with regard to the embryo’s legal ‘status.’ 
As Natasha Hammond-Browning has pointed out in reference to the 
Warnock Report, “its recommendations were destined to be closely 
examined.” 283  While there has been a lot of support for the Warnock 
Committee‘s approach, calls are increasingly being made to revisit the issue 
in light of recent advances in technology and changes in societal perception 
of these techniques. These commentaries have thoroughly highlighted some 
of the key issues with the extent and nature of the embryo’s status within 
law. 
 
Notably, while these critiques are varied (and variedly convincing), academic 
efforts to provide alternatives for embryo regulation are rare compared to 
critique of the regulatory structure itself. This thesis has found that while 
some writers do provide suggestions for an alternate regime, these are more 
starting points upon which future regulation could build.284 While appealing, 
they therefore tend to leave analytical gaps. Below, some of the key themes 
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in these suggestions shall be summarised and explored. Based upon this, 
later Chapters of this thesis (7 and 8) will use liminality as a lens through 
which to analyse some of the questions left unanswered by these works, 
and build upon their suggestions. A full explanation and justification for the 
use of this lens will also be offered.  
 
This chapter explores some of the key academic commentaries in this area, 
selected based on their discussions surrounding the findings at the end of 
Chapter 3. Based on this, the following summarises literature on the 
embryo’s ‘special status’, which, as the below discusses, has the following 
themes: (1) that law has repeatedly missed opportunities to revisit the basis 
of the 1990 Act, for which we have good reason, and (2) that the embryo 
needs to be contextualised further in law, perhaps beyond their present 
legal bounds. Overall, it finds that the root of the ‘special status’ vagueness 
is prevailing uncertainty regarding how we ought to treat embryos in vitro.  
 
The last section of this chapter ties together these two sections by way of 
analysis, and concludes that if the production, use, and disposal of embryos 
in vitro for reproduction and research are to continue in light of the 
advancement of scientific techniques in this field, a more coherent and 
transparent legal approach is required. This lays the groundwork for Part 2 
of this thesis, which charts an analytical framework that might help enable 
the latter.  
 
4.2 Towards legal stasis? 
 
Building on academic commentaries, this section argues that with the 
inception of new technologies, particularly with the incorporation of 
regulated stem cell research into the 1990 Act in 2000, the embryo’s 






apparently singular and unchanging ‘special status’ has become 
increasingly problematic as a legal mechanism or, indeed, as a legal reality. 
This is so not necessarily because of its indefensibility in its inception, but 
rather because of the legal stasis, and unreflexive iteration embryonic status 
that the 1990 Act (as amended) has been led towards. Notably, not all 
commentaries below cite process expressly, but important lessons can be 
drawn from them for the purposes of this thesis because of law’s limit to 
reflecting the embryos processual, and uncertain nature.  
 
4.2.1 Fade from discourse 
 
Following the passage of the 1990 Act, the debate on the use of embryos 
has largely faded from the public arena.285 For some, this is surprising given 
that the legislation (and the Warnock Report) “failed to resolve the 
fundamental issue of the juridical status of the embryo.”286  Fox argues 
juridical status is both of practical and theoretical importance, considering 
the number of embryos that exist “in a cryopreserved state and legal limbo 
in laboratories around the world.”287 As briefly discussed above, the courts 
have done little (but not necessarily wrongly) to address this, and in fact the 
embryo’s presence in judicial commentary is markedly decreasing. 
Interestingly, Martin Johnson argues that the issue of the embryo’s status 
cannot be left to the courts. First of all, because there are inherent 
limitations to the extent of judicial freedom in any area of law. 288 Secondly, 
“for this approach to work, the legislation must have clearly identifiable 
purpose(s) that must be assumed to remain unchanged by events,” and this, 
he argues, is clearly not the case, particularly as social/political/scientific 
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understandings can change over time.289 Not only has the embryo faded 
from legal discourse, it has also faded from the public arena more generally.  
 
It is important to note, however, that the policy reasons behind this fading 
are not necessarily unclear. As Baroness Mary Warnock has iterated in the 
past, and reiterated very recently at the 2016 Progress Educational Trust 
Conference, IVF and embryo research came very close to being blocked by 
Enoch Powell’s Bill.290  
 
While the risk of losing the benefits of IVF and embryo research entirely is 
one which intuitively some might not wish to take, one cannot ignore the 
evolution in society and social views on these matters since 1985. Indeed, 
there are those who believe that public debate may not necessarily lead to 
the 1990 Act’s demise. For example, Therese Callus argues that the 
decision in Quintavalle291 “stifled democratic debate” on the development of 
cloning techniques. Her work argues that cases such as this demonstrate 
how the law has become servile to science, and to scientific criteria, which 
in turn subdues full democratic debate.292 She believes that such debate 
would not ‘smother’ promising research such as this; rather, it would enable 
a balance between respect for the embryo and respect for those who 
benefit from these types of research.293  Perhaps the answer to this is, 
therefore, as Mason concluded, that in order to satisfy the pro-life lobby, 
any reform in the law should recognise that “no-one can deny that the 
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embryo represents a form of human life deserving, as the Warnock 
Committee had it, some sort of protection and respect in law.”294  
 
Emily Jackson has described the 1990 Act (as amended), based on the 
Report’s recommendations, as having “stood the test of time rather well.”295 
Sarah Franklin, in praise of the Warnock Report, goes further. She writes:  
 
In spite of the many criticisms of the Warnock Report for its failure to 
address the supposedly crucial issue of “the moral status of the 
human embryo” (criticisms Warnock fully anticipated and skilfully 
answered in the original Preface to her report)…we can see in 
retrospect why she was wise to do so…embryos exist as a plurality. It 
is not possible to give them an ‘absolute’ status – legally or ethically 
any more than socially or politically.296  
 
Arguing that “when some legislation is preferable to none, the absolute must 
give way to the acceptable”, Franklin contrasts Britain to the US, where the 
dominance of particular religious views over public and political debate have 
(at least in the past) resulted in a legal stalemate, with little regulation in this 
area.297 She thus posits that, learning from this, the law cannot be absolutist 
but must prescribe what is acceptable as a minimum, as she contends the 
Warnock Committee did. Similar to Franklin, Natasha Hammond-Browning 
has argued that while the embryo’s status in law is equivocal, it was based 
upon evidence received by the Committee in their attempt to determine a 
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suitable mode of regulation for this field in a pragmatic manner, at a time 
where there was no regulation at all.298  
 
There has been much praise and support for the Warnock Report over the 
years. Indeed, it was thorough in its approach, and its recommendations 
have certainly stood the test of time. Nonetheless, it is also important to 
draw the distinction between critiquing the 1990 Act (as amended) as it 
stands today, and the extent to which its origins were justified at the time. 299 
 
Despite later ruling out revisiting the embryo-in-law, in 2004 the Department 
of Health stated that while the 1990 Act (as amended) has performed well, 
and continues to do so, “any cutting-edge legislation, no matter how 
successful, needs at some stage to be reviewed and any necessary 
readjustments made to ensure that it continues to be effective.”300  For 
Hammond-Browning,301 while the original report is to be praised as seminal 
work in this regulatory minefield, the societal, legal, and technological 
advances that have occurred since then mean that it is time for the matter to 
be reviewed. What the discussion below also reveals, however, is there is 
more of a dissensus when it comes to ethical desirability of the Report’s 
(and the subsequent Act’s) lack of decision on the embryo’s legal status. 
This has led to confusing law. 
 
Hammond-Browning praised the work of the Committee and its subsequent 
report, which she describes “an excellent demonstration of a report that 
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took into account diverse views in order to make recommendations on a 
number of divisive issues.”302 Nonetheless, she also concludes her paper by 
calling for another Warnock-esque committee in this ‘new era of 
reproductive technologies and reproductive ethics:303 “advances in human 
fertilisation and embryology treatment and research have progressed far 
beyond what was envisaged by the Warnock Committee in the early 
1980s.”304 Citing some of the more recent advances in reproductive science, 
for example mitochondrial replacement therapy, she prescribes: 
 
…a new committee that had as its remit the ethical, legal, and social 
consideration of these new and future used of reproductive 
technologies and research would undoubtedly be of much value in 
regulating this next era of human fertilisation and embryology, in 
much the same way that Warnock has for the past 30 years.305  
 
Indeed, as she pointed out, there have been some excellent reports 
produced in this field since Warnock, from bodies such as the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, but none have looked at this field holistically as the 
Warnock Report did.306  Hammond-Browning has not been alone in her 
analysis. Sarah Franklin has commented that an appropriate aspiration for 
law in this field would be for more legislative initiatives like the Warnock 
Committee, “…that both show respect for diversity, and use discordances 
as a resource in the effort to create a workable and sustainable 
compromise.” 307 She points out that we must remember that morality is not 
only collective, but also individual, and in this manner, initiatives such as 
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these are (and should be) led not with a spirit of absolution, but of 
toleration.308  
 
Overall, the Report, which as we have seen was in and of itself not entirely 
un-processual, has stood fast as the intellectual basis for our framework for 
over 27 years. Why, when we have seen an increasing rhetorical move to 
disentangle the legal status of the embryo from other considerations (such 
as that of the potential child),309 have we not seen a similar move within the 
regulatory framework? This move has hardly been reflected in law, but at 
least a little in the rhetoric of the HFEA, and the HCSTC.310 Questions raised 
by the issue of the embryo’s ‘special status’ are exemplary of the 
implications of the law when it remains static in a fast-moving area. While 
the pathways and boundaries within the 1990 Act have shifted slightly, 
deepening the reproductive and therapeutic distinction, its ‘pillars’ have not. 
I thus posit that legal development, with regards to how we ought to treat 
embryos in law, has come to a standstill; it has ossified.  
 
When the Department of Health issued the amended Act in 2007, a question 
arose regarding whether the 1990 Act should be repealed and replaced 
altogether.311 This did not come to fruition. Further, as already mentioned, 
the year before (2006), the Department of Health explicitly ruled out 
revisiting the embryo’s status.312 The policy reasoning behind the stagnancy 
of the embryo’s status is clear. For example, some have suggested that 
legislative reform was driven by the government’s desire to, first, avoid 
opening the ‘can of worms’ that is abortion or to revisit the embryo’s legal 
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status, and second, to maintain the UK’s position at the forefront of 
research and technologies in this field.313 Nonetheless, Fox argues that the 
amendments to the 1990 Act were a missed opportunity to “re-think the 
appropriate model of regulation to govern fertility treatment and embryology 
research in the UK.”314 
 
By ruling out any reconsideration of the underpinning principles of the 
1990 Act, the government foreclosed the possibility of a radical 
reappraisal of the ways in which we regulate fertility treatment and 
embryo research.315  
 
She adds that the result of this is an undesirably complex and confusing 
legislative regime.316 Fox also agrees with Ford that the “fundamental status 
of the embryo continues to be as elusive and ambivalent as ever… ensuring 
that the legislation would close off even more contentious debates about 
what it might mean to be human.”317  She adds that all of this is not 
necessarily surprising; not only have in vitro procedures become normalised, 
but also the reproduction and research business has become rather 
lucrative, meaning that the government is keener than ever to maintain 
Britain’s position at the forefront of this.318 
 
As advancements in science came to the fore of public concern, particularly 
around the turn of the millennium regarding stem cell research (SCR) and 
again a few years later regarding cell nuclear replacement (CNR), debate 
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began to take place regarding clarity of terms used in the 1990 Act (as 
amended). Several writers contend that the 1990 Act (as amended) is not fit 
for regulatory purposes today. Not only has it been “plagued by twists, turns 
and controversy” throughout its legislative life, but its regulatory agency has 
repeatedly found itself “in the eye of the storm.”319 The 1990 Act, and the 
1990 Act (as amended), have suffered from a multitude of criticism, 
including in the media,320 from their failure to prevent the exploitation of 
women 321  to its “excessive bureaucracy.” 322  One of these criticisms, 
particularly amongst academics, is the nature and source of the embryo’s 
ethico-legal status within the 1990 Act (as amended).  
 
As discussed in Parts 2 and 3, this thesis’s answer to this problem is not to 
change the status, but rather to reconsider the status as a legal tool for 
regulating a morally relative entity, especially if there is potential for the 
furtherance of social justice aims in law. Yet before this is explored, the rest 
of this section suggests that while each argument may be independently 
valid, a common thread may be drawn through all of them: law’s response 
to the uncertain nature of the embryo in vitro is no longer intellectually 
defensible. This research argues that this may be attributed in large part to a 
growing facet of the 1990 Act (as amended), namely the law’s ‘legal stasis’. 
This ossification of legal development has not gone unnoticed, as the above 
shows. Other critiques of the embryos status are often made in tangent with 
this point, and some even go further to claim that the basis of the 1990 Act 
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was flawed altogether (rather than that it needs revisiting). The below 
subsection summarises some of the reasons put forward for why this 
stagnancy is problematic, namely that the special status itself is unclear.  
 
While legislative initiatives such as the Warnock Commission are 
undoubtedly productive, and rightly encompass the spirit of moral pluralism 
much needed in a contentious field such as this, a sound basis for this (or 
indeed an alternative legal initiative) is still required for its inception (and thus 
change) to be brought about. It is arguable that many starting points, 
although not necessarily discussed in the context of a ‘new Warnock’, have 
been provided by socio-legal academics. These are explored in the section 
below.  
 
4.2.2 A status unclear in nature, source, and extent 
 
Writing in 2010, Fox and Murphy argue that the precise legal status of the 
embryo “remains undecided, or perhaps undecidable,”323 and further, that 
the 2008 Act “remained silent on this key issue.”324 They quote Stephanie 
Hennette-Vauchez, who describes the failure to offer clear legal definition of 
the embryo as ‘the socio-legal (non)construction of the embryo.’325 They 
iterate that “law seems to reject the judgment of social theorists that 
embryos are ‘elusive’… or ‘unruly.’”326 Yet contrary to law’s rejection of this, 
it should arguably be embraced, as it has done so historically. As Chapter 2 
has shown, regulation of the early stages of human life has fluctuated 
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relatively regularly in line with new social and scientific understandings of 
the former. If this history has shown today’s law anything, it is that embryos 
are indeed ‘elusive’ and ‘unruly’, especially in the context of regulation. This 
notion thus requires further thought.  
 
Ford has also argued that the embryo’s ‘special status’ “contains one of the 
most arresting examples of an ambivalent response to the embryo/foetus.327 
Her exploration included potentiality, interests, relationships, and notions of 
human dignity, and concluded that all of these are problematic as a basis for 
‘special status’, if not meaningless. For example, Ford argued that if those 
who wish to ascribe ‘special status’ also support legal access to termination 
of pregnancy, and the right of a woman to refuse medical treatment, then 
the rhetoric becomes unsustainable.328 Notwithstanding the contradictory 
provisions of the 1967 Act and the 1990 Act (as amended) (as discussed 
below), it is difficult, she pointed out that it is difficult to ‘value’ an embryo in 
practice if we allow it to be destroyed. This reflects Mason’s point that:  
 
Either the in vitro embryo of Homo sapiens is a human being with 
rights that are absolute in themselves, and which only become 
comparative when they are in conflict with those human beings in a 
more developed state, or it is an artefact to be regarded in the same 
light as any other product of the laboratory.329 
 
To put Mason’s argument in another way, either we use embryos for 
research (and thus destroy them), or we do not. 
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Moreover, as discussed above, the Report recommended that the human 
embryo’s special status should be a fundamental principle enshrined in law, 
and be afforded a ‘special status’, without explaining “either what form it is 
to take or how it is to be justified.”330  Ford has also pointed out that while 
the committee described it as a “fundamental principle which should be 
enshrined in law,”331 they also added the caveat that the latter “does not 
entail that this protection may not be waived in certain specific 
circumstances.”332 She thus described this response as a representation of 
“a microcosm of wider cultural uncertainty and ambivalence about how such 
entities ought to be regarded.”333  
 
In the end, the law is ill-equipped to respond satisfactorily to life 
before birth. The kind of ‘special status’ which best befits the 
‘inchoate’ embryo/foetus, therefore, is one that reflects law’s failure 
to make sense of it, and the reasons for that failure: the status of the 
postmodern Other. Of course, this kind of status cannot be conferred 
by law. Whether postmodernist theory will develop in a way that 
embraces the Otherness of the embryo/foetus remains to be seen.334 
 
The murkiness of the nature, source and extent of the embryo’s status is not 
necessarily an issue in and of itself for this thesis. Perhaps it is something 
that is unavoidable. Nonetheless, it seems it is at the very least symptomatic 
of law’s way of navigating the embryo’s uncertain, processual nature. 
Uncertainty and ambivalence regarding the embryo, characteristic of a 
liminal state, is not intrinsically unproductive, or undesirable. 335  Indeed, 
navigating this uncertainty, i.e. the uncertainties surrounding how we ought 
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to treat embryos, legally, has been the task for the law (governing the early 
stages of human life) since its inception. As discussed further in Part Two of 
this work, evolving out of uncertainty (and thus characteristically towards a 
degree of certainty) is not necessarily productive, or progressive. Yet, it 
seems that legal response to this uncertainty, or ambivalence, is arguably 
nonetheless key to reflecting the relative ‘value’ of the embryo with social 
justice aims in mind, again as Chapter 2 has discussed.  
 
4.3 Reconceiving the embryo in vitro: beyond stasis? 
 
If one accepts that the status of the embryo has ossified within law, what 
can, or should we do, if anything? This section looks at suggestions for what 
we might do if revisiting the law governing embryos in vitro, not necessarily 
framed in terms of ossification or uncertainty, but generally, it discusses 
suggestions for reframing law. A common thread that may be drawn from all 
of these is that we should account more for the contexts from which 
embryos in vitro are borne, i.e. coming from and being in women, and 
coming from and being in technology. It thus separates the discussion 
below into calls to move beyond three (interrelated)336 normative bounds of 
law: categories, definitions, and binaries.  
 
One might ask: why should we consider the embryo’s status at all? The 
embryo’s ‘special status’ has lasted well as a regulatory tool and achieved 
many desirable outcomes. Nonetheless, those who support the practices for 
which it was made increasingly challenge it. For Fox, the “contested status 
of the embryo has rendered subsequent questions of reproductive choice 
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more problematic”,337 because, as one example, it marginalises the interests 
of the woman regarding her embryo/foetus. Her discussion, like this one, is 
limited to the “cryo-preserved” embryo, i.e. embryos created outside of the 
woman’s body.338 The introduction of the embryo in vitro in the 1980s raised 
important questions regarding the construction of its identity,339 most of 
which have not yet been answered by law:  
 
The construction of embryonic identity is a contingent, rationally 
undecidable and rhetorically constructed matter. Frequently it is 
reduced to the simplistic issue of whether embryos matter or 
not…framing the question in this way is problematic. It contributes to 
the polarisation which marks this debate, in which the embryo is 
either likened to a clump of cells or is accorded moral/legal 
personhood. It also skews broader public debate on issues like 
IVF…we must seek a new approach to the issue of embryo status 
which aims to forge new understandings to inform discussions of the 
legitimacy of embryo research and reproductive choices.340 
 
Assuming that as a non-cognisant being,341 it cannot have ‘identity’ in the 
narrative sense,342 the embryo’s identity can only come from what society 
and/or the law attributes to it. While Fox is arguably right that embryonic 
identity is a rhetorically constructed matter, and rationally undecidable, one 
might wonder whether seeking a new approach343 is just one form of rhetoric 
construction replacing another. Yet, as argued above, rhetoric is a powerful 
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device and can have great effect on what we can and cannot do (e.g. 
research on embryos). Furthermore, it is arguable that the rhetorically 
constructed, fundamentally undecidable nature of the embryo’s identity is 
not necessarily the source of the problem she describes, but instead the 
nature of the rhetorical constructions we have used, and affirmed so far in 
debate, law, and the courts. These constructions, as she points out, are 
preoccupied with placing the embryo somewhere within the 
property/personhood binary, when it clearly does not fit into either legally 
speaking (although there are some who would fit it neatly in one of those 
categories). Perhaps, then, we should look beyond this. One way to do so, 
as Part 2 of this thesis suggests, is to move away from a focus on binaries, 
to what lies in between them. 
 
Uncertainty, regarding embryos in vitro, has arguably led to legal stasis. 
Given the above issues faced by law in what, for this thesis, are symptoms 
of law’s purgatorial response to uncertainty regarding the embryo, we 
arguably need a new ethico-legal approach to thinking about the human 
embryo. This section discusses some recent scholarly suggestions for re-
framing the embryo, moving away from calls for redefinition, toward re-
contextualisation of the embryo within law. It does so with a view to 
beginning to highlight the positive disruptive potential of rethinking the 
manner in which the embryo is situated in law. 
 
Notably, a re-framing embryos on a contextual basis is also already taking 
place in some postmodern feminist scholarship.344  For example, Valerie 
Hartouni argues that the embryo needs to be situated in a manner that 
makes its dependency upon the woman’s body, or technology, more 
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evident.345 One can see that there has been a particular call to contextualise 
it within environments old and new. These environments may be divided into 
two broad areas: a) as dependent upon the woman’s body; 346  and b) 
technology (and as suggested in Chapter 8, people who use this technology) 
upon which embryos in vitro are dependent at that early stage.347 While both 
are important, this thesis, in its focus on the 1990 Act (as amended) and its 
regulation of the embryo outside of the human body, looks primarily at the 
latter. 
 
4.3.1 Beyond categories? 
 
Amongst academics who call for the law in this field to be updated in 
accordance with societal and/or scientific advances, there are some who 
call for the embryo to be revisited in law in order to reflect better newer 
understandings of ‘biological reality’.348 While these might sound appealing 
on a scientific level in their reflection of current ‘truths’, not only is the 
attempt to legally reflect ‘biological reality’ nearly impossible, but it is also 
limited as a sole or principal basis for moving beyond legal stasis.  
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Reproductive scientist Jan Tesarik has suggested that clear definitions are 
required in order to protect early human life from “abusive destruction.”349 
He therefore argued that the law should define pre-implantation embryos as 
a ‘zygote’ (specifically the period beginning with fertilisation and ending with 
the achievement of nuclear syngamy 350 ), based on ‘objective scientific 
arguments’ so that laws may be coherent and easily applicable to the 
regulation of techniques which lead to embryo destruction, without 
compromising the rights of infertile patients.351 
 
Tesarik was not alone in calling for a closer alignment between law and 
science in this field. Martin Johnson has argued that early legislative 
responses to the human embryo in the UK have exaggerated the protection 
of the human embryo at the expense of other parties.352 While he admitted 
that more recent changes, for example the 2008 Act, have ‘lessened this 
embryonic grip’, the formulation of law in this area “distorts legal thinking 
and is fundamentally in conflict with biological understanding.”353 In contrast 
to Tesarik, however, he did not recommend a definitional approach. There 
arguably is a parallel here between the medicalisation movement and its 
influence on law therein that I discussed in Chapter 2. Medicine drove how 
the law saw the embryo/foetus in the 19th Century, and before. Tesarik’s 
argument was similar to this, except in the context of the 21st Century.  
 
Johnson theorises that it is not strictly correct to call the regulated biological 
entity an ‘embryo’ until carried inside a placental support system. If we 
understand an embryo as a group of cells that can give rise to a foetus and 
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therefore a baby, it cannot do so until it attaches to this system of ‘extra-
embryonic tissues’. There has, nonetheless, been much confusion over legal 
terminologies in this area. He calls this period the ‘embryogenic’ stage of 
development, as the embryo is still being generated at this stage.354 In the 
UK, zygotic and embryogenic periods are captured by legal definition.355 
Second, he points out that while the term ‘embryo’ is used as a categorical 
description, the embryo’s development is a “continuous process.”356 He 
posits that giving “stage names” to this process “can easily confuse us into 
thinking that each stage is discrete- semantics distorts concepts.”357 Yet, he 
also admits that legally defining the embryo is difficult because it is a 
definition that biology cannot really provide. For him, however, “the fact that 
lawyers ask biologists inappropriate questions is no reason to give 
unbiological answers.” 358  Third, he points out that even if there were 
agreement on the biological definition of the embryo, it would not 
necessarily last very long. “Discoveries and new technologies challenge 
concepts and understandings.”359  
 
To build on this last point, the legal embryo is very much bounded within law, 
not only under categorical descriptions (e.g. as ‘embryo’, or admixed 
embryo), but further, under one broad ‘special status’. This, arguably, does 
not reflect the multiplicity of continuous processes that take place under the 
1990 Act’s rule. One might counter-argue, in its defence as a legal pillar, 
that this is true, but equally an unchanging moral status can always 
accommodate changing scientific understandings. I do not deny this. 
Instead, my argument is that this ‘gap’ is intellectually incoherent.  
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Moreover, while a definitional approach to embryo regulation undoubtedly 
has its limits and indeed embryonic categories may be described as fictional, 
or not reflective of science, categories are not necessarily the source of the 
problems that Johnson describes. According to Thomas: “The truth value of 
the legal fiction is not simply ambiguous or subjective; it is actually quite 
irrelevant.”360 The law must provide its own definition(s). Rather than fixating 
on the rigidity of categories as per Johnson, it might be more productive to 
consider the fluidity and reflexiveness of those boundaries. As we have seen, 
there is little disagreement that the embryo is fluid, but the question is: how 
can the law deal with that? Alternatively, a more effective question might be: 
is the law’s technique (the use of legal fictions) actually working efficiently? 
This work’s answer to the latter is that we seemingly cannot avoid the law’s 
need for categorisation, and therefore fictions will be an inevitable outcome. 
In regulating something like this, law not only creates its own fictions, but 
also its own ‘truths’ in the form of a new ‘class’ of embryo; the ‘legal 
embryo’. Or, perhaps more accurately, ‘legal embryos’: the plural here 
captures the legal reality that not all embryos are made equal and some are 
destined for destruction from the start. 
 
Indeed, all research and reproductive practice in vitro occurs within one 
particular ‘regulatory space,’361 which Laurie describes as the “metaphysical 
environment occupied by institutional actors and bounded by law.”362 He 
notes that in health research regulation, legal instruments often adopt a 
‘bounded object’ approach, which is typified by the creation of artificial 
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constructs within law. These become the object of dedicated regulators, 
“who operate within legally defined spheres or ‘silos’”363 (an example of this 
is the HFEA). Further, for science and technology studies (‘STS’) scholars, 
such as Susan Leigh Star, ‘boundary objects’ are valuable because they 
have ‘interpretative flexibility’, which she points out, exists with any 
‘object’.364 She refers to her and Griesemer’s original example of a road map, 
which she explains can have different meanings/uses for different groups 
such as campers or geologists.365 Boundary objects thus occupy shared 
spaces. To use Leigh Star’s map example, again: “…such maps may 
resemble each other, overlap, and even seem indistinguishable to an 
outsider’s eye. Their difference depends on the use and interpretation of the 
object.” 366  Considering the above discussions of embryonic 
(non)categorisation, and the utility of ‘bounded objects’ for discussions 
surrounding health research regulation (per Laurie’s analysis), perhaps then, 
embryos in vitro are also boundary objects. Phrased interrogatively, is ‘the 
embryo’ not a ‘boundary object’ capable of interpretative flexibility? 367 
 
As the Liminal Spaces Project team has commented, “a liminal approach 
complements this scholarship because it highlights the effects of rigid or 
static classificatory systems in the fluid contexts of biomedical research and 
regulation.”368 Coupling this observation with STS literature, one may posit 
that embryos as ‘boundary objects’ are valuable to us because they have 
                                            
363 Ibid 49.  
364 As do other aspects, see Susan Leigh Star, ‘This is not a boundary object: Reflections on 
the origin of a concept’ (2010) 35(5) Science, Technology, and Human Values 601, 602.  
365 See Susan Leigh Star, and James Griesemer, ‘Institutional ecology,translations' and 
boundary objects: Amateurs and professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology 
1907-39’ (1989) 19(3) Social studies of science 387. 
366 Leigh Star ‘This is not a boundary object’ (n364).  
367 Clare Williams et al have discussed embryos as boundary objects per their use for PGD 
and SCR, see ‘Human embryos as boundary objects?  Some reflections on the biomedical 
worlds of embryonic stem cells and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis’  (2008) 27(1) New 
Genetics and Society 7. 
368 Taylor-Alexander et al (n8) 170. 





interpretive flexibility, and importantly, this draws attention to the networks 
at play within the ‘silo’369 of embryo regulation. This sits at odds with any 
singular categorisation of ‘the embryo’ in law. 
 
Yet, this is not to say that categorisation is entirely impractical here. Jacob 
and Prainsack, noting that we must also be alive to the “failure” of once-
successful law in this area,370 argue that: “While law entails an explicit need 
for actionability, most social scientists would resist the imperative to even 
temporarily ‘freeze’ meanings and to operationalize them for application to 
‘the real world.’”371 For the embryo(s), as well as other areas of law, their 
definitions (see below) and context are in a state of constant change. Yet, as 
their analysis points out, temporal freezing is required at certain 
intervals.372 We have seen that the law requires categorisation here, as it 
does with almost everything. For Jacob and Prainsack, categorisation in 
itself is a placeholder for something ‘messier’.373 We cannot expect for our 
hopes, or indeed fears,374 for this area of law to remain the same for a 
quarter of a century. Law-makers must be willing, as has been the case in 
the past, to move the boundaries of law itself in accordance with new 
‘understandings’ (not purely biological).  
 
To quote Fox and Murphy, we must “ditch durability”375 in the regulation of 
this fast-paced field. In this way, we can address concerns highlighted by 
Johnson, Tesarik, and others. We can thus unfreeze concepts such as 
quickening and make them malleable, and then freeze them again at a later 
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point.376 We have seen this in the law’s use of devices such as ‘quickening’ 
and ‘viability’. Drawing from STS literature, I argue that if ontological 
boundaries (or the boundaries upon which embryos sit) are not fixed, as 
they are not per ‘the embryo’, then neither should be the law that 
demarcates them. This is not to say that regular change is necessary, but 
that we must be open (to borrow from Jacob and Prainsack) to ‘unfreezing’ 
the law in order to revisit its basic tenets.377  
 
Overall, it seems that the ontological boundaries of embryos, particularly 
those in vitro (outwith the literal, physical boundary of the mother’s womb) 
are uncertain; law’s response to this reality has been instead to legislate ‘the 
embryo’. To complicate matters further, the transgressive status of embryos 
in vitro continues to raise many “difficult moral and legal questions, which 
are forced into sharp relief by advances in reproductive technology.”378 As 
we have seen, conflicts occur within existing legal structures governing 
embryos in vitro; within the framework of the 1990 Act there is a convoluted 
juxtaposition of a) a distinct lack of rights for some embryos, against b) an 
articulated379 protection of all embryos’ supposed interests.380 As argued 
above, this has left a ‘gap’ between the intellectual basis of the 1990 Act 
and the reality of what it legislates for: there are multiple contexts in which 
embryos can be legally created and instrumentalised.  
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4.3.2 Beyond definitions?  
 
This subsection looks further at work of Martin Johnson, who suggests that 
legally defining embryos is problematic. Given the difficulties that law has 
experienced so far in defining the embryo, Johnson suggests that rather 
than relying on judicial interpretation to continue to bridge newly occurring 
gaps, 381  a new approach to law is required that embeds early human 
development more firmly. He recommends an alternative legal approach 
that accounts for our objectives for regulation in this field, our intentions for 
the embryos governed by the framework, and that relies on definable 
outcomes. In such a system, it would become necessary for a specified 
outcome to be identified in regards to medical intervention, and there would 
be a requirement for intent to reach such an outcome.382 He thus identifies 
three classes of ‘embryo’: one intended for reproduction, another intended 
for research/disposal, and a third category where ‘spare’ ‘reproductive 
embryos’ are used for research.383 He is clear that ‘intent’ means the joint 
intent of doctors and parents. 384  Thus, his overall claim regarding this 
approach is that: 
 
By moving to an objective-based outcome-assessed approach to 
treatment that clearly prioritizes the child’s interests, outcomes 
not inputs would determine how reproductive practice is regulated. 
Moreover, the ability to license exceptional activities provides for 
flexibility should the clinical case be made. Overall, defining 
medical interventions and gaining agreement on their definitions 
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should be easier and indeed more useful than trying to define 
‘embryos’.385 
 
Johnson then goes on to address whether the problem of ‘defining embryos’ 
has been resolved. While admitting that the parenthesised ‘embryo’ would 
still feature in legal discourse, he suggests that encompassing all of the 
artificially bounded ‘stage names’ are covered within these broad ‘classes’, 
it aligns the law closer with biology. Thus, citing the HFEA Code of Practice 
(sixth edition),386 he advances that these stages of development should be 
referred to as ‘human generative tissue’ (HGT). 387  For Johnson, a less 
precise description is more advantageous in this field than the alternative.  
 
In the event, he suggests that his approach (‘HGT’) embeds the ‘embryo’ in 
its developmental place within law. 388  He states that “in doing so, it 
emphasizes its potentiality as one elemental player in the cumulative 
development of a person:”389 
 
…this approach addresses more directly the interests of the intended 
child. In doing so, it also provides via the conditional licensing system 
a mechanism or the interests of parents, public and health care team, 
as well as the potential interest of the reproductive HGT itself, to be 
addressed.390 
 
Thus, for Johnson, this approach is not necessarily ‘anti-embryo’; it does 
not prevent the restriction of the use of HGTs for reproductive, or other 
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purposes. 391  He adds that if this approach were to be used, the 
redesignation of non-reproductive embryos as ‘therapeutic or research 
HGTs’ would also occur. The use of this type of definition in law would 
render some of the more controversial research practices (nuclear transfer, 
for example) no longer problematic “in contrast to the possible ambiguities 
of inclusion that come with attempts to define ‘embryos.’”392 It removes the 
possibility of one of the central concerns these practices bring: 
‘unacceptable’ pregnancy and birth outcomes. He also iterates the 
importance of ‘objectives’ in his approach, and argues that purposes for 
licensing can be qualified to provide boundaries for the use of HGTs, similar 
to Schedule 2 of the 1990 Act (as amended). 
 
Johnson’s proposals are thorough and logically combine law and science; 
as such, they are rather appealing. They move us away from a focus on how 
to define the embryo, which is not necessarily productive, toward the new 
contexts in which the embryo can appear through in vitro technology. 
Although he does not describe his theory as such, it is a rather contextual 
approach, looking beyond definition toward the broader network of 
considerations that take place when producing/using embryos. This said, 
there are theoretical gaps in this approach, which would require to be filled if 
it were to be used as a basis for embedding human development more 
firmly.393   
 
While science, in many cases, can be in broad agreement, it is often not the 
case that there is whole agreement when it comes to the embryo. As 
Johnson admits, embryonic definition is not really something science can 
provide. For example, scientists can disagree semantically on the 
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knowledge we are purported to have (for example when an embryo 
becomes ‘an embryo’), or the knowledge that we need (as highlighted by 
scientific debate on extending the 14-day rule). This explains, in part, why 
law has to come up with its own definition based on all contributing factors. 
‘Biological understandings’ are arguably not purely ‘biological’ and involve a 
plethora of considerations, including social, moral, anthropological, and 
bioethical theory.  
 
Uncertainty regarding embryonic process, as previously shown, does not 
solely stem from uncertainties regarding biology, but also uncertainties 
regarding how we feel about the embryo, and changes in the network of 
actors involved in constructing the embryo’s processes. To limit a regulatory 
framework to decisions based on objective, intent, and definable outcomes 
(in the manner Johnson has described), contextualised within “biological 
understanding,” thus misses considerations of non-biological 
understandings (such as new, non-biological family structures). This is not to 
say, however, that biological understanding should be discounted from legal 
(re)considerations; on the contrary, as we have seen in Chapter 2, they have 
been a key ‘motor’ for the evolution of law throughout history. 
Notwithstanding the issue discussed in this paragraph, Johnson’s theory is 
also limited in that it does not detail how law, and the dynamics of his 
processual approach might interact. As Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis discuss, 
the lens of liminality (itself concerned with revealing the dynamics of process) 
acts as a key conceptual step between contextualising the embryo, process, 
and legal processes and regulation.  
 
4.3.3 Beyond binaries? 
 
Law has tended to move the ‘goal posts’ of its embryonic/foetal boundaries 
throughout history. This continued to the 1990 Act, yet, embryos/foetuses 





have not been comfortably fitted within the boundaries law provides for 
other entities. This subsection, building on the above discussion of embryos 
as ‘bounded objects’, considers literature that discusses law-makers’ binary 
approach to regulation. 
 
Donna Dickenson has noted that law considers those that it regulated to be 
either a person/subject or a thing/object, but not both.394 This subsection 
considers work that cites the predominance of the subject-object/ property-
person binary within law. Quigley and Ayihongbe in a forthcoming article 
discussing their work on ‘everyday cyborgs’ (i.e. persons with integrated 
technologies/prosthetics), note that:  
 
Broadly speaking, the law is divided into that which relates to persons 
(assault and battery, personal injury, medical negligence, etc.) and 
that which relates to things in the external world (land law, personal 
property, sale of goods, etc.).395  
 
In a footnote, they then comment that “…although we note that 
fundamentally all law regulates dealings between persons (or legal persons 
such as corporations), even law which is about objects.”396 From this, it is 
worth noting, at this stage, that regulation of embryos in vitro does not really 
regulate the embryos themselves, but the dealings between persons who 
come into contact with, use, or produce embryos in vitro, that is, those that 
guide them into, through and out of these legal processes in various ways.  
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Yet how can law manage those who sit somewhere between the bounds of 
person and technology? In her 2000 article, ‘Pre-persons, Commodities or 
Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and Representation of the Embryo’, Fox 
examined the “ways in which the embryo is constructed in bioethical and 
legal discourse and to explore the consequences of these constructions for 
the process of legal regulation.”397 Fox posited that it would be productive to 
shift from the property-personhood binary towards locating embryos within 
a “biotechnological milieu.”398 This may be done, she suggested, by using a 
‘cyborg’ metaphor when discussing embryos (or positing the embryo as a 
‘cyborg’), which would thus contextualise embryos amongst our responses 
to other cyborgs.399 For Fox, the term ‘cyborg’ involves the coupling of 
animal and machine (for the embryo, technology that enables its 
maintenance in vitro), and captures neatly “the quintessentially technological 
nature of cryo-preserved embryos.”400 She cited Sarah Franklin, who has 
argued, “in its ability to embody the union of science and nature, the embryo 
might be described as a cyborg kinship entity.”401 Thus, she posited that: 
“designating embryo bodies as cyborgs opens up productive new ways of 
thinking in which we can acknowledge that as a technological life-form they 
certainly matter, but leave open for debate the question of how much they 
matter.”402 For Fox, this formulation situates the embryo within a complex 
matrix of biotechnological entities. It moves us away from a focus on 
whether or not it matters as an isolated being, and forces us to question 
how much cryogenically preserved embryos matter in relation to other 
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creatures.403 This presents us with the question, for example, of whether 
they matter more than the woman whose gametes produced them?404 
 
Fox thus suggested that this metaphor enables us to pose questions, which 
lead us beyond current debates regarding the embryo’s status. She noted 
that this not only confronts the dualism that dominates Western thinking, but 
also compels us to rethink our notions of species.405 She also noted that 
there are some who believe this metaphor might be a problematic for 
women, as it might write women out of the picture “given its conduciveness 
to technologism.”406 However, Fox advanced that the relational questions 
revealed by the cyborg metaphor will not leave the embryo ‘free-floating’.407 
This approach does not negate that the embryo’s status is contestable, but 
nonetheless overcomes the current ethico-legal position of the embryo, 
which Fox deemed unsatisfactory.  
 
To add to Fox’s analysis, while the embryo is indeed a coupling between 
animal and machine to a certain extent (as humans are part of the animal 
species) – or perhaps more accurately a coupling between animal and 
technology – this coupling takes place within a broader network of 
interaction between subjects and objects: donors, the embryo, 
researchers/technicians, scientific objects, and technology. Advancing 
relational questions regarding the embryo may thus not only be resituated 
as a non-’free floating’ being in the context of female reproduction, but also 
situate it within the complex of network of actors in the lab (in a research 
context). A relational approach thus arguably allows us to move beyond the 
notion of the embryo as a bounded subject-object within law (for it is not 
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bounded in ‘reality’, whether biological or social), toward a reflection of the 
complex processes that the law itself regulates.  
 
To further add to Fox’s analysis, I would argue the assemblage of 
technology and biological matter to create embryos in vitro blurs boundaries 
between technology and person; thus, in a way creating the ‘cyborg’ she 
describes. 408  The amalgamation of human and technology is becoming 
increasingly important and so, therefore, is recognising these new contexts. 
Discussing the ‘everyday cyborg,’ Quigley and Ayihongbe comment that:  
 
…the subject-object boundary is taken to be an ontological one (i.e. 
an empirical reality). This is then imbued with a moral significance 
which we find reflected in law’s structure and operative rules.409  
 
Location is thus important for the law (i.e. internal versus external).410 Yet is 
this also true for the embryo in vitro? While, as Quigley and Ayihongbe also 
point out, this division may seem pragmatic at first glance, it gives rise to 
some difficulties, which they detail in reference to the ‘everyday cyborg’. To 
borrow from Quigley, Ayihongbe, and Fox’s analyses, but in reference the 
embryo in vitro, there may be at least two ontological difficulties with law’s 
approach:  
 
• The boundary between subject and object, for ‘the embryo’, is 
arguably not fixed in legal reality. While embryos never been 
named under the category of ‘property’, ‘object’, or ‘thing’ under 
statutory or common law, it arguably at the very least becomes 
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the latter two by virtue of the research and disposal processes the 
1990 Act has enabled.  
• The future internal/external placement of the embryo in vitro 
seems to be what matters, ontologically, for law. If, at a particular 
moment along the embryo’s pathway through legal processes, it 
inherits a quality that deems it un-implantable (whether ‘spare’, 
not selected, or from the beginning created as an embryo for 
research), its practical/real (as opposed to legal) ontology changes 
to a subject-object that is disposable/destroyable. Embryos in 
vitro have this ‘special status’, and all that the 1990 Act (as 
amended) applies to it, but the minute it is within the woman’s 
womb, this special status disappears and a completely different, 
and from therein a somewhat uncomplimentary set, of laws apply. 
 
It seems that advances in technologies may very well continue to provide 
challenge to the normative ontological divisions law has provided, for 
example the use of artificial wombs. Embryos’ transgression of multiple 
normative biological, and legal boundaries maps on to other dichotomies, 
for example, that between the biological and the artificial.411 Let us recall 
Fox’s analysis of the embryo as ‘cyborg’, and her call for embryos to be 
contextualised within the technological environment, as a product of 
technology and human biological cells; embryos created in vitro arguably 
straddle the boundary between biology and artificiality. Yet, in the 
intellectual framework underpinning, the 1990 Act (realised through embryos’ 
‘special status’) does not place the embryo on this boundary, but instead 
firmly within the bounds of biology as a member of the human species. 
Further, as an entity placed firmly within the bounds of biology by the 
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intellectual grounds for this law, further boundary work has taken place by 
delineating embryos from other human cells (or tissue). Overall, it seems that 
for law, what matters is whether something is pure matter: 
 
Thus, for the law it is clear that the types of materials at issue matter. 
But it is not just that “matter matters”; that is, whether it is important 
that the materials themselves are biological or synthetic. The process 
of mattering – how material comes to matter – is significant.412 
 
Nonetheless, when law was asked to capture ‘the embryo’ (and when 
Warnock was asked to advise on how this should happen), it was 
confronted with the problem that embryos are413 neither matter nor subject. 
Embryos fell into neither of law’s normative dichotomies (much like embryos 
and foetuses in vivo, which are ‘biological’) regarding the biological vs. the 
synthetic; law has placed them firmly in the same arena as it has already 
placed embryos in vivo: with the biological. Yet herein lies a contradiction, 
for the law also contains, to borrow a phrase from the above, both 
processes of mattering and de-mattering embryos in vitro, through use via 
reproduction or research. Processes of mattering,414 or indeed de-mattering, 
are not captured by law. 
 
We have seen that law’s ‘boundary work’415 concerning embryos is unclear. 
It does not fall within any of the normative legal categories; it hovers on the 
apparently bright line between what is subject and what is object. 
Notwithstanding, it is important to note that all law technically governs only 
persons and their actions; it does not really regulate the objects themselves, 
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for objects cannot act/refrain from acting. The framework governing 
embryos is no different. Practically speaking, it does not govern the embryo, 
but rather the persons who do (or do not) use the embryo. The law has also 
managed to legislate in-between these categories, somehow, fitting 
embryos between the bounds of property and personhood. This is visible, 
for example, from the 1990 Act’s treatment of embryos as non-subjects 
(although it does not say this, we can glean this from case law).416 This is 
further evidenced by the fact they can be researched on and disposed of, 
despite their underlying ‘special status.’417  
 
The legal boundaries discussed above highlight the challenges that embryos 
in vitro pose to prevailing legal ontologies, “perceived realities which get 
built into law’s structure and operation.”418 It thus seems that embryos in 
vitro need to go through a legal and conceptual re-formation that captures 
the unfixed (processual, changing) nature of its own forms, 419  and the 
changing status of those who guide embryos through these varying legal 
contexts.  
 
4.4 Conclusions: from process to purgatory 
 
4.4.1 Chapter 4 
 
In sum, this chapter has traced an emerging consensus amongst some 
academics that the time has come to revisit some of the core features of this 
                                            
416 e.g. Quintavalle [2003] (n234). 
417 In one way this almost sounds like law treats embryos as special property (closer to how 
we treat organs), but with more moral vigour behind them. 
418 Quigley and Ayihongbe (n395) 28. 
419 e.g. whether as ‘human’, ‘admixed’, ‘reproductive’ or ‘research’. 






framework, including, as Hennette-Vauchez puts it, the “socio-legal 
(non)construction of the embryo.” 420 Further, it has also found that there is a 
re-emergent call for ‘the embryo’ in vitro to be better contextualised among 
its female and technical origins. 
 
“It is to the credit of the social sciences that they examine and explicate the 
genealogies of the legal embryo”’, write Jacob and Prainsack, adding, “in 
turn, the legal embryo and its surrounding legal lexicon can offer fresh 
material for social sciences.” 421 They argue that: 
 
Legal objects drawn from doctrine or policy, old and new, can be 
useful in a twofold manner: They do not only constitute raw data, to 
be deciphered by social scientists, but they can also bring new 
theoretical insights to social scientists.422  
 
Thus, while the academic analyses described above are convincing, the 
ensuing key question for this thesis is: how might new contextualisations 
such as these translate to regulatory practice? Fox admits this is a question 
left unanswered by her arguments regarding cyborgs. She argues that this 
metaphor should be used as a productive starting point as an alternative to 
“simply slotting the embryo into convenient but ill-fitting legal categories of 
person or property.” 423 If one, for example, believes that Fox’s arguments 
are convincing, which this work does, how might we take her argument (and 
the arguments of others) beyond use as a ‘starting point’? Similarly, if we 
are to heed another main call emerging from scientists in particular – that is, 
to align the law with biology – how might we do so? As we have seen, 
scientific ‘fact’ does not always translate easily into law, and Johnson 
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provides an attractive solution to this. What is arguably lacking in his 
analysis, however, is a legal perspective that relies on more than ‘biological 
understandings’ of the embryo; this is because these are not the only 
understandings that matter here.  
 
4.4.2 Part One 
 
It is arguable that between 1990 and 2017, the law has gone from process 
to purgatory, a state whereby it does not move beyond its original iteration.  
 
With regards to another processual element of the law, the embryo itself, 
increasing embryonic visibility (i.e. increased knowledge of its processes) 
was brought about by research practices, and thus sparked the inception of 
the 1990 Act. I argue, therefore, that this ‘special status’ as a response to 
embryonic uncertainty is inadequate, and this has contributed legal 
ossification of the framework. This, I have argued, has resulted in a legal gap 
between the intellectual set-up of the 1990 Act (as amended), and the 
realities of the multiplicity of processes it now allows for.  
 
Yet what from can we take from this? What is missing; where is there space 
for further reflection of embryonic (and other) processes? To be clear, for the 
purposes of this research, reflecting process means neither a) incorporating 
every new technology, nor b) that our biological understandings of the 
embryo have changed that much since 1990. Rather, it is about paying 
attention to the processes and transformations that occur with the regulated 
subject-object (the embryo) and those around it (donors, researchers 
etcetera). Further, a processual legal approach does not necessarily indicate 
that the law wholly reflects embryonic processes.  
 






As such, there is a two-fold ‘problem’ for law in regulating embryos: 
embryos neither have a fixed status, nor is it possible to ‘fix’ their status 
(practically speaking). Law, accordingly, struggles to capture and regulate 
what embryos are ontologically, as opposed to what the ‘embryo’ is 
descriptively. This may be, for example, because it does not reflect its 
biological processual complexities as per Johnson’s argument. I thus argue 
that further conceptual steps are required if we want the law to better 
respond to the embryo’s uncertain nature.  
 
Ultimately, by constructing embryos in law as ‘the embryo’, under one 
encompassing ‘special status’, law has fixed embryos in vitro in time and 
matter. One might counter argue that this is untrue; the law’s definition of 
‘embryo’ within 1990 Act was amended in the 2008 Act to provide exception 
to their requirement that an embryo be ‘human’, to include human admixed 
embryos (human-animal hybrids). Nonetheless, this does not invalidate the 
fixed, bounded, and all-encompassing category that ‘the embryo’ has 
become under the 1990 Act (as amended). Legally constructing embryos in 
vitro within the bounds of one ‘special status’ fixes multiple embryonic 
processes within one boundary. Thus, I argue that the problematic features 
of law associated with embryonic status (not all of which this thesis deals 
with) are also fixed.  
 
From the analyses of Chapters 2-4, I argue that there are two interrelated 
facets of this legal gap: 
 
• Uncertainty surrounding embryos (in vitro and in vivo), for example 
with regards to how we feel about them and how we should treat 
them. This was reflected throughout history, and in the deliberations 
within the Warnock Report; 





• The ‘legal stasis’ of the embryo in vitro, as regulated by the 1990 Act 
(as amended); in other words, the ossification of its legal 
development. 
 
Further, it has been noted that there is not necessarily a disjunction between 
the 1990 Act (as amended), and the historical development of the early 
stages of human life. Nonetheless, conjoined, the analysis in Chapters 2-4 
have shown that there is cause to better embody process, and move 
beyond the 1990 Act’s original iteration (per its intellectual basis), as law has 
done in the past. It seems that in law almost blinded itself to process, 
history of process, and scientific ‘reality’ of process post-Warnock.   
 
Yet, why, for this work, does all of the above matter? In short, as Part One 
has found, the intellectual basis of the law treats embryos singularly as ‘the 
embryo’, by virtue of according one ‘special status’. In reality, however, the 
1990 Act (as amended) creates multiple categories of, and pathways for, 
embryos in vitro (with seemingly multiple statuses). Up until now, this thesis 
has referred to ‘the embryo’ as it is conceptualised as such in law. 
Hereinafter, however, this thesis shall refer to ‘embryos’, plural, to reflect 
and emphasise the multiplicity of embryonic entities that are created and led 
into various legal pathways.  
 
While the pleas for contextualisation, above, provide justifiable starting 
points, arguably the ‘legal gap’ and relatedly, legal stasis, point to a need to 
redress the way in which law embraces and/or deals with the uncertain, 
changing nature of the embryo in vitro and our understandings of it. Yet, 
how might we navigate this? Is there a way in which law can better embrace 
the uncertain, processual nature of the embryo? There are deeper parallels 
between uncertainty, the stasis of law, and its anti-processual reflections of 
the embryo that may be better understood by exploring the connection 






between the latter, and ‘liminality’ itself. These parallels are explored in the 
next chapter (Chapter 5), which builds on the works of those who frame (the 
embryo and other uncertain entities) in an emergent postmodern category 
called ‘the gothic.’  
 
The research problem thus carved out by Part 1 of this thesis is: how we can 
understand process, legal process and legal regulation more deeply with 
respect to embryos, their protection, and their uses? The following chapters 
explore how law might better navigate and capture each element of this gap 
by way of a two-part analysis. The following Chapter 5, first discusses the 
utility of a framing associated with understanding those who are uncertain in 
nature, and our responses to them, namely that of the ‘gothic’.  
  














Part Two: Through Liminality 
 
Part One of this thesis has shown that while law has changed to reflect 
changing biological and social boundaries, in its modern form its creation of 
multiple embryos - while failing to account for the multiple processes at play 
- has created problems. These may be articulated as a ‘gap’ between the 
intellectual set up of the 1990 Act (as amended), and the reality of the 
processes it has helped to create. This gives rise to the question: how might 
the law fill this gap, both intellectually and practically speaking? Part Two of 
this thesis therefore considers how law might navigate this purgatorial state, 
as diagnosed by Part One, by way of a twofold examination. It does so with 
a view to providing a frame of analysis that can capture and explain the 
uncertain, processual nature of the embryo in ways that can inform legal and 
policy responses to existence and use in reproductive and research settings.  
 
With a view to this, Chapter 5 looks at ‘the gothic self’: this is an emergent 
concept that has evolved as a challenge to liberal idea(l)s of the ‘self’. 
Drawing on the works of Ford and Karpin, it draws parallels between this 
literature, and embryos in vitro as a paradigmatic of ‘gothic’, and argues that 
there is benefit to legally realising them as such. As a framing, it enables us 
to explore the ways in which law deals with uncertainty, regarding those 
who fall between boundaries of normative categorisation. This formalisation 
is a key step in filling the previously articulated legal ‘gap,’ in that it enables 
an understanding of the nature of, and reasons for it, yet it still leaves the 





question as how we should legally 424  treat the embryos that are so 
categorised. This thesis therefore argues further that this residual question 
may be navigated by liminality, a concept concerned with processes and 
states of in-betweenness.  
 
Accordingly, Chapter 6 applies a liminal lens to my previous analysis 
regarding the static nature of the regulation of embryos in vitro. This chapter 
first introduces liminality as an anthropological concept, before going on to 
explain why the human embryo may be described as a liminal being. 
Liminality, which is inherently concerned with transformation, shall then be 
used as a means to further analyse the law’s navigation of processes and 
changes in this field. From this analysis, it will be argued that liminality’s 
presence within embryo regulation is twofold: 1) Within the nature of the 
regulated embryos, and 2) Within the nature of the law that governs them.  
 
By these means and by the end of Part Two, this thesis will have shown that 
there are ways that law can better navigate and capture the contexts that it 
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5.   Navigating Purgatory: The 




This chapter situates embryos within emergent analytical responses to 
postmodern forms of categorisation, which often ignore those that fall in-
between: the ‘gothic self’. In doing so, it provides an important step in 
navigating the contours of this thesis’s previously articulated legal gap, 
which as a reminder, are as follows:  
 
• The intellectual basis of the law treats embryos singularly as ‘the 
embryo’, by virtue of according one ‘special status.’ In reality, the 
1990 Act (as amended) creates multiple categories of embryos 
with seemingly multiple statuses; and 
• Similarly, the 1990 Act (as amended) accords embryos in vitro no 
‘rights’, but also purports to protect their perceived ‘interests.’ 
This, I have argued, is intellectually, legally incoherent.   
 
This chapter therefore draws parallels to ‘the gothic’ as a frame of analysis 
that has grown in counter-response to law’s tendency to place entities either 
within the category of a ‘liberal, individual self’, or outwith it (not between). 





To explain, “the gothic self is everything that [the] liberal self is not”;425 it is 
characterised by disorder, chaos, and dependency. It cannot be subsumed 
under the traditional self that the law presupposes of its subjects. Further, 
within ‘the gothic’ lies the key concept of ‘monstrosity’, those on the 
margins of what we deem to be human: “we stake out the boundaries of our 
humanity by delineating the boundaries of the monstrous.”426 Overall, this is 
a useful frame of analysis for the purposes of this research because it 
provides a category for beings that are transformative and transgressive;427 
ill fitting into our normative forms of categorisation. While ‘the gothic’ does 
not explicitly centre around ‘the in between’, nor law, Part Two argues that 
we should see gothic entities as such, because of their common placement 
(legally, and sometimes socially) on the boundaries between liberal, 
individualised human, and theoretical ‘monster’. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
a parallel discourse of what it means to be ‘human’ has come to shape the 
construction of embryos under the 1990 Act (as amended). Within this, 
embryos in vitro are foregrounded as “disputed territory and endangered 
bodies”,428 reflecting the irresolute discourse leading up to the 1990 Act’s 
inception.  
 
The ‘gothic self’ is often described as an entity that occupies the boundary 
between that which we consider familiar, and that which is unfamiliar. This 
quality, which can invite an uncomfortable mixture of “distaste and 
sympathy”429 from many persons, can easily be located in fictional gothic 
literature. Within this literature, ‘monstrous’ entities, characterised by their 
existence on the boundaries of humanity, may be found. These shall be 
explored first, with a view to a) providing context for this analytical framing 
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and; b) providing relatable examples for those unfamiliar with this theory. 
The rest of this chapter shall then discuss scholarly adaptations of this 
concept, particularly as they apply to embryos in vitro, and an analysis will 
be offered of the regulatory lessons that we might learn from this concept.  
 
5.2 Accounting for those in between 
 
5.2.1 The literary birth of the ‘gothic self’  
 
Classic gothic fiction often contains a mix of themes, such as death, horror, 
humanity, and even romance. From classical literature to contemporary 
depictions of horror, writers create a sense of fear in the reader or onlooker 
through stories where the protagonist encounters creatures that occupy the 
boundaries between human and non-human.  
 
Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel Frankenstein may be described as the original 
‘gothic’ novel, where scientist Victor Frankenstein sets about creating life 
from non-living matter. In doing so, he unintentionally creates an unsightly 
‘monster’, yet with all the features of a human being. He is revolted by his 
creation, however: 
 
I had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful!—Great God! His 
yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries 
beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of 
pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid 
contrast to his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour 





as the dun-white sockets in which they were set, his shrivelled 
complexion and straight black lips.430 
 
It was the abnormality of his apparently ‘human’ features that invited such a 
response from Frankenstein and, later in the book, from many others. 
Importantly, the monster was not necessarily a ‘monster’ within; it develops 
very human emotions and needs. Nonetheless, the monster’s persistent 
rejection by society leads to its demise at the end of the tale. Further 
examples include Robert Louis Stevenson’s 1886 novel, Dr Jekyll and Mr 
Hyde, which depicts a man troubled by an ever changing, morphic, split 
personality and Bram Stoker’s 1897 novel, Dracula, which effectively 
invented the form of vampire that we so commonly see in horror fiction 
today.  
 
There is also, of course, the classic children’s fairy tale Little Red Riding 
Hood. While it is not generally typified as ‘gothic’ fiction, we can see 
elements of classical gothic themes in the story. The tale, with which most 
people are familiar, tells of a talking wolf who encounters a little girl in a 
forest. Here, the wolf has many human capabilities, like being able to speak 
and plan, but in every other sense is very much a wolf. This mixture of 
human and animal, mixed with mal intent, is the root of the wolf’s frightening 
quality. The story climaxes where the wolf kills and takes the place of the 
girl’s grandmother.  
 
Indeed, even in modern entertainment some of the most acclaimed horror 
films (or testified as ‘most scary’) involve entities or creatures that are 
human-esque, for example ghosts or zombies. The source of our sense of 
horror regarding the entities depicted in the above tales is not that these 
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entities have no human-like qualities, but “rather, it is the fact that they seem 
to exist liminally, at the margins of the category of ‘human’, and interstitially, 
across or between categories.”431  Whilst traversing or existing between 
boundaries of categories of humanity, these beings also “conform cleanly to 
none of them.”432 
 
Although embryos and foetuses certainly do not invite such extreme 
responses of fear and adrenaline as the creatures of fictional horror, they 
certainly act as a very real example of the responses of abjection that the 
familiar-yet-unfamiliar can invite. Like Frankenstein’s monster and Dracula, 
embryos exist not only at the boundaries of humanity, but on the boundaries 
of what we know. Further, there is a strong link between research and gothic 
tales more generally. As mentioned in Chapter 2, research by Michael 
Mulkay has, for example, found that within the public debate leading up to 
the legalisation of IVF in the UK, negative images from science fiction such 
as Frankenstein’s monster were used heavily in the debate.433 He suggests 
that in public appraisal of scientific advancements, such as the latter, the 
line between fact and fiction can become easily blurred; the imagery that 
goes along with this can play a powerful role in popular perceptions about 
the ‘threat’ of science, and scientists.434 Further, Andrew Tudor also argues 
that novels or films such as Frankenstein are expressions of society’s 
longstanding “cultural ambivalence” toward science within which there is 
recognition of the power that science’s sense of enquiry can have.435  The 
link between fiction and reality is thus not tenuous; the line between science 
fiction and science fact is becoming increasingly blurred with the invention 
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of new techniques such as implanted devices,436 and artificial wombs.437 
Further, new questions are arising regarding the blurring of traditional lines 
between other areas of health research (and medical law more generally). 
Examples include the blurring of the lines (or ‘silos’) between data and 
persons; genes and data; organs, persons and property.438 The blurring of 
ontological boundaries and legal categories through scientific advancement 
and social change presents a tremendous challenge for the law’s framework. 
As the regulation of embryos in vitro exemplifies, this can lead to a 
conceptual and intellectual gap within the law. In order to explore this gap, 
the following analysis uses emerging academic responses to these blurred 
boundaries, particularly concerning those who exist/hover on the 
boundaries of normative legal subjecthood (as ‘the embryo’ in vitro certainly 
does).   
 
5.2.2 Gothic accounts of the postmodern ‘Other’ 
 
One’s feelings toward the fictional beings mentioned above, whether 
reading a novel or watching a horror film, may be explained by 
psychological theory of the ‘uncanny’. Whilst this theory existed before 
Freud,439 he developed it further in a 1919 essay, das unheimliche, where he 
described the feeling of cognitive dissonance induced in a subject looking 
upon something which is uncanny;440 to put it simply, an entity or object (or 
perhaps both) that one is simultaneously repulsed by and attracted to. The 
                                            
436 Quigley and Ayihongbe (n395). 
437 Hannah Devlin, ‘Artificial womb for premature babies successful in animal trials’ 
(Guardian, 25 April 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/apr/25/artificial-
womb-for-premature-babies-successful-in-animal-trials-biobag accessed 3 March 2018. 
438 See Taylor-Alexander et al (n8). 
439  These theories utilized a being that one sees a lot in modern horror films- lifelike dolls. 
See Ernst Jentcsh, ‘On psychology of the uncanny’ (1906) (2(1) Angelaki: Journal of the 
Theoretical Humanities 7. 
440 Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny (Penguin, 2003). 






Gothic fictional genre has used this unique combination to great success in 
the world of entertainment and publishing. It has also generated much 
scholarly attention, and has been used by academics in multiple 
disciplines.441 As a genre, and as a mode of analysis for those who have 
been ‘Othered’,442 it offers narrative to those who fall between the cracks, or 
outside of modern (or indeed postmodern) norms.443  
 
This trope, in its scholarly form, arose in order to debunk conventional 
narratives around the latter, including females, 444  and those with a 
disability.445 As Allan Lloyd Smith has pointed out in his introduction to 
Modern Gothic, there are “striking parallels between the features identified 
in discourses concerning postmodernism and those which are focused in on 
the gothic tradition.”446 Yet, it does not only apply to those permanently 
between the cracks of norms; Fred Botting wrote that gothic novels warn 
others of “social and moral transgression by presenting them in their darkest 
and most threatening form…when the rules of social behaviour are 
neglected."447 Heyler, who pointed out that these gothic narratives rely on an 
emotional response rather than an intellectual one, explores this in her 
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analysis of the postmodern gothic of the characters in the novel American 
Psycho.448  
 
Explorations of the ‘gothic self’ and ‘monster’ have emerged, in particular, 
as a scholarly counterpoint to legal liberalism (the idea that law presupposes 
individuals to be competent and self-sufficient).449 As Ford has pointed out, 
these concepts are both “literary precursors to, as well as contemporary 
examples of, the postmodern Other”450 (the former having been exemplified 
in the literature discussed above). Otherness, in and of itself, is often a 
transgressive way of being (transgression, according to Ford, means a state 
of ‘non-compliance’ with existing norms).451 ‘Others’, particularly new forms 
of Otherness that have formed in the past half-century (for example the 
‘everyday cyborg’452) on the boundaries of the norm, are often overlooked in 
law.453 As a result, law remains ill equipped to deal with those that fall in 
between the cracks of its normative realms of categorisation. Indeed, within 
the concept of the gothic, the notion of monstrosity plays a vital role. It is 
closely linked with the notion of the ‘abhuman’: “the abhuman subject is a 
not-quite human subject, characterised by its morphic variability, continually 
in danger of becoming not-itself, becoming other.”454 
 
It is this sense of “social and moral transgression” that may be located in 
embryos in vitro. As Ford wrote, this quality of being ‘almost, but not quite’ 
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is close to Freud’s aforementioned concept of ‘the uncanny’.455 This peculiar 
type of familiarity invites negative responses: “abjection (distancing, casting-
out), disgust, shame and revulsion.”456 She argued that this language can be 
easily located in law, particularly in areas such as end of life or disability.457 If 
the gothic is in opposition to the liberal, it is also in opposition to the legal, 
for the law embodies liberal norms.458 The gothic is not only free from the 
law, but also “extra-legal.” 459  According to Punter, the gothic body is 
“perpetually unamenable to the rule of law.”460 In other words, the law finds 
it difficult to permit the exceptional body, “the existence of a monster thus 
poses the threat to the law.”461 The ‘monster’ does not fall under any of the 
law’s categories, and thus challenges these; it is therefore something that is 
difficult to regulate. In her discussion, Ford used the example of the 
conjoined twins case Re A. 462  Here, she described, where the twin’s 
physicality was ambiguous, the individualised liberal self/subjecthood was 
alluded to in emphasising values such as bodily integrity and dignity in 
support of surgically separating the twins at the cost of one of their lives.463 
Thus, as Ford noted, so ‘illicit’ was the twins’ physicality that they were 
“better off separate and dead than alive and conjoined.”464  
 
The ‘liberal self’ and the ‘gothic body’ are thus contrasting models of 
selfhood. One is individuated and self-contained, and the other “disordered, 
leaky and lacking in self-sovereignty.”465 Leakiness, discussed in Margret 
Shildrick’s, “Leaky bodies and boundaries: Feminism, postmodernism and 
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(bio)ethics”,466 is used to refer to the literal physical “leakiness” of women’s 
bodies, and also the leaks and flows between bodies of knowledge and 
matter once traditional boundaries (such as the gender binary) are 
deconstructed. She points out that the normative categories that organise 
us are discursively unstable, and balance is usually obtained by reiterating 
them repeatedly over time. An easily relatable example here might be the 
constant societal reiteration of women’s ‘body standards’; sometimes 
changing with trends, but ever iterated all the same. Shildrick, however, 
argues that we should embrace embodiment as a process, and that we 
should resist formalisation: “an acceptance of the leakiness of bodies and 
boundaries speaks to the necessity of an open response.”467 While ‘the 
embryo’ may not be described as a typical ‘self’, neither can the ‘selves’ 
expounded in works such as Shildrick’s. Both are fluid, occupying unstable 
categories. These associations are born from embryos’ placement in bodies, 
and their challenge to subjecthood in and of itself, not conforming. 468 
Therefore, despite differences in selfhood/personhood, there is much to be 
drawn from ‘leaky’, and other ‘gothic bodies’. In particular, the aforesaid 
point that liminality, as a lens, helps us to account for the fluid yet bonded 
nature between people and ‘things.’ This point is built upon later in this 
thesis (Chapters 6 and 7), which explores the importance of relationality for 
embryonic pathways through the law. 
 
5.2.3 The Otherness of embryos: a ‘gothic’ framing  
 
This research argues that drawing parallels between regulated embryos in 
vitro and the ‘gothic’ trope helps to articulate the complexities that law 
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encounters when faced by their processual, uncertain, “transformative and 
transgressive” 469  nature. This analysis is important because it helps to 
navigate the contours of the ‘legal gap’ carved out in Part One. This 
subsection thus introduces scholarly work on embryos as ‘uncanny’ and 
‘gothic’ (of which relatively little work has been done so far) before going on 
to build upon these works in order to draw lessons from them.  From 
Chapter 3, we have seen at least two possible pathways for embryos in vitro 
thus far (reproduction or research/therapeutic use). We could say that 
embryos are therefore similar to ‘the gothic’ not only because of what they 
are, but also because of 1) the premonitional considerations we make of 
them 2) as Ford argues, where embryos originate from and what we 
associate them with (women), and 3) where they are, i.e. amongst 
technology. Each allows us to understand, more deeply, the legal 
uncertainties surrounding embryos in vitro. The following thus explores the 
‘gothic-ness’ of regulated embryos in vitro under these three headings.  
 
1. Embryos destined for the womb: physical placement within a woman  
 
Isabel Karpin invokes the idea of ‘the embryo’ as unheimlich, or uncanny, in 
her work, in reference to the technologically produced embryo that exists 
outside the body of the woman. Karpin posits that the “technologically 
produced embryo is constructed as a phantasmal premonition of the child 
to be.” 470  Karpin thus suggests that instead of focusing of the latter 
phantasmal premonition, we should instead focus on another, the “not yet 
pregnant pregnant woman.”471 In this way, she evokes the assumption that 
where there are embryos there are also women who will be become 
pregnant with them. Therefore, they are “premonitionally pregnant,” and 
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thus the provisionality of embryos in vitro is highlighted.472 Indeed, in vitro 
embryos, whatever path they are on can only ever achieve personhood 
through gestation within a woman,473 and therefore such embryos remain 
entirely subject to the decisions that any woman makes regarding her 
pregnancy or non-pregnancy. To add to this analysis, this is a more 
processual way of framing in vitro production, because it recognises 
processes have to take place for i) women to become pregnant and then ii) 
birth to take place.474 This is seemingly absent from contemporary policy. 
 
2. The Female Body: Origins and Associations 
 
 
Ford argues that all embryos may be described as ‘uncanny’, and in 
contrast to Karpin, Ford argues that this is particularly so if they are located 
inside the body. She draws upon literature on the ‘gothic’, characterised by 
“ambivalence and uncertainty,”475 which, as described above is a contrast to 
legal liberalism. In doing so, she adds something to the ‘gothic’ discourse, 
as the gothic character of the embryo/foetus is largely absent from 
postmodernist critiques of the liberal self, and where it has been recognised 
this has not occurred with a view to challenging assumptions underpinning 
this portrayal. 476  This “powerful critique” has rarely been extended to 
embryos/foetuses, even though they are arguably some of the most 
paradigmatic cases of transformation and transgression (key elements of 
being ‘gothic’) that one can find in a human context.477 Ford also argues that 
embryos’ (all embryos, but especially embryos in vivo) ‘gothicness’ comes, 
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in part, from their origins. They are created through processes that inspire 
fear and awe: sex and science.478 They are both powerful, yet exposing and 
threatening in their own ways.479 Embryos and foetuses originate in either 
one or the other, or sometimes both of these “profoundly exciting, but 
profoundly troubling institutions, so they are, from their very inception, 
ambivalent and challenging beings.”480  
 
While on one hand, the 1990 Act (as amended) provides for implantation of 
embryos in vitro, on the other it provides for their scientific use and disposal. 
Does this in some way dissociate embryos from women? If so, does this 
make them potentially even more monstrous or gothic? Arguably it does, 
because not only do the associations of being born from women remain, but 
their placement in technology, sometimes being part ‘human’, part animal 
(for example),481 furthers their ‘abhuman’ nature. Yet even where research 
embryos in vitro are not human-animal hybrids, or, as Ford writes even if 
they could be dissociated from their feminine origins and associations, ‘the 
embryo’ would nonetheless remain intrinsically gothic: “its very body, and 
existence, refute and transgress liberal norms of subjecthood.”482 Further, I 
add that there are gothic parallels for embryos in vitro because of their 
technological origins, and, for some, technological futures (research 
embryos).  
 
Not only are women ‘leaky’483 etcetera, but a brief survey of past legal 
judgments, for example refusal of treatment cases, shows a depiction of the 
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woman as unreasonable when “in the throes of labour”,484 albeit women 
have been awarded more autonomy in this area in recent times.485 These 
depictions stand in contrast to another typical caricature of the woman and 
her body, namely, as a powerful and threatening being, “one capable of 
containing the male both in intercourse and in pregnancy, and performing 
hidden and profound transformations.”486 ‘The embryo’/foetus is, of course, 
tied up in this narrative, contained within – or destined for - the woman’s 
womb. Ford claims that ‘the embryo’ ‘absorbs’ the negative associations 
associated with contemporary (mis)understandings of female corporeality.487 
As Ford further points out, the latter argument might be open to critique 
from the standpoint that ‘the embryo’/foetus is often imagined as ‘free 
floating’,488 that is, isolated from the woman in public discourse. However, 
she writes, these two arguments are not mutually exclusive. While, with the 
increased visibility of the early stages of life, the entire process of pregnancy 
has become more of a ‘public event’, it is exactly because pregnancy has 
become so prevalent in the public imagination that the association between 
pregnancy and ‘the embryo’/foetus has been severed. 
 
Even where an embryo is technologically predestined (see below), its 
associations with the female body arguably contribute to embryos’ gothic 
parallels, which itself can be inherently negative, given feminist critical 
literature on ‘the monstrous feminine’. 489  For Karpin, this embryonic 
existence: 
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 ...evokes sympathy and horror in the same moment. Unhinged from 
the all-encompassing female body and equipped with its own genetic 
identity it attains an individuality that pre-figures its birth. In this way 
even in the absence of the mother, the embryo is assigned a holding 
place in the (human) family. But the hybrid/manipulated embryo 
amplifies its uncanniness evoking the horror of an alien presence, 
apparently the same but yet not so.490 
 
It is no news to those familiar with feminist literature that women have often 
been caricatured in every day social and legal discourse as weak 
(emotionally and physically), vulnerable, dependent and unstable.491 Feminist 
discourses have challenged the dominance of liberal notions of the self in 
the case of narratives surrounding those who might be seen in a process of 
transformation, or as transgressing modernist norms, including female, 
‘vulnerable’, disabled, and transgender persons.492 For them, embodying or 
occupying transformational dimensions causes their marginalisation, and 
thus invites responses of abjection.493 Michael Thompson, for example, has 
argued that within the 1990 Act, the association of the feminine with 
monstrosity has been exacerbated by the Act’s regulation of reproductive 
technologies; it combines the ‘monstrous feminine’ with concerns regarding 
new technologies to produce an image of the female as “an object of horror 
and fascination”.494  
 
3. Embryos destined for research: placement amongst technology 
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For some gothic writers, technology is gothic in and of itself:495   
 
Technology… becomes threatening when it emerges as a dangerous 
supplement that supplants and exceeds its control. Like the 
vampire…technology monstrously undoes the system which 
designed it.496 
 
As we have seen above in Chapter 3, some original gothic novellas each 
with their own gothic-technological associations497 (briefly discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter) were regularly cited in media debates leading up 
to the original 1990 Act.  
 
For some, “Frankenstein’s dream of systematic, science-based control over 
the creation of human beings can be seen as having become a reality in the 
modern fertility clinic.”498 Mulkay cites Christopher Toumey who posits that 
many mad scientist stories (like Frankenstein) are presented to us not as 
enjoyable fiction, but as a warning about scientists and science.499 These 
warnings have been easily transferred to media coverage of scientific 
advancements, especially IVF.500 In the lead up the 1990 Act, both sides of 
the debate to support their arguments used this imagery.501 While direct 
reference to science fiction was not always present in Parliamentary debate 
or the media, the negative construction of scientists’ motives, and the 
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temporal extension of the scientific narrative beyond the matter at hand 
(‘slippery slope’ arguments, for example) mirrored some of the more direct 
Frankenstien-esque rhetoric used in the news media when the issue first 
aired. The notion of the mad, malicious scientist continued to work behind 
the scenes. The connotations of embryos within technology, as reproductive 
or research subject-objects thus undoubtedly has gothic associations.  
 
Yet what do we take from (1)-(3), above? Interestingly, although not 
articulated in any of the literature cited in this thesis, it seems that the 
pathways through the law for embryos in vitro (see Chapter 3) coincide with 
the various ‘gothic’ ways of framing embryos delineated above. To explain, 
(1) aligns with the ‘reproduction’ path, and (2) and (3) align with both 
‘research’ and ‘reproductive’ paths. In this way, a gothic framing of embryos 
in vitro has helped not only confirm, but deepen our understandings of law’s 
uncertain ‘reaction’ to embryos in vitro. To explain further, it is important to 
note that a considerable part of the legal and scientific narrative given to the 
reproductive (and perhaps non-reproductive process) is the ‘casting out’ of 
the woman from the story: “The embryo occupies the legal imaginary with 
the force of a vivid premonition of the child-to-be.”502  This is the narrative 
that gives embryos such an uncanny, and ‘gothic’ quality: 
 
For Freud, the uncanny develops from the transformation of 
something that once seemed homely into something decidedly not 
so...The technologically produced embryo existing outside the female 
body is at its most uncanny when it doubles for the child...503 
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Gothic literature thus highlights the uncertain moral and legal responses we 
have had towards human embryos, including those rooted in its association 
with the female body. While embryos in vitro are evidently not (yet) physically 
located within the female body, these associations remain when outside of 
the body, by virtue of the female associations ‘normal’ embryos bear, or 
from premonitions of their future (potential) placement within a female womb. 
This seemingly contrasts with embryos destined for research. Overall, there 
are some similarities in terms and concepts used in this, and the liminal 
literature, as the last section of Chapter 6 will explore. Karpin and Ford, who 
have framed embryos as uncanny/gothic (a framing hitherto rather 
uncommon), have advocated that law recognises the uncanny, and gothic 
nature of embryos, respectively. Literature has yet to answer how the law 
might take its next steps towards encompassing such a framing. The next 
section uses the above to pinpoint key lessons for the law moving forward, 
by way of drawing from Part One’s analysis, and the analyses summarised 
above. 
 
5.3 Lessons from a gothic analysis  
 
This section builds on the above literature, and analysis of that literature, to 
expose two important facets of the law’s framework for embryos in vitro. 
Both of these lessons articulate two things: 1) The nature of embryos in vitro, 
and more importantly for this thesis, 2) The nature of the law that regulates 
them. It also argues, nonetheless, that these lessons leave some vital 
questions, which cannot be answered by any of the analysis made so far, 
and that we thus need an additional framing in order to move forward, one 
concerned with navigating processes and states of in-betweenness: 
liminality.  
 






1. Embryonic ontologies are a challenge to conventional subjecthood 
 
As discussed above, a gothic analysis provides a way to conceptualise and 
articulate those on the bounds of legal subjecthood. The first lesson from 
the above is, therefore, that if we conceptualises them as such, then we can 
bring them out of the outskirts of legal awareness.504 As we have seen, 
conceptions of the gothic self are a useful tool for challenging commonly 
conceived, liberal notions of legal subjecthood. Legal subjecthood, amongst 
other classifications, denotes a certain ‘category’, distinguishing subjects 
from other (non-liberal) persons or things. The law struggles with the ‘self’ 
who is not a liberal subject (for example those who defy bodily norms, such 
as the conjoined twins in Re A,505 or the ‘everyday cyborg’);506 selfhood 
commonly signifies independence and full personhood. It perhaps, then, 
struggles even more so with those who do not qualify as persons (a ‘self’), 
but also do not seemingly fall within the ambit of property. The gothic body 
is one that stands in ‘stark contrast’ to the liberal self;507 it is everything that 
the liberal self is not: “Whereas the liberal self is autonomous, the gothic self 
is dependent.”508  
 
‘Selfhood’ is a problematic term to use when discussing embryos. This, 
however, does not discount it from ‘gothic’ analysis, even in reference to 
arguments about legal subjecthood. Yet, as we have seen, there are still 
many parallels between the gothic trope and embryos. While embryos 
cannot be said to have selfhood, their legal and social oscillation between 
the latter and ‘property’ still places them in stark, somewhat uncomfortable 
contrast to the aforementioned ‘liberal subject’. In other words, the law does 
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not (at present) class embryos as property (whether or not it should is 
outwith the ambit of this work) nor as person; by failing to do either, the law 
leaves embryos to sit in awkward relation to both legal categories. As such, 
it is arguable that the familiar human-like qualities of embryos (amongst 
other things such as its ‘potential’), along with its dependence upon others 
(namely the woman), ‘the embryo’ is a problematic (non)category of entity 
for the law. The law places it in a “category of its own”:509 not quite human, 
not quite inhuman, but “abhuman.” 510  
 
Thus, as a challenge to conventional subjecthood, embryos’ lack of fit within 
law’s normative bounded categories of person or property has provided an 
ontological challenge for the law (and other disciplines, too). This challenge 
has seemingly resulted in what this research has diagnosed as the 1990 
Act’s ‘legal gap.’ 
 
2. A deeper understanding of the 1990 Act’s ‘legal gap’ 
 
A gothic framing of embryos in vitro also aptly highlights some of the 
contours this thesis’ has previously articulated as the ‘legal gap’ between 
the 1990 Act’s conceptualisation and practical effect(s). This gap has been 
ossified in the 1990 Act’s realisation of the Warnock Report’s ‘special 
status.’ This status seemingly treats embryos with both favour and disregard 
in that it gives them ‘special protection’, but also does not disallow research 
and disposal.   
 
In order to explain further, it is worth noting a potential criticism of a gothic 
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framing of embryos in vitro, per Ford’s arguments summarised above: if the 
liberal law’s response to the ‘gothicness’ of ‘the embryo’ has been to ‘cast it 
out’, does the law appear to show ‘the embryo’ or foetus a degree of 
favour?511 For example, it appears to accord it some goodwill by according it 
a ‘special status.’ Ford’s answer to this is that seemingly positive 
statements such as the latter do not necessarily negate the abjection 
response.512 Abjection is ambivalent, and not necessarily without a sense of 
approval. It combines fear and revulsion with a sense of identification, and 
sympathy. 513  Nonetheless, there is arguably more to this. It does not 
necessarily follow that the law shows embryos complete favour. Indeed, it 
favours all embryos, including research embryos, by giving them a special 
status in one sense, and has thus given them nominal and somewhat 
symbolic protection via the 14-day rule, but in another it does not because it 
still allows for these embryos to be researched upon and destroyed. The 
difference between special status and law’s practical effects is thus a prime 
example of how responses to something ‘gothic’ can play out; an apparent 
(and confusing) mixture of favour and disregard. 
 
Further, it helps us to understand more granularly the difference between 
reproductive embryos and research embryos, based on the contexts from 
which they were borne, and are associated with. As an interim conclusion, I 
therefore posit that our understandings of the importance of process are 
deepened by a gothic analysis. Although the literature does not state this 
directly, one may take from it that we need to account (more), for example, 
for the importance of the woman and the processes in her womb for 
embryonic/foetal evolution; a link that has become disconnected. But how 
can we understand these processes more deeply than this? There is 
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arguably a gap in the literature here. The below considers this, before going 
on to examine the answer in more depth in Chapter 6.  
 
5.4 Conclusions: From conceptualisation to 
realisation, what is missing?  
 
If one accepts that embryos are well situated within the gothic category, and 
as a constituent of this category invite these abject responses (as this 
analysis has argued, from people and law), then, as Beebee points out “…to 
counsel against such responses is tantamount to claiming that the 
embryo/foetus does not really belong in that category at all.”514 Indeed, this 
is not what this thesis intends to do; rather, it is quite the opposite: it seeks 
to use the gothic as a frame of analysis in order to better capture 
postmodern responses to embryos. I agree with Ford, who argues that we 
must accept embryos’ gothic character. I also argue that we need to do so 
in order to better understand a) our own responses and, more importantly 
for this thesis b) the law’s responses to them (which has been the allocation 
of a ‘special status’ under the 1990 Act). Also, there seems to be a gap in 
gothic/ uncanny discussions of embryos, in that process seems to be part of 
gothic throughout. Further, while this framing is undoubtedly revealing it 
does not “deliver any positive proposal as to how, morally or legally, it ought 
to be treated.”515 Thus, while this conceptualisation is undoubtedly useful for 
capturing those in between, it leaves the key question of how the law might 
navigate that. In other words, what are the a) contours and b) consequences 
of doing so? 
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Although ‘gothic’ work is not framed in terms of liminality, there is insight to 
be gained by adding this concept to the analysis. Liminality draws our 
attention to the importance of a threshold, that is, having the quality of being 
‘betwixt and between’ states.516 In the next chapter, I shall thus situate ‘the 
gothic’ within liminal literature. Combined, these concepts provide a 
powerful explanation and articulation of why we (as persons), and the law 
(as an institution), treat embryos as they do. The next chapter of this work 
therefore explores liminality as an essential component of realising this 
‘gothic’ framing in law, before finally discussing what it might mean for the 
regulation of embryos in vitro.  
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Thus far, we have seen that embryos in vitro sit on the boundaries of legal 
categories, and, further, represent an essence transformation that law is 
seemingly unable to capture. What complicates the matter for the law, as 
this chapter shall explore further, is the variable physical boundaries517 that 
embryos in vitro can move into, through and out of, namely: 
 
• Research within the lab; 
• Subsequent (and inevitable) disposal post- research; and  
• A woman’s womb (and then out of the uterus, either by growth 
and birth, or by ‘natural’ or medical termination).  
 
Yet, how can the law better capture this, and thus close the intellectual and 
practical gap between conceptualisation of ‘the embryo’ and its reality? This 
thesis argues that to answer this, we need a concept that deals with the 
navigation between boundaries, uncertainty, and processes. For this work, 
that concept is liminality. 
 
This chapter introduces liminality as an anthropological concept, before 
going on to explain why human embryos may be described as liminal beings. 
As an entity in a state of constant and rapid change, embryos sit ‘betwixt 
                                            
517 Not to be confused with variable liminal states, which this chapter will identify.  





and between’ the various realms of legal categorisation. As such, the core 
problem for law is two-fold: ‘the embryo’ has neither a fixed status, nor is it 
possible to ‘fix’ its status. Law, accordingly, struggles to capture and 
regulate what embryos are ontologically (as opposed to what the ‘embryo’ is 
descriptively).518 The challenge in capturing these ontologies is perhaps part 
of the problem; if, indeed, this is what law has sought to do. I will argue that 
an embrace of liminality (both as a state embryos are led into, and as a lens) 
fully reveals the multiplicity of contexts in which embryos are used and 
created. I will posit that if embryos’ current legal status is indeed 
problematic (or at least out-dated), and if the law would like to take process 
seriously, then it is time for the law to recognise explicitly the separate 
contexts and processes through which it is leading embryos. I will show that 
a liminal perspective demonstrates that there are vital aspects of embryos 
(some of which the law itself creates) that the law might better recognise, 
namely its contextually variable and relational qualities. To some extent, 
focus has already been thrown on these matters by a gothic analysis, but, 
as I have argued, this does not go far enough. 
 
Liminality is important to this work because its application (as a lens) helps 
us to understand processes, in a scholarly sense. Further, it can also inform 
practical solutions and approaches concerning how we legally treat 
embryos. Yet if a key facet of liminal process is being led out of liminality, 
one must ask where exactly are embryos being led? Section 6.4 of this 
chapter argues that we must consider whether embryos have a ‘telos’. The 
term, is used here in a basic sense519 in order to cast light on the purpose, or 
perhaps more accurately, the end-stage of embryonic processes within 
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law.520 This analysis is important for Part Three of this thesis, which, draws 
on lessons from this Chapter in order to look more closely at the ways 
embryos are led through and out of processes in vitro. 
 
An exploration of the nature of the interaction between liminality, law, and 
embryos is a key facet of this thesis’ original contribution, within which there 
are several lessons. With a view to this, the final part of this chapter 
assesses the common (and indeed uncommon) threads that may be drawn 
between lessons from liminality, and the previously discussed lessons from 
a ‘gothic’ (re)conceptualisation of embryos in vitro. It builds on the Chapter 
5’s ‘lessons’ in order to carve out a further contour of this thesis’ 
contribution: the explicit, and important link between a gothic 
(re)conceptualisation of embryos in law and a liminal lens.  
 
6.2 Rites of Passage 
 
The realm of the liminal is entered when we participate in cultural rituals that 
transcend everyday life.521 The term is derived from the Latin term “limen” (a 
threshold), which simply denoted a situation where ritual and temporal limits 
were removed “in order to facilitate a ‘passing through’.”522 The concept, 
coined by anthropologist Arnold van Gennep in his 1909 book The Rites of 
Passage, emerged from an ethnographic study of ritual practices. 523 These 
‘rites of passage’, often highly staged ceremonies, were commonly found in 
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tribal communities.524 These were used to stage, often in a ceremonial or 
formal manner, “…a sensitive point in transition between states or statuses 
in a person’s life or in the life of a collective.”525 In some communities, for 
example, children might undertake an initiation rite to mark their transition to 
adulthood when they come of age. Describing these transitions, where one 
crosses a threshold, leaving their old state and entering the new, van 
Gennep wrote:  
 
Life itself means to separate and be reunited, to change form and 
condition, to die and to be reborn. It is to act and to cease, to wait 
and rest, and then to begin acting again, but in a different way. And 
there are always new thresholds to cross: the thresholds of summer 
and winter, of a season or a year, of a month or a night; the 
thresholds of birth, adolescence, maturity, and old age; the threshold 
of death and that of the afterlife – for those who believe in it.526 
 
These rites of passage, for example birthdays, weddings, christenings and 
funerals, bring us from one state of being to another: a transitional phase.   
 
Arnold van Gennep sought to understand social transformations, and 
identified ‘liminal rites’ as a “…key component of the reproduction of social 
order.” 527  Within these rites of passage, suspension of social order is 
nonetheless spatially and temporally limited, and therefore ‘rites of passage’ 
allow a social transformation to occur without disturbing broader 
organisational structures.528 He posited that these transitional moments have 
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three stages:  
 
... [1] the rites of separation from a previous world, preliminal rites, 
those executed during [2] the transitional stage liminal (or threshold) 
rites, and [3] the ceremonies of incorporation into the new world post-
liminal rites.529  
 
Put simply, these stages are: “…a separation from everyday life, a move into 
the margin or limen…and finally a return to everyday life, though at a higher 
level of status, consciousness or social position.”530 ‘Liminality’ refers to the 
middle phase in transition, where the aforementioned suspension of 
structural order occurs. This suspension marks the sense of becoming that 
happens, where someone enters a threshold as one type of entity, and 
leaves it as another. This sense of becoming is paradigmatic of the liminal 
phase.531 A young man may thus enter a rite of passage as a child, and leave 
it as an ‘adult’ or ‘man’.  
 
Anthropologist Victor Turner later built upon Arnold van Gennep’s 
interpretation. His work studied the role of liminality in ritual performances, 
such as initiation rites, and described the manner in which liminal 
experiences may be both transformative, and a powerful lens that reveals 
the underlying values and structure of society. He posited that: “Liminal 
entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the 
positions assigned and arrayed in law, custom, convention, and 
ceremony.”532 Turner also noted that liminality is an “inter-structural situation” 
that involves a concurrence of opposite symbols; thus in the second (liminal) 
stage, opposite processes and notions coincide in a single representative. 
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This representative is characterised by the unitary quality of the liminal: “that 
which is neither this nor that, and yet is both.”533 We may apply this analysis 
to a multiplicity of transitions, where, for any period of time, person(s) are 
neither their old selves, nor yet their new selves, for example during a 
marriage ceremony, or where someone changes their nationality.  
 
Since van Gennep and Turner, liminality has been extended further in 
modern theory. Building upon the work of Árpád Szakolczai, 534 
anthropologist Bjørn Thomassen suggests that there are further concepts 
that help to reveal both the dangers, and the “analytical potential of 
liminality.”535 These are mimesis, trickster, and schismogenesis,536 each with 
their consequences for those ‘in between’. These three concepts reveal the 
danger of not emerging out of liminality, otherwise known as ‘permanent 
liminality’. Here lies an anti-structural, constant state of chaos where the 
entity does not or cannot emerge out of its liminal state to the other side. 
Thus, reincorporation into society is, in some cases, simply not possible.537 
 
Mimesis may be described as a mode of unreflexive imitation through 
imitative behaviour or patterns in the absence of a clear path out of 
liminality.538 As Szakolczai puts it, “a real-life situation of transition – unless 
meticulously regulated in law, as in political elections – starts by a 
weakening and eventual suspension of the ordinary, taken-for-granted 
structures of life. The search for a solution usually involves an escalating 
process of imitation.”539  
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Yet, where imitative situations arise, who “convinces others to follow this 
model”?540 The next concept reveals the risk that a ‘trickster’ emerges where, 
again, there is an absence of a clear path out of liminality. This ‘trickster’, or 
‘shaman of the liminal’, may claim to lead the way out of this situation, but 
instead exploits it for nefarious ends.541 Tricksters are outsiders, figures who 
cannot be trusted, often associated with jokes and storytelling. They exist 
on the margins of society until a situation arises where the attention of the 
community is diminishing, and they can place themselves as a central figure; 
this is where they become dangerous. As Szakolczai explains: “The 
condition of possibility for such trickster takeovers is a liminal situation 
where certainties are lost, imitative behavior escalates, and tricksters can be 
mistaken for charismatic leaders.”542 This figure can be easily located in pre-
liminal literature, myths, and folktales for example Hermes and Prometheus 
in Greek mythology, Loki in Scandinavia, or the North American Coyote. 543 
To add to this, more modern familiar examples might include 
Rumplestiltskin, Jareth (from Jim Henson’s ‘The Labyrinth’), and (perhaps 
controversially) The Doctor (from ‘Doctor Who’). Tricksters thus emerge to 
present a seemingly ‘rational’ strategy that can hook others into following 
them, and where this occurs, liminality can be endlessly perpetuated rather 
than following through to the abovementioned third stage (a return to 
normality); 544 otherwise known as Schismogenesis.545 Schismogenesis may 
be described as a: 
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…risk that the transformative process will not be completed because 
of the (negative) cumulative interaction between parties. This can 
result in either a state of permanent liminality where a state of crisis is 
perpetuated, or the incorporation of a ‘schism’ into society itself at 
the re-integration phase and a ‘splitting off’ of groups’.546  
 
In other words, where society is continually stuck in a state where unity has 
been broken, yet those who have been split are forced to stay together 
(facilitated by a trickster), it can produce an unpleasant state for all and may, 
for example, induce violence. 547 
 
It should be noted that Thomassen548 also argues that liminality should be 
used to examine, rather than explain, social phenomena.549 As a mode for 
examination, he argues, it ‘opens the door to a world of contingency where 
events and meanings - indeed “reality” itself - can be moulded and carried 
in different directions.’550 However, this research argues that it can, and 
perhaps should be used both as an exploratory and an explanatory power in 
the context of embryos. This is because liminality reveals the array of 
subjects, objects, actors, and non-actors involved in the day-to-day life of 
those regulated under and affected by the 1990 Act. It is a lens that enables 
us to explore possibilities, but it also explains, in tangent with Ford and 
Karpin’s work on the gothic/uncanny embryo (discussed above), the 
predominant regulatory attitude towards the status of embryos. In other 
words, it is important to note that for this work the analytical power of 
liminality comes from the ways in which the lens can reveal, more deeply, 
the dynamics of process. For scholars like Thomassen, liminality is not 
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normative, but just ‘is’.551 This work concedes this, but for the purposes of 
this thesis, liminality helps us to understand more than how things are; this 
work focuses on transformational process rather than on (subjective) 
experience. I argue that it helps to reveal an understanding of how liminality 
goes beyond the gothic because it informs normative responses, but 
importantly it is not signalling any particular normative outcome as such (see 
Chapter 8).  
 
6.3 Widening the lens 
 
This section widens the liminal lens beyond rites of passage, and explores 
the liminality of embryos in vitro. It argues that they are liminal in two key 
ways. First, and perhaps the most obvious, embryos are biologically and 
physically liminal - rapidly changing, from one state to another, from a ball of 
cells to (potentially) a baby. Within that, in certain situations embryos are 
also physically frozen, with a somewhat unknown future. It is an ongoing 
process of becoming (what it is becoming will be addressed shortly). 
Secondly, it is legally liminal, neither person nor property: 552  it hovers 
between these two legal categories, suitable for almost everything else we 
regulate. In many ways, it is thus defined by being ‘not yet something else’, 
legally, biologically, socially, and so on.  
 
6.3.1 The liminality of embryos  
 
Human embryos may be described as liminal entities, aside from the liminal 
states that the law has created for them, by delineating categories of being, 
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for they are in an ongoing process of ‘becoming’. Embryos, as ‘liminal 
lives’,553 occupy the second stage, the marginal, or ‘in-between’ zone. As 
Squier states: “these liminal lives test the boundaries of our vital taxonomies, 
whether social, ethical, biological or economic.”554 Building upon this, the 
Liminal Spaces project stresses the need to move away from the tendency 
present in some of the liminality literature to use the word as a synonym for 
a person who occupies merely ‘marginal’ space.555 In the context of health 
research, as well as others, liminality is central to subjects and objects of 
regulation, and the spaces that they go through certainly do not occupy the 
periphery of everyday life.556 As an entity regulated by the 1990 Act (as 
amended), embryos occupy a realm of “pure possibility”; 557  there are 
multiple ‘ends’ to its liminality: research (eventually disposal), reproduction, 
and ‘freezing’. For example, ‘the embryo’ as a resource for SCR “is defined 
by its being ‘not yet’ something else, that is a stem cell is defined more in 
terms of a biological possibility – its pluripotency – than a well- defined 
actuality’”.558  It is arguable that there is room for law to recognise this ‘pure 
possibility’ more. After all, as we have seen there are many possibilities for 
embryos under the framework. Possibility is a key facet of the processes it 
regulates, for example, exact futures are unknown when an embryo is 
created (unless it is created to be researched on). All there is here, therefore, 
one possibility, especially at the stages where embryos are frozen or tested 
via PGD (where possibilities are truly unknown at those stages.) The 
transitory state of embryos have been recognised in other cultures, for 
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example in mizuko kuyo, a Japanese tradition for grieving miscarriages that 
recognises liminality in embryonic life in utero.559 
 
To return to the above point about liminality’s normative quality for this work, 
Susan Squier, writing on excess embryos, argues that “contemporary 
medicine necessitates a significant revision of Turner’s thesis, one that 
acknowledges the shifting, interconnected, and emergent quality of human 
life.” 560  Her work explores how science fiction has paved the way for 
changes in biotechnological science, and uses liminality to explore how 
science and fiction have altered the contours (ontologies) of human life 
through several contemporary examples, such as hybrid embryos. She 
draws upon Paul Rabinow’s work to bridge writings on liminality with his 
concept of ‘purgatory’. According to Rabinow, with biological and social 
ambiguity comes “purgatorial anxiety.” 561  In combining the sense of 
responsibility associated with the latter, and the sense of possibility 
associated with liminality, Squier uses both as a reminder for the long-term 
implications of biotechnological interventions alongside the inventive 
capacity of human beings to change or redirect the trajectories of our 
development.562 Quoting Victor Turner, she adopts the following meaning of 
liminality: 
 
Liminality, literally ‘being on a threshold’- is Turner’s term for an in-
between state, ‘betwixt-and-between the normal, day to day cultural 
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and social states and processes of getting and spending, preserving 
law and order, and registering social status.’563 
 
Liminality is thus a conceptual lens that challenges us to engage with, and 
perhaps even embrace the processual nature of regulated (and unregulated) 
subjects and objects, and their interactions. Through this lens, we can “see 
and experience the most basic elements of common humanity”564 and thus 
“engaging with process and change helps reveal existing social structures 
and ordering practices.” 565  As Squier points out, liminal lives function 
relationally.566 In some ways, embryos may function “less as nouns- whether 
subjects of experience or objects of other’s actions- than they do as verbs, 
enacting a reciprocal exchange between science and culture.”567  Embryos 
are thus a prime example of an entity caught between humanity’s sense of 
“tremendous possibility of the new biomedicine, and our purgatorial anxiety 
to account responsibility for its implications.”568  The rest of this thesis draws 
regularly from the above, yet Squier’s work, unlike this, has no legal focus. 
Further, this work adds a gothic framing to the liminality of embryos in vitro. 
 
As we have seen in Part One, there are multiple processes and ends to 
embryos in vitro under law. These may be identified as:  
  
1. Where embryos are to be used for reproductive purposes; 
2. Where they are to be used in research; and 
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3. Where they have an uncertain future i.e. if used for PGD, their future 
could be either state 1 or 2 (above).569 
 
If an essential component to being liminal in nature is ‘being led out the 
other side’, then one must ask: if the law is to embrace the liminal, 
processual nature of human embryos, then where is it leading embryos to? 
This might be cast as a form of the question: what is/are the telos570 of 
human embryos? The short answer, discussed in this section, is that it has 
no single telos, but multiple ones, as facilitated further by new technologies. 
 
6.3.2 Do embryos have a ‘telos’? 
 
The teleologies available to embryos (in a legal sense) in turn impact on the 
ontology of the regulated embryo(s). For example, if a particular embryo or 
group of embryos are put on a research path, because we can apply new 
technologies to them, they then become research artefacts.   
 
What is/are the telos of human embryos? The short answer, discussed 
further below, is that many embryos created in vitro have no single telos, but 
multiple ones, as facilitated further by the regulation of new technologies. 
Indeed the ‘natural’ telos of embryos has never been singular. Once 
conceived, embryos may be lost naturally from a couple of days in age, right 
through to the later, foetal stage. Alternatively, they may of course undergo 
successful gestation within the mother’s womb and be born into the world. 
The development of modern medicine has brought about more than two 
telos for human embryos. While, as aforementioned, there has never been a 
guaranteed continuity to embryonic life, modern technology has brought 
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about a more explicit disruption to the latter than ever. As Waldby and 
Squier state: 
 
Stem cell technologies introduce a decisive disruption into any 
imagined continuity between embryonic life and infantile or adult life. 
Any biotechnology that changes the temporal trajectory of human life 
has implications for ways of being human.571 
 
New research and reproductive technologies demonstrate that embryos are 
not ‘proto-human’;572 meaning that we cannot simply read the biography of 
human life, and biology, back to our moment of origin. The temporal 
implications of stem cell technologies, for example “demonstrate the perfect 
contingency of any relationship between embryo and person, the non- 
teleological nature of the embryo’s developmental pathways.” 573  The 
boundaries of human existence are therefore increasingly unstable; 
“imprecise at best, contested at worst.”574 As research and conception 
practices are evolving and changing, so does the narrative(s) of embryonic 
life:  
 
Thus, assisted conception practices had already unsettled the 
teleological end point of embryos that places it within a sequential, 
linear narrative of ‘life’: gametes-embryo-foetus-child…. For instance, 
the teleological sequence of embryos may include one or more of the 
following: be frozen and stored, allowed to perish, implanted into the 
‘mother’ who then miscarries, used for implantation into a woman 
other than the source of the oocyte (egg), or used by clinicians to 
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practice assisted conception techniques and further understanding of 
human reproduction.575 
 
Certain embryos thus lack a ‘human’ teleological trajectory, for example 
admixed embryos. Some argue even further that if they lack that trajectory, 
perhaps it is a misuse of language to even call them embryos at all: “An 
embryo reflects an evolutionary history and a developmental future. If cloned 
human blastocysts lack this teleological trajectory, it would be a misuse of 
language to continue to call them ‘embryos.’”576 Whilst this thesis does not 
claim that the term ‘embryo’ should be retired from use in certain cases, it is 
nonetheless worth noting the modern redundancy of the connotations, and 
teleological implications, of using the term ‘embryo’ in all contexts.  
 
It seems, then, that modern science, facilitated in law, affects the teleologies 
of embryos in at least three ways: 
 
1. It interrupts;  
2. It pauses; and  
3. It creates teleologies for embryos. 
 
It is interrupting, in that it can change the liminal ‘path’ that embryos are on. 
They can go from PGD to implantation, or to research. They can go from the 
developmental process, to being terminated where a woman wishes it. It 
pauses it in that allows embryos to be literally frozen in time, in a state of 
‘permanent liminality’, unmoving along any trajectory at all. The law also 
creates teleologies for embryos, in that it creates new situations, possibilities, 
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and paths in which they can exist (liminally), and from which they can be led 
out of (teleologically) that did not exist before. For example, embryos can 
now be used as a supply of stem cells, the telos of which is to be disposed 
of or turned into something new, such as an advanced therapy for the 
treatment of others or a research tool.   
 
One might argue that the use of teleology in this context is misplaced. If, as 
according to Aristotle the ultimate telos of all humans is ‘flourishing’, and 
living a virtuous life (etcetera)577 then it would seem nonsensical to use it to 
support practices which result in embryo disposal. Yet, this is not 
necessarily implicated by use of the word ‘telos’. Here it is used to 
emphasise the third, hitherto unarticulated stage(s) of embryonic legal 
processes. As Karpowicz et al argue, teleological arguments do not 
preclude or necessarily support, for example, the creation of chimeras.578 
Whether merging human and non-human tissues, or altering the ‘path’ on 
which an embryo might sit (see figures 1 and 2, above), the nature of 
teleological guidance leaves room for endless speculation on the ‘natural’ 
purposes of any living thing without providing guidance on what is ‘right’:579  
 
…it is not clear whether a teleological view would consider heart 
transplants or in vitro fertilization natural or unnatural. By their very 
artificiality, these would seem to violate the natural ends of the human 
components involved and of those who possess them, rather than 
restoring them to their teleological functions. Yet the same 
interventions would help humans achieve their natural ends, 
respectively, of being alive and reproducing.580 
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Scientific intervention has clearly defined, and redefined, the possible telos 
of human embryos. Yet, what role should the law play here? The answer to 
this is of course subjective, but there are considerations it might better 
embrace if it wishes to take a sincere stance on the processual nature of 
embryos. Reintegration into the community, as per Turner, 581  is neither 
possible, nor desirable for all embryos in vitro.582 Perhaps, then, the answer 
to this is not that the law should necessarily lead them somewhere, but to 
recognise that by virtue of being entities ‘betwixt and between’, they are 
already being led out of liminality by technology and society, facilitated in 
law. Yet, as the below shows, this is not always possible.  
 
6.3.3 Permanently liminal? 
 
As argued in the introduction to this chapter, liminality literature can add to 
the gothic analysis in order to help us understand our (non)-engagement 
with the abhuman. Recall that according to liminal literature, the ultimate 
telos of liminal beings is to be led out of liminality. Some, however, may 
experience ‘permanent liminality’: a constant state of chaos where the entity 
does not or cannot emerge out of their liminal state to the other side; 
reincorporation into society is, in some cases, simply not possible. Thus, 
some entities can remain (permanently) ‘in between’.  
 
Like all that is gothic, and all that is liminal, embryos are “always on the 
point of dissolving into something else.”583 It is unstable, tenuous, and 
incomplete. According to liminal literature, the permanently liminal become a 
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perpetual ‘outsider’. While this has a marked overlap with aforementioned 
theories of the ‘gothic self’, nonetheless, as aforesaid, this does not 
necessarily always place them at the margins of moral and social life. 
Permanent liminality has been used in disability literature to discuss and 
challenge the experiences of some disabled persons in society. Willet and 
Deegan confront our “hypermodern society”, which “creates permanent 
liminality for most people with disabilities” and is full of barriers for the latter 
such as “forbidden spaces” (e.g. those without wheelchair accessibility).584 
Persons with disabilities have also been described as experiencing 
responses of legal abjection.585 As an “inchoate,”586 partially formed being, 
embryos are a model of the various hallmarks of the gothic, and liminal (yet 
not necessarily marginal).587 Some embryos’ liminality is perpetuated in law, 
their in-between state ossified either physically (by being frozen) or 
symbolically by what may be interpreted as failing to provide an effective 
‘out’, or ‘third stage of the liminal process. Teleologically speaking law 
arguably treats research embryos as ‘artefacts’,588 yet their telos (as an 
artefact) has arguably been limited by the 14-day rule.  
 
Perhaps the most obvious form of permanent liminality for embryos, then, is 
their physical freezing within a lab context. “Good quality”589 embryos may 
be frozen for use in future treatment, or research. The ‘quality’ of embryos is 
unaffected by the amount of time they are frozen. According to the HFEA 
website: 
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The embryos will be put in a special substance, which replaces water 
in their cells. This will protect the embryos from damage caused by 
ice crystals forming. They’ll then be frozen, either by cooling them 
slowly or fast freezing (vitrification) and stored in tanks of liquid 
nitrogen until you’re ready to use them.590 
 
At the end of the standard storage period (10 years, but in some special 
cases this can be extended to 55 years),591 where one’s embryos have not 
been used for treatment, there are a number of options: donate them to 
someone in need; donate them to research; donate them to training, or; 
discard them (the most commonly selected option).592 Where embryos are 
used for training, research, or are discarded, their final (legally governed) 
process is their disposal, where according to the HFEA, they are “simply 
removed from the freezer and allowed to perish naturally in warmer 
temperatures or water.”593  These embryos thus never really ‘emerge’ out of 
liminality to a new ‘flourished’ state. Further, one could also argue that 
permanent liminality also applies to embryos used for research in particular; 
never going beyond the 14-day stage and thus all they ever have been 
(since conception), or will be, is ‘in between’. It is therefore arguable that 
embryos, as “research artefacts”594 are prevented from becoming the best 
possible artefact they can be (teleologically, in terms of an object of 
scientific value), as opposed to the common norm where their use is limited, 
despite their inevitable disposal. 
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Accordingly, there is little in the way of substantive “feedback loops,” a 
mechanism we explore in our Liminal Spaces paper, ‘Beyond Regulatory 
Compression’.595 To explain, feedback loops are outputs of a regulatory 
system routed back as inputs to the various actors implicated in an 
enterprise.596 We argue that: 
 
 Using the frame of command-and-control regulation as a particularly 
acute instance of regulation given effect through law, we posit that 
such responses often compress and dislocate the ‘feedback loops’ 
needed for robust and dynamic steering of behaviour, thus stunting 
the development of flexible regulatory tools that can better address 
health research…. To consider command-and-control in particular, 
such an approach is characterised by what we call regulatory 
compression. While feedback loops – outputs of a regulatory system 
routed back as inputs to the various actors implicated in the 
enterprise – exist between research and regulatory spaces, they are 
bound by the organisational structures in which they arise. The 
temporal dimensions of health research regulation play a central role 
in mediating the resolution of ontological issues (of what something 
‘is’ that is to be regulated) and of democracy (how can we decide 
appropriate and socially acceptable ways of regulating). When the 
regulatory space is viewed this way, we can see the effects of 
respective regulatory approaches in health research practices.597  
 
We discuss them in the context of health research regulation more generally, 
but embryos are rather representative of this point in context: 
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Embryo regulation is a form of static, hard law, and the question of 
the status of the embryo – as laid down by Warnock – has not been 
revisited since the creation of the original HFE Act in 1990. Even the 
debacle over cloned embryos was effectively shut down by the 
House of Lords in 2005 in Quintavalle. This is arguably an example 
where potential for new, more public input into the regulation of 
embryos has been blocked, thus maintaining the rigidity and 
inflexibility of one of the core focuses of the HFE Act, viz., the status 
of the embryo. Accordingly, there is little in the way of substantive 
feedback loops, and the statute itself is quite inflexible in this 
regard.598 
 
Although there are, quite commendably, regular consultations on certain 
proposed incremental amendments to the 1990 Act,599 notwithstanding the 
small extent to which this is done in consultations, there are few 
supplementary opportunities for this issue to be addressed. Therefore, the 
key issue at hand for this research is that the ‘special status’ of ‘the embryo’, 
a core facet of the 1990 Act that regulates the use of embryos in the UK in 
multiple contexts,600 as having been made entirely inflexible by the law, the 
status itself being permanently liminal in a way. In the years since, the law 
has seen examples such as Quintavalle,601 where potential for new and more 
public input into the regulation of embryos has been blocked. This acts to 
maintain the rigidity and inflexibility of one of the core focuses of the 1990 
Act (as amended), the ‘special status’ of ‘the embryo’. 
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Embryos may also be framed as liminal in law. This state is, thus far, 
unchanging. Notably this is not necessarily a ‘bad’ thing, nor is permanent 
liminality more generally. It is important, nonetheless, that this state is 
realised so we might move beyond, and out of it (discussed further in the 
next subsection). Therefore, two of the three liminal states summarised 
above may be identified as not only ‘liminal’, but also ‘permanently liminal’ 
(1 and 3). Nonetheless, as discussed further in the next section, not only are 
embryos in vitro liminal entities or indeed permanently liminal within the 
framework that governs them (as argued above), but so too is the law that 
governs them. Overall, this section has drawn out one of the key facets of 
this thesis’ original contribution: the positive potential of permanent liminality. 
Below, I argue that considering it in this manner allows us to move beyond 
what we have (if we so desire, although whether or not we desire it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis), or rather, it provides a framework for 
discussion when considering moving beyond what we have (and which we 
have had for about 27 years, at the time of writing). 
 
6.3.4 Liminal law?  
 
This section argues that liminality may not only be identified as a feature of 
embryos themselves, but also of the law that governs them. Here it is 
argued that the static, unchanging regulation of embryos in vitro identified in 
Chapters 3-4 is a form of permanent liminality, building upon academic calls 
for ‘frozen’ medico-legal concepts to “unfreeze”.602 
 
From what we have seen above, a diagnosis of permanent liminality 
seemingly paints a bleak picture. Szakolczai has termed the aforementioned 
permanent states of crisis, as ‘permanent liminality’; a never-ending chaotic 
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state. 603  While he describes this state as negative, as with mimesis, 
schismogenesis and trickster above, it is arguable that ‘permanent liminality’ 
has positive potential, at least as an analytical lens. In revealing the 
permanence of an inherently processual legal and physical condition, this 
analytical process leaves scope for this purgatory’s disruption. Indeed, calls 
have already been made by some to “ditch durability” as a hope for law in 
this ever-changing field.604 This thesis argues that permanent liminality can 
create a new ‘condition of possibility’ when this state of stasis becomes 
apparent; a condition for change. 
 
One aspect of these concepts particularly speaks to the UK’s regulation of 
embryos in vitro. Mimesis, the blind following of certain practices without 
reflection, might arguably be located in the 1990 Act’s iteration, and 
apparent reiteration of embryos’ ‘special status’. Recall that the question of 
the status of ‘the embryo’, as laid down by the Warnock Report, has not 
been revisited since the creation of the original 1990 Act. It is arguable that 
Parliament has been unreflexively iterating embryos’ ‘special status’ since 
the 1980s, without revisitation or reflection. It has not been questioned in 
Parliament since its inception, and in fact has been specifically noted as not 
up for discussion in deliberations leading up to the 2008 amendments to the 
Act.605 This correlates with the above discussion of ‘feedback loops’.  
 
While this may seem bleak, it is nonetheless worth noting, what this thesis 
calls the ‘positive analytical potential’ of liminality. Szakolczai has termed the 
aforementioned permanent states of crisis, as ‘permanent liminality’; a 
never-ending chaotic state. While he describes this state as a negative, as 
with mimesis, schismogenesis, and trickster above, it is arguable that 
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‘permanent liminality’ has positive potential, as an analytical lens. In 
revealing the permanence of a particular situation, whether it be the 
regulation of embryos or others, the analytical process leaves scope for the 
disruption of this permanence. Indeed, calls have already been made by 
some to ‘ditch durability’ as a hope for law in this ever-changing field.606 
 
In a collection of papers entitled ‘Embryonic Hopes’,607 Fox and Murphy 
posit that contemporary law-making on embryos cannot and should not be 
durable: “We think that durability has to go: it can no longer be our hope for 
the law in this area.”608 In expecting law to fail, and for failure to be made 
‘ordinary’, their hope is that law will become more workable, as change is a 
necessary feature in regulating this field. 609  They advance that if we 
articulate our hopes (as reference points for scenarios and decision-making) 
for law, and settle conflicts regarding meanings and boundaries (whether 
potential or actual) in a pragmatic way, then these expressions of emotion 
can yield to reasonable legal solutions,610 such as amendments that have a 
positive impact on family structures.611 For the authors of this collection, 
hope, and failure seem to go hand in hand in law, each the flipside of the 
other. Failure “breaks open a consensus agreement once it is no longer 
capable of responding to real-world problems in a satisfactory manner.” 612  
It thus enables us, and particularly stakeholders in policy such as those 
affected by infertility, to revisit and re-actualise hopes (in terms of what we 
might want for law) in reaction to this.  
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Legal constructions of embryos thus have considerable power to make and 
break research and family-making practices. I argue, therefore, that we must 
be receptive to change in its normative characterisations, and not allow 
them to stagnate as social and scientific understandings change. ‘Durability’, 
then, where science and society are changing relatively rapidly in the field 
the 1990 Act regulates, may be framed as a form of permanent liminality. If 
we do not hope or intend for permanence of law, however, we need to be 
cognisant of embryos’ regulatory purgatory. To explain my argument further, 
and a return to Squier’s work and her connection between Turner’s 
‘liminality’ and Rabinow’s ‘purgatorial anxiety’, allows parallels to be drawn 
between Rabinow’s diagnosis, and the unrevised legal status of embryos 
today. Rabinow describes this experience of social and biological ambiguity 
as: 
 
…a chronic sense that the future is at stake; a leitmotif among 
scientists, intellectuals, and sectors of the public turning on 
redeeming past moral errors and avoiding future ones; an awareness 
of an urgent need to focus on a vast zone of ambiguity and shading in 
judging actions and actors conduct; a heightened sense of tension 
between this-worldly activities and (somehow) transcendent states 
and values; and a pressing need to define a mode of relationship to 
these issues.613 
 
In Squier’s elicitation of the intrinsic relationship between possibility and 
responsibility in contemporary health research,614 a core feature of embryo 
regulation is unveiled. To extend this analysis, we have seen this tension in 
recent debates surrounding embryos on the extension of the 14-day rule; 
surrounded by the very tensions described above by Rabinow. Yet I argue 
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that as we have seen, law’s characterisation of this tension often occurs in 
the fixation of boundaries in order to balance the weights of possibility and 
responsibility in rapidly advancing fields of technology. I thus posit that this 
fixedness, when unvisited, becomes purgatorial.  
 
Although there are, quite commendably, regular consultations on certain 
proposed incremental amendments to the 1990 Act,615 notwithstanding the 
small extent to which this is done in consultations, there have been few 
supplementary opportunities for this fundamental issue to be addressed. 
Recall that the key issue at hand for this research is that the “special status” 
of embryos, a core facet of the Act that regulates the use of embryos in the 
UK in multiple contexts,616 has been made entirely inflexible by the law. In 
the years since the law has seen examples such as Quintavalle,617 where 
potential for new and more public input into the regulation of embryos has 
been blocked. This serves to maintain the rigidity and inflexibility of one of 
the core focuses of the 1990 Act (as amended), the ‘special status’ of 
embryos in vitro. Yet, can we move beyond this, out of liminality, applying 
the positive potential of permanent liminality, above? This thesis explores 
the answer to this in Part Three.  
 
Jacob and Prainsack end their collection by asking: “If the law’s facing of its 
own failure (and resilience) is more inspiring than disconcerting, could this 
be because embryos have had an effect on the law as well as being 
produced by the law?” 618  ‘The embryo’ in law is just one of many 
representations of embryos. Indeed, Jacob and Prainsack “…challenge law 
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as an instrument of order and its reliance on the distinction between 
persons and things.”619 As discussed in ‘Beyond Regulatory Compression,’ 
the ‘liminality of things’ helps to reveal the fluid and bonded relationship 
between health research subjects and objects,620 for example tissue and its 
donor. It also helps to reveal the nature of entities that might be classed as 
‘subject-objects’ (here, neither subject nor object, yet both) where their 
states in respect of the latter are fluid and subject to change. While law in 
this area has continued to be reactionary and piecemeal,621  it has not 
necessarily dictated embryos’ liminal nature, for liminality is “not easily 
amenable to direct influence or control.”622  It has, however, facilitated new 
forms of liminality, each with their own end. If the production, use, and 
disposal of embryos in vitro for reproduction and research are to continue in 
light of the advancement of scientific techniques in this field, a nuanced 
legal approach is required in order to take embryos out of regulatory 
purgatory. This approach, which draws from the analysis made in this Part, 
shall be explored in Part Three.  
 
6.4 Lessons from a liminal lens 
 
So far, the key lessons from a liminal lens (for this thesis) are as follows: 
 
• The positive potential of ‘permanent liminality’ with regards to the 
regulation of emerging technologies and scientific processes;  
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• The centrality of relationality and experiences of the regulated 
embryo623 as subject-object, and embryonic processes as it travels 
through legally and scientifically produced ‘pathways’ 
• The liminality of law itself, permanently in a state where it does not 
renew, or emerge out of this state to a new one. 
 
This section of the thesis argues that there are several key parallels to be 
drawn between liminal literature and hallmarks of the ‘gothic’. Both can 
draw lessons from the other, and the following aims to synthesise these 
lessons in the context of the regulated embryos in vitro. It does so with a 
view to debunking current legal norms surrounding the singular ‘special 
status’ of ‘the embryo’. 
 
As we have seen above, scholars such as Squier have already cast embryos 
as liminal beings, and this thesis does not purport to make a new claim re 
embryos as liminal. What this thesis does do, however, is make a key, and 
arguably much needed link between embryos as ‘gothic’ and embryos as 
‘liminal.’ As discussed in Chapter 5, a gothic framing of embryos in vitro 
enables us to appreciate the way we treat embryos and the reasons for that, 
but this perspective still leaves the key question of how it may be 
encompassed in law. As mentioned above, analysing law through a liminal 
lens may answer this. Yet, why, one might ask, is a gothic framing required 
at all? I argue that it is important because it reveals essential facets of the 
law that would be absent from the employment of a liminal lens alone: it 
reveals both the nature of and why there is a ‘legal gap’, as identified in Part 
One. It thus provides an essential intellectual step between the gap in the 
law as is, and the intellectual closure of this gap; from conceptualisation to 
realisation.  
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Both ‘gothic’ qualities and the liminal condition commonly include those 
who are in a state of fluidity and flux; they neither conform to one category, 
nor any other. Further, there are multiple categories or ways of ‘being’ for 
embryos (this is in part facilitated in law); this is discussed further in Part 
Three.  This section therefore draws together some of the distinct, yet 
currently underexplored links between ‘gothic’ and liminality literature. Thus 
far, it identifies three main qualities as sites of interconnection between the 
two concepts, all concerned with those who fall between normative 
boundaries: ‘in-between’, ‘becoming’, and ‘relationality’. There is, however, 
one glaring disparity between ‘gothic’, its related literatures, and the liminal 
literature: marginality. 
 
6.4.1 ‘Marginal’?  
 
A key feature of the gothic trope is to challenge the marginalisation of, and 
debunking of conventional narratives surrounding, those who stand in 
contrast to liberal norms and thus may be perceived as sitting as on the 
outskirts of ‘normal’ society. For some, their personal/physical opposition to 
liberal (legal) norms causes these groups’ marginalisation in society.624  
 
Marginality, however, is a key divergence between liminality and the ‘gothic’ 
that should be addressed here. The Liminal Spaces Project challenges the 
common conception that ‘liminal’ can be used as shorthand for ‘marginal’, 
and argues instead that in the context of health research regulation liminal 
spaces are central to every day practice: 
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…we stress the need to move away from a tendency of some of the 
liminality  literature to employ the word as a synonym for something 
or someone that occupies a ‘marginal’ space. When viewed in the 
context of health research regulation, these liminal spaces do not 
occupy the periphery. On the contrary, our analysis shows that 
liminality is central to the everyday research practices and the 
regulatory mechanisms that surround them.625 
 
While other ‘gothic’ entities may rightly be described as ‘marginal’, this 
thesis argues that embryos may not. The gothic literature above does not 
say that embryos are marginal per se, but it does point out that there are 
parallels between them and ‘monstrous bodies’, who are often classified as 
marginal persons. And indeed Ford has argued that we ought to be willing 
to acknowledge that ‘the embryo’ can invite abjection responses from the 
law, and others.626 Nonetheless, liminality shows us that it is important not to 
frame embryos as something that is liminal because it is marginal. It is 
important to articulate that while gothic entities are indeed “extra-legal,” 
“unamenable to the rule of law,”627 and they may sometimes be liminal, one 
does not necessarily give rise to the other. Liminality is central to the 
physical transformation of embryos because these entities are subject to 
perpetual change towards well-defined (legal) ends, and thus this realisation 
has significant implications for the way in which the law regulates them. To 
be clear, this thesis draws an important distinction between being placed on 
the margins (whether in law or society), and being marginal (intrinsically). The 
key point, here, is not that embryos are not marginal in any sense, but that 
liminality cannot be used as a shorthand for marginality, which it seems that 
‘gothic’ sometimes can be. Moreover, a label of ‘gothic’ is a mere descriptor: 
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it tells us nothing about law as regulation, nor indeed about law as process. 
If regulatory objectives are to be met, including those with regard to 
embryos which will necessarily change status in the pursuit of those 
objectives, then we require better ways than we have at present of 
understanding the processes in play.  
 
 
Liminality, whether experienced by subjects, or experienced by onlookers in 
relation to subject-object, or indeed (not)experienced by objects, is central 
to every day social and political life. The law may indeed ‘cast out’ non-
liberal individuals, and as we have seen in Chapter 5, whether by default or 
by design, embryos in vitro have been slowly disappearing from the legal 
landscape, but this does not imply that they are marginal (either as research 
objects, or reproductive subjects-to-be). In other words, while the law may 
have ‘cast out’ certain individuals or entities, they remain central to scientific, 
societal and political life. Herein lies one of the key problems for this thesis: 
the law has placed embryos on the margins, whereas in reality, embryos are 
liminal, not marginal. This is because embryos are central to research and 
reproductive practices. Yet, what might we do about this? In answer to the 
legal ‘casting out’ of embryos, Ford suggests that:  
 
For a start, instead of embedding the notion of the foetus as 
‘monstrous’ or as ‘outcast’…or excluding discussion of the 
embryo/foetus altogether as most postmodernist discourses on 
corporeality and subjecthood do, we ought to be alive to the parallels 
between the body of the embryo/foetus and other ‘monstrous’ bodies. 
We ought to be willing to acknowledge the possibility that the 
embryo/ foetus invites responses of abjection – from academic 
commentators and judges, as well as from ordinary members of the 
moral community. It would be strange if the embryo/foetus were able 





to avoid such responses, given how readily it maps onto concepts of 
the monstrous and the abhuman. As such, any notion that the 
incomplete, unstable body of the embryo/foetus can be excluded 
from serious attempts to critique liberal subjecthood, particularly in 
the bioethical context, must be regarded as problematic.628 
 
A liminal lens does not necessarily stand in contrast to this recommendation, 
but to add to this, this thesis recommends that while we should be alive to 
the parallels between embryos and ‘monstrousness’ or ‘Otherness,’ their 
liminal qualities have placed it centrally within the moral community; albeit 
with mixed responses. This does not negate that the law has had an ‘abject’ 
response to ‘the embryo’, quite the opposite; these abovementioned 
parallels place ‘the embryo’ in a particularly unique place in law, where it is 
there left relatively untouched, yet remains central to moral and scientific 
knowledge exchanges. Instead of naming this legal response to ‘the embryo’ 
as a ‘casting out’, it might be better to call it a ‘regulatory purgatory’. And if 
this is accepted, then this brings another reason to consider the issue 
through a liminal lens: liminality, as stated previously, is about leading 
through and out of a state of stasis. It requires us to ask: what lies beyond 
legal stasis?  
 
6.4.2 Between boundaries: “A confusion of all the customary 
categories”629 
 
Building upon Freud’s abovementioned theory of das unheimliche, 
psychologists have since referred to the ‘anxiety’ that can be facilitated by 
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the Uncanny.630 This may be linked to Susan Squier’s adoption of Rabinow’s 
‘purgatorial anxiety’, also discussed above, and liminality. When we come 
across the liminal, this sensation is created not only in concern over what 
we should or should not do, e.g. with regards to biotechnologies, but 
interestingly adds that “in the ambivalence and ambiguity of our responses 
to them, we also confront our own in-between state.” 631 From what we have 
seen of accounts of the ‘gothic self’, one could say that ‘gothic’ persons, or 
onlookers upon ‘gothic entities’, can experience the same kind of anxiety. 
When encountering the gothic, the sense of familiar-unfamiliarity arguably 
leaves the onlooker in his or her own emotional purgatory. This thesis 
argues that the ‘gothic’ thus invites people to experience their own ‘in-
between state’. Purgatory, even if it concerns another, is a fearful state of 
being for many, which has been reflected in classical gothic literatures such 
as Dante’s ‘Divine Comedy’ (‘limbo’ or ‘purgatory’ being the first circle of 
hell).632 Embryos’ own purgatorial state has put the law, an onlooker, in its 
own moral, social, and regulatory purgatory. This is an effective explanatory 
power behind the law’s ever more apparent ‘step back’ from the human 
embryo over the past 27 years.  
 
Recall that Turner describes liminal beings as “neither here nor there; they 
are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed in law, custom, 
convention, and ceremony”.633 There are striking similarities between this, 
and ‘gothic selves’ described by literature, who often do not quite belong to 
one societal group, or another, or fall under a particular category of person 
that the law prescribes (for example gender.) Being in an “inter-structural 
                                            
630 See Gilbert Diatkine, ‘Le Séminaire, X: L'angoisse de Jacques Lacan’ (2005) 69(3) Revue 
française de psychanalyse 917. 
631 Squier Liminal lives (n24) 9. 
632 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy (Vintage Books, 2013). 
633 Turner, Forest of Symbols (n484) 95. 





situation” involving a concurrence of opposite symbols, 634  a quality of 
liminality, is equally as important a hallmark for those who are thought to be 
‘gothic’. Occupants of the liminal, and the gothic, both sit betwixt and 
between, being neither one nor other, occupying a liminal space between 
societal taxonomies “…whether social, ethical, biological or economic”.635 
Yet those who have been delineated as gothic in nature, in many cases, 
cannot reach the ‘third stage’ of liminality; emerging out of the other side 
and returning to everyday life. These people or entities may therefore be 
described as ‘permanently liminal’.  
 
Human embryos are the epitome of Turner’s description of the liminal social 
condition: “a confusion of all the customary categories.”636 While embryos 
are not in a ‘social’ condition per se (for that might require personhood), the 
latter analysis can still apply. It is physically and structurally absent from 
society; it is in many ways, invisible. According to Turner, liminality is often 
accompanied by seclusion of those in transition, “since it is a paradox, a 
scandal, to see what ought not to be there.”637  
 
One can see how this effect of liminality applies to those who have also 
been centred in gothic literature, which argues that we should not 
necessarily see this quality as something that is negative, it is an 
“inescapable feature of humanity.”638  Those who feel that they do not fall 
within the normative gender binaries, for example, have certainly 
experienced (and indeed suffered) responses of abjection, yet some may 
also be described as liminal (‘between genders’). There is an androgynous 
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quality to embryos, as are many of those who are in a liminal state.639 Their 
sex organs, whether male or female, are not visible via ultrasound until the 
nine-week stage, and in fact do not even develop before the sixth week. 
This adds to the paradoxical, ambiguous quality of embryos, qualities that 
also characterise liminal beings.640 Dually, gothic and liminal literature helps 
to frame and reveal these qualities; ever underlying discourse, but never 
articulated.  
 
Moreover, recall Chapter 4’s consideration of embryos in vitro as ‘boundary 
objects’, of which there is a degree of ‘interpretive flexibility’. This point was 
made to demonstrate that embryos are on the thresholds of various 
boundaries that we recognise; for example, they are simultaneously “nothing 
and not-nothing.”641 This analysis, conjoined with the above, is helpful to a 
point, for this work, but a further step is required here because are embryos 




Embryos are very much in a state of constant change, ever becoming 
(unless frozen). It should be noted that the notion of becoming is much 
centred within the liminal literature, rather than the gothic literature. While 
we can see echoes of this notion within some applications of ‘the gothic’, 
there is still a significant divergence between the two concepts on this front. 
Recall Kelly Hurley’s description of the abhuman subject: “a not-quite 
human subject, characterised by its morphic variability, continually in danger 
of becoming not-itself, becoming other.”642 The latter part of this description 
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very much echoes the liminality literature. Nonetheless, a divergence should 
be noted, in that becoming ‘not itself, becoming other’ is a ‘danger’ here, 
rather than a rite of passage with the positive connotations of reintegration 
into society. The ‘danger’ (if any) in liminality is not sourced from an entity’s 
becoming, but that it might stop becoming; the possibility that that state 
might become ‘permanent’, or subject to mimesis, a trickster, or 
schismogenesis. To apply this to embryo regulation, as argued above, one 
could say that the 14-day rule prevents embryos from becoming: here, they 
are stuck in a limbo from which there is no emergence.  
 
Thus, one parallel may be drawn here, however, in that if a liminal being is in 
‘danger’ of these three concepts, it is in danger of becoming ‘Other’ by 
virtue of not being able to emerge from liminality. For the purposes of this 
research, a distinction of Hurley’s analysis of the abhuman may thus be 
made between something’s morphic variability and sense of becoming, and 
its danger of becoming ‘Other’. Embryos may thus still be situated as 
‘abhuman’ as per the parallels it has with ‘gothic selves’, yet it is important 
that we differentiate between becoming as part of liminality, and becoming 
‘Other’ as part of permanent liminality.  
 
It is also worth noting that for those to which ‘gothic’ literature typically 
lends its analysis their ‘Otherness’ is often not a development, but 
something they have been born with (albeit not always, disability etc. can of 
course be acquired), and thus often cannot (and do not necessarily want to) 
‘emerge’ out of as per liminal literature. Thus, for those who are ‘gothic’, 
there is much more of a sense of negotiating their ‘being’ as opposed to 
negotiating ‘becoming’.  
 
In the two permanent liminalities described above the law is thus preventing 
embryos from becoming. I posit that permanent liminality, like a gothic 











Some liminality literature applies the concept to experiential contexts, thus a 
subject is often described as experiencing liminality.643 Why, then, might we 
still apply liminality to embryos? To explain (at least in part), by connotations 
of ‘experience’ itself, as it is clear that embryos do not yet have the 
conscience to ‘experience’ in the normal sense. Notwithstanding, this is not 
problematic for the use of this lens in an embryonic context for this thesis. 
Thomassen highlights in his work the multitudes of applications that 
liminality may have, from moments, to places, to objects.644 However, he 
also remarks that experiences of liminality can relate to three types of 
‘subjecthood’ (individuals, social groups, and whole societies).645 While this 
might have opened up the possibility of liminality to some extent, as a lens, 
in some ways it is also rather restrictive. As the Liminal Spaces paper 
‘Beyond Regulatory Compression’ notes: “…this typology is rather limiting, 
especially when we observe how much of health research regulation 
focuses on objects- tissue, data, embryos, genes and so on- rather than on 
the person to whom these objects relate.”646  
 
We argue that Thomassen’s typology arguably does not take account of the 
network of participants (subject or object) who can be involved in a liminal 
process or setting. Subjects and objects in these settings can be moulded 
and defined by their interaction, in other words, their experiences of each 
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other. To provide a basic example, when parents christen a baby, he/she is 
not aware of what is going on or why; the process, in many ways is for the 
parents. Liminality thus helps to account for the changing relations between 
people, things, and the world around them. It is not only people who can go 
through processes, “things” are also capable of transitioning in a manner 
which leads to new, or renewed understandings of the thing itself, and their 
connections to people.647 As demonstrated by the above discussion, it is 
important to recognise the “fluid but bonded nature of the connection 
between subject and object.” 648  Thus, in order to use liminality’s full 
analytical potential, we cannot only talk about the liminality of things 
(objects), but of those who experience objects’ (or indeed subject-objects’) 
liminality. Policy, and its construction affect the way that people experience 
the thing being regulated; it is entirely relational. Human embryos are 
arguably paradigmatic of that, in that their subjectivity and objectivity is fluid 
depending upon the regulatory path they are put on, (for example research, 
or reproduction). These pathways shall be discussed in more detail in Part 
Three. As mentioned above, after all, the 1990 Act does not actually regulate 
embryos, but persons’ actions/inactions regarding embryos.  
 
To tie this analysis into liminality’s normative potential (discussed above), it 
is arguable that we could continue to talk about liminality of things as a 
standalone category, or, we could argue that the thing itself is going through 
experience, but this is being experienced by the actors who are implicated 
in the transformations being done to the thing in question. A multiplicity of 
actors can affect embryos in vitro, from the decisions of their progenitors, 
intended parents, or the scientists who research upon and dispose of them. 
These relations can all have different meanings, in different contexts, for 
example the relation between an embryo and its donor is rather different 
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depending upon whether it is decidedly a ‘research’ or ‘reproductive’ 
embryo.  
 
Herein lies the relational lesson from liminality. Overall, it is arguable that the 
1990 Act (as amended) overlooks experience as transformative part of 
liminal process, although embryos do not ‘experience.’ In other words, if 
experience is one revealing component (in that it can inform normative 
discussions) of the liminal lens (with regards to our regulatory structure), 
another is the dynamics of process. Yet, if the process is incomplete, and 
embryos do not reach their telos, then, as we have seen above, we are at 
risk of ‘permanent liminality.’ 
 
Further, application of this relational framing to a legal context helps forge 
connections between the law, regulatory subject-objects (embryos are often 
treated as both simultaneously in law, for example when frozen) and the 
human subjects from which they were derived.649  In these situations, law 
facilitates the modification of the subject-objects’ states of affairs, for 
example ‘consent’ acts as a mechanism for ‘unused’ reproductive embryos 
to be used for research purposes.  
 
6.5 Conclusion: navigating through liminality 
 
While law in this area has continued to be reactionary and piecemeal,650 it 
has not necessarily dictated embryos’ liminal nature, for liminality is not 
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easily amenable to direct influence or control.651 It has, however, facilitated 
new forms of limen, each with their own end.  
 
Both ‘gothic’ qualities, and the liminal condition commonly include those 
who are in a state of fluidity and flux; they neither conform to one category 
nor the other. Further, there are multiple categories or ways of ‘being’ for 
embryos (as, in part, facilitated in law), which is discussed further in the Part 
Three. A gothic analysis emphasises embryos’ (liminal) placement between 
‘person’ and ‘non-person’, and provides convincing explanation as to the 
‘step back’ the law has taken from them in the past 27 years. As an aside, 
this is not to say that the reason for this is not also grounded in policy. 
Baroness Warnock, for example, recently advocated that we should not alter 
the 14-day rule, so that embryo research is not opened up for discussion 
again:  
 
We should note that every time the law about embryo research has 
been changed or amended the opposition has rallied its forces, and I 
think it would do so again if we try to get the 14-day rule 
extended…The risk is that all the progress we have made since 1990 
would be lost. I think we should stick to the 14-day limit.652 
 
Whether or not one agrees with this, it is nonetheless grounded in legal (and 
social) ambivalence towards embryos. This ambivalence would not be there 
(at least in part) if it were not for the parallels that human embryos have with 
the ‘gothic self’. Yet, how can the law cope with this ambivalence? The 
Warnock Committee’s original answer was, as aforementioned, according 
                                            
651 See Laurie ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law’ (n15) 60. 
652 Baroness Warnock speaking to the Observer, quoted in, Robin McKie, ‘Row over 
allowing research on 28 –day embryos,’  (Guardian Online, 4 December 2016) 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/dec/04/row-over-allowing-research-on-28-day-
embryos accessed 4 February 2018. 






‘the embryo’ a ‘special status’ and thus attaching limits to its use in research 
context. Nonetheless, as very recent debate over research time limits has 
shown,653 the advance of science has proven problematic for this static form 
of regulation, placing embryos and law in regulatory purgatory. This is where 
liminality becomes relevant. Liminality helps to reveal how law might better 
engage with the liminal, processual treatment of embryos. It emphasises 
that our regulation of embryos is already somewhat context-based, in that it 
treats reproductive and research embryos very differently. Moreover, if we 
want law to embrace that further, there are certain distinctions it can make 
between certain ‘types’ of embryos, based on recognising the different 
processual pathways on which we  - and the law – place different categories 
of embryo.  
 
Yet what has liminality revealed about these pathways? Recall that the 
‘liminality of things’ helps to reveal the fluid and bonded relationship 
between health research subjects and objects, for example tissue and its 
donor. It also helps to reveal the nature of entities that might be classed as 
‘subject-objects’, where their states in respect of the latter are fluid and 
subject to change. “The paradox is that while liminality has failed hitherto to 
account for things, regulation all too often fails to account for experiences of 
subject in relation to things...” 654  This, for example, we can see this 
argument reflected in feminist literatures (discussed above, critiquing the 
law as having failed to articulate the vital relation between embryo and 
woman). Further, while embryos do not, of course, subjectively experience 
liminality (as far as we know), science, and the law turn them into liminal 
entities in the sense that they are in transition (or stasis) towards diverse 
ends. These factors necessarily impact on their legal and moral status in 
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654 Taylor-Alexander et al (n8)159.  





different ways, but the law at present does not recognise this, let alone 
accommodate it.   
 
It might be the case that law will always be liminal, and this is something we 
should embrace. Recognising its liminality means we can revisit, and grow, 
almost in a Hegelian sense. This analytical frame thus suggests that there is 
a way for law to better capture and navigate process, and enable moving 
out of law’s ‘permanent liminality’ (previously identified as ‘legal stasis’) at 
some point. If we move away from permanent liminality, perhaps the 
associated negativities of this state can be lost as that state is lost (namely, 
the lack of a coherent framework). This is not to say that permanent 
liminality is always a ‘bad’ thing: on the contrary, here its realisation enables 
us to move beyond stasis.  
 
To recap, the key combined lessons from Part 2 are as follows: 
 
• A gothic framing articulates research embryos’ permanent liminality 
within law; 
• Utilisation of a liminal lens has diagnosed law, too, as permanently 
liminal. This framing has positive potential, which can enable law to 
emerge out of its stasis; 
• A liminal lens has brought a new facet to a gothic framing of embryos: 
that being on, or between, boundaries do not and should not denote 
marginality. Those in between, per this research’s analysis of 
embryos, are central to everyday lives of donors, potential parents, 
and research practices. However, as Part One has shown, there is a 
disparity between the reality of these everyday lives and practices, 
and the law’s framing of them;  
• Law treats embryos in vitro as marginal, because of their gothic 






nature, yet as a liminal analysis has shown, this is not the reality in 
practice. This articulates more deeply, a key facet of Part One’s ‘legal 
gap’;  
• Relationality, and experiences by persons that produce or use 
regulated embryos are central to their use, as subject-object that 
travels through legally and scientifically produced pathways, one of 
the key original contributions of this thesis (to liminality literature); and 
• Overall, this conjoined analysis acts to articulate, and navigate, the 
contours of this gap, where law has seemingly struggled to capture 
the uncertain, processual nature of embryos in vitro.  
 
The next step for this thesis, then, is to identify how Part Two’s articulation 
and navigation might take place in order to lead embryos out of liminality. 
This work’s final question is thus: How can law better reflect the uncertain 
nature of embryonic processes, and the technologies that create them? 
 
  













Part Three: Out of Liminality 
 
The lessons from Part Two, as applied here, make evident that there are 
more ways to define embryos than by an interpretation of biology; 
everything that happens to them is because of actors along the way. 
Moreover, these actors relationally define their embryos through their 
experience of them. Thus, future parents and their IVF clinicians experience 
embryos differently than the donor couple and the researchers who conduct 
research on embryos qua research artefacts. A context-based approach, for 
this thesis, provides a more intellectually robust basis for regulating embryos 
in vitro, especially in light of the ever-changing nature of science, technology, 
and society.  
 
Part Three addresses these lessons. In order to do so, Chapter 7 explores 
how an embrace of liminality (as a lens that also allows us to see this as a 
quality of embryos) reveals the multiplicity of contexts in which embryos are 
used and created. I argue that if we wish for law to continue to take process 
seriously (as it has done in the past), and that if liminality teaches us about 
the permanent liminality of law in this area, then it is this approach that 
provides a framework to consider the separate contexts that law is leading 
embryos into, through, and out of. Importantly, this thesis does not claim 
that doing so would change what we have, in terms of the prevailing legal 
and regulatory framework, in any seismic way, but rather in a nuanced way 
that allows us to ask questions about how we want to treat embryos, legally.  
 





Building on Chapter 7, Chapter 8 then considers 1) the implications of this 
approach for the ‘legal gap’ identified in Part One, and 2) ways in which this 
lens might help the law to consider contemporary debates on embryos in 
vitro, and the broader implications that those debates may have. Importantly, 
this chapter is not assessing what we should do, but the ways in which this 
lens helps us to think about what we could do. It emphasises that liminality 
and ‘the gothic’ can add to legal, ethical, and social discussions on embryos 
in vitro.  
  






7.   A Context-Based Approach 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Amongst other things, Part Two of this thesis, by way of a twofold analysis, 
revealed the legally liminal nature of embryos in vitro, particularly when it 
comes to embryos that are to be used for research purposes, and/or 
disposed of. Yet recall that the liminal process has three stages: “a 
separation from everyday life, a move into the margin or limen…and finally a 
return to everyday life, though at a higher level of status, consciousness or 
social position.”655 The first and second stages of embryos’ legal liminality 
have been examined by Parts One and Two of this thesis, but what of the 
third? If an essential component to being liminal in nature is ‘being led out 
the other side’, then one necessary question that a liminal analysis has 
made evident is if the law is to embrace the liminal, processual nature of 
human embryos, then where is it leading embryos to?  
 
With a view to answering this question, building on Part Two’s gothic 
framing and liminal, teleological analysis, and Part One’s diagnosis of the 
1990 Act’s ‘legal gap’, this chapter explores and articulates embryos’ 
‘pathways’ through the law. I emphasise, in particular, that there can only 
ever be two places that law (as it is) can lead embryos: to a woman’s womb 
or to its own destruction and disposal. Ultimately, this chapter has been 
carried out with a view to answering a question left by Part Two’s analysis: 
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how might we use a liminal lens to bring its lessons, and the lessons from 
Chapter 5’s analysis of ‘the gothic’, from conceptualisation to realisation? It 
does so in three sections: 
 
• First, it briefly takes stock of the analysis and ‘lessons’ highlighted 
by this thesis so far, before going on to synthesise the above, and 
in doing so consider the ways in which law can lead embryos out 
of liminality;  
• Second, it focuses on the roles of persons in embryonic 
processes in vitro; and 
• Finally, it draws out the contours of a context-based approach, 
including what the approach is not. 
 
This chapter concludes by asking what the implications of this approach 
might be a) for the ‘legal gap’ identified in Part One, and b) for some of the 
contemporary debates surrounding the use and production of embryos in 
vitro.  
 
It is important to note that by advocating a context-based approach this 
work does not intend to imply that different contexts in which embryos can 
be used are entirely ignored by the law. As discussed in Part One, the 1990 
Act (as amended) has arguably recognised these (and thus embryos’ 
processual nature) to some extent with, for example, its separation of 
‘human’ embryos and hybrid embryos. 
 
 






7.2 Synthesis: leading embryos into and through 
liminality 
 
As we have seen from Part One, well before the development of modern 
science, law has dipped in and out of the special relationship between 
mother and embryo/foetus. The legal regulation of embryos in vivo has been 
variable, but heavily influenced by common understandings of embryonic 
process at any given point in time. It is important to begin by reiterating that 
there is, of course, no such thing as ‘the embryo’ under law. However, recall 
that, in the UK, all embryos in vitro do fall under one ‘special status’. We 
thus have a multiplicity of embryos implicitly delineated in law, and these 
arguably vary depending upon the context in which they appear. The 
following summarises, briefly, these legal contexts, and the extent of the 
law’s involvement in embryonic/foetal processes in each. 
 
To start at the beginning, as it were, the first context in which embryos 
appears may be described, as (once a woman is pregnant) 656  through 
‘natural’ reproduction.657 Where the mother intends to take an embryo to full 
term the law in the UK does not interfere. It does get involved,658 however: 
 
1. Where a woman wishes to terminate her pregnancy. This (as 
previously discussed in Chapter 2) is governed by the Abortion Act 
1967; 
                                            
656 On pre-pregnancy, people may have as many children as they like, with whomsoever 
they like. There are a few limits on whom: for example, limits such as age of consent to 
sexual activity, and prohibitions on incest.  
657 Although women can also self-inseminate via ‘DIY assisted conception’. See Emily 
Jackson, ‘The law and DIY assisted conception’ in Kirsty Horsey (ed) Revisiting the 
Regulation of Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Routledge, 2015).  
658 Directly, although there is a lot of discussion surrounding ‘nudging’ pregnant women. 
See for example: Medard Hilhorst, Eric Steegers, and Inez de Beaufort ‘Nudge me, help my 
baby: on other-regarding nudges’ (2017) 43(10) Journal of Medical Ethics 702.   






2. Where a woman wants to refuse medical treatment that would 
prevent termination;659  
 
3. Where the woman and partner are in conflict over an unborn 
embryo/foetus, the law has traditionally been very involved. Today, 
however, the law has (at least relatively speaking) taken a step back. 
In many cases the interests of the woman trump those of the unborn 
embryo/foetus,660 or any other parties involved, including the father. 
There are some exceptions, such as the Evans case661 where it was 
ruled that frozen embryos could not be implanted without both 
parties’ permission; and 
 
4. Where the woman wishes to take an unborn embryo/foetus to full 
term but it is not medically possible (medical futility).662 This of course 
existed before the development of modern medicine, but has become 
more articulated as science, and the ability to intervene in 
pregnancies, has advanced.  
 
With the growth of modern (technological) science, however, embryos can 
exist in more contexts. All of the above may be classed as ‘reproductive’ 
embryos, however the onto-teleological 663  categorisation of embryos 
becomes slightly more complicated in vitro. The creation and biological 
                                            
659 For cases on this, see for example: Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1978] 2 
All ER 987, [1979] QBD 276; Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 411 ER 649; 
Re S (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671; Burton v Islington Health Authority 
and De Martell v Merton and Sutton Health Authority [1992] 3 All ER 833; MB (an Adult: 
Medical Treatment), Re [1997] 38 BMLR 175 CA, [1997] 8 Med LR 217; St George’s (n485).  
660 See Sheila McLean, ‘The moral and legal boundaries of fetal intervention: whose 
right/whose duty’ (1998) 3(4) Seminars in Neonatology 249, 251. 
661 Evans [2008] (n247). 
662 See Laurie, Harmon and Porter (n241) 516-542.  
663 Referring to the importance of time in the way we categorise embryos, see Chapter 6.  






processes of embryos/foetuses in vivo are only touched upon by the law in 
certain situations, and even then, law can only be called upon after the fact 
in most situations.664 In this way, the law relating to reproduction in vivo is 
very much outcome-oriented. Unlike the latter, law is greatly involved in 
every stage of embryonic processes in vitro. It goes beyond getting involved 
in variable situations, and outcomes for these embryos, created outside of 
the body, to governing all stages of the process. Yet, as this thesis has 
argued, while the 1990 Act (as amended) governs all of these stages, it does 
not encompass them as well as it could.  
 
Traditionally, medical law has dealt with the first three contexts listed above. 
The result of this is that, in the present day, the interests of the pregnant 
woman often trump those of the unborn embryo/foetus, or the man involved 
(importantly, not always).665 The fourth remains a far more complicated area. 
For the purposes of this research, however, we turn to a fifth context: 
 
5. The fifth context, the one central to this thesis, creation in vitro, has 
multiple sub-contexts that an embryo may go through. These are 
listed in further detail below. These, as aforementioned, may be either 
‘reproductive’ or ‘research’ embryos. 
 
An all-encompassing statutory framework governs this context: the 1990 
Act (as amended). As summarised in Chapter 3, legal provisions for embryos 
in vitro seem to fall under the Warnock Report’s ‘special status’ in one way 
or another (the extent and nature of this special status being, in and of itself, 
quite vague). 666  Yet, in juxtaposition to this singular status, within this 
framework exist a number of legal ‘pathways’: 
                                            
664 E.g. ‘wrongful life’ and ‘wrongful injury’ actions.  
665 Particularly when the embryo is not in utero, see Evans [2008] (n247). 
666 See discussion in Ford (n20). 






a) Creation of a ‘human’ embryo in vitro, and subsequent implantation 
into a woman’s womb, intended for reproduction; 
b) Creation of a ‘human’ embryo in vitro with a view to implantation in a 
woman’s womb, which is subsequently, but prior to implantation, 
deemed as surplus or tested upon for genetic disorders (resulting in 
positive or negative selection). Here the intended use of an embryo is 
‘reproductive’ at the time of testing, but may change to ‘research’ 
subject with the permission of its ‘parent(s)’; 
c) Creation of a ‘human’ embryo in vitro for the purposes of research 
only, researched upon for up to 14 days, then disposed of; and 
d) Creation of a hybrid (legally ‘non-human’) embryo in vitro, 667 
researched upon for up to 14 days, then disposed of. 
 
It should be made clear that not all of these legal pathways are available (or 
indeed possible) for every embryo in vitro. Some embryos were created in a 
manner that means they can never legally be used for reproductive 
purposes, either a) as a hybrid embryo, b) as a cloned embryo, or c) 
because they were created especially for research purposes with donor 
gametes. Yet, this work is particularly interested in the regulation of ‘human’ 
embryos in vitro, for they (unlike admixed embryos, at least at the moment) 
have multiple possible teleologies under the current framework.  
 
As a rule that reflects a ‘special status’ that applies to all embryos in vitro, 
the 14-day rule places ‘research embryos’ in permanent liminality, per 
Chapter 6’s analysis. Part of this research’s original contribution is the claim 
that permanent liminality, as it applies to embryos, is not always a negative 
experience, and in fact can give rise to positive change if realised. This may 
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be said to reflect the consequences of schismogenesis, per Chapter 6’s 
liminal analysis668 that eventually results in permanent liminality. For embryos 
in vitro, per pathways (b) and (c) above, there are several stages within those 
legal pathways where they sit at a crossroads between potentially becoming 
being, or becoming ‘artefact’.  This reflects the ‘splitting off’ of groups at the 
re-integration phase of the liminal process.669 Those which are led down the 
research route (undoubtedly by relational means, see below/above), as we 
know, may no longer be implanted into a woman’s womb. An embryo on 
this route or ‘pathway’ may therefore only ever be treated as research 
‘artefact’670 under the 1990 Act’s framework. If an embryo is on this route 
then, from which there is ‘no return’, as an ‘artefact’ or (essentially) a legal 
‘object’, then there may be reasons (legally speaking) to treat these embryos 
as the ‘best’ object they can be, per a liminal analysis. To use the 
teleological analysis from Chapter 6, in other words: in asking where law 
leads embryos to, it becomes evident that at some point, some embryos are 
split off from others, and essentially become treated as ‘objects’ under law 
(although certainly not explicitly, in fact maintaining a ‘special status’ implies 
quite the opposite). ‘Reproductive’ embryos, on the other hand, remain 
legally liminal (as subject-objects), until they (hopefully) emerge out of legal 
liminality by being born. Further, there are arguably multiple liminal 
processes beyond a ‘reproductive’ embryo in vitro’s ‘end stage’ (i.e. once it 
is in vivo). Two possibilities spring to mind, the first being the implantation 
process, and second, the process of birth. As this thesis has shown 
however, through its processual analysis, this end stage, for embryos in vitro, 
is by no means the only stage of importance for law.  
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669 Laurie ‘Liminality and the Limits of Law’ (n15) 58. 
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Further, this is also true for embryos, and liminality might again add insight 
to this. The overlap of embryonic categories, and its presence betwixt and 
between thresholds of categories define embryos. The fluid corporeality of 
embryos has, in a way, defined the law’s response to them. However, 
instead of embracing the former, it has resorted to a version of law that only 
partially recognises embryos’ inherent instability; an instability that the law 
itself has facilitated: 
 
By virtue of this process of becoming, it makes little sense to 
categorize it as a singular entity. Moreover, not only does the 
ontology of the embryo change as it moves into different time-spaces, 
the ability to engage with the therapeutic possibilities of the embryo 
for research is co-produced at the intersection of regulation, biology, 
and laboratory approaches technologies.671 
 
Where embryos are given a ‘reproductive path’, their treatment as a subject, 
rather than as an object, could be said to intensify. To be clear, they are not 
treated as subjects (with personhood) in law, but more as a subjects-to-be. 
For example, the Abortion Act 1967 makes it increasingly difficult, as the 
foetus develops, for it to be terminated. Liminality, as a lens, makes evident 
the law’s treatment of embryos as subjects-to-be or objects, and, further, 
the importance of relationality; connections with subjects that already enjoy 
full personhood, namely the biological (or non-biological) creators of the 
embryo, “ought not to be too easily or quickly severed.”672 It raises the 
question: If a particular embryo is a research object, should it be led to be 
the ‘best object it can be’, i.e. the ‘best possible’ research object? The 
implications of this shall be discussed in Chapter 8.  
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Overall, teleological liminal analysis allows us to consider embryos’ 
pathways into, through, and out of the law. For ease of references, they may 
be depicted in the following manner: 
Figure 1.673   
 
 
From the above, we can see the thresholds in place for embryos in vitro, 
beyond which they sometimes cannot return (for example, after being 
created ‘for research’, or after being implanted). The above flowchart has 
attempted to show the overlap of embryonic categories, and their onto-
teleologies that occur under the 1990 Act. For example, there is an overlap 
between the ‘not-selected’ or ‘spare’ embryo created for reproduction, and 
embryos created for research. This is not to say, however, that they always 
overlap, but at key (liminal) moments in legal processes, they certainly do. 
Yet how, practically speaking, are these changes in path made? They are 
only determined in law to some extent. If, as Part Two has shown us, 
relationality is a key aspect of liminal embryonic processes, perhaps it is 
more pertinent to ask: who creates these changes in embryonic onto-
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teleological pathways? The exploration of the dynamics of these processes, 
aside from a focus on process itself, also reveals the importance of persons 
for these processes, i.e. their relationality. After all, it is people who place 
embryos in the womb, gestate, research upon, or dispose of them. This is 
the subject of the next section.  
 
7.3 Who leads embryos into, through, and out of 
liminality? 
 
If what embryos might become is variable, the outcome is largely at the 
behest of external actors (at least in the context of the 1990 Act).674 Given 
that the 1990 Act (as with all statutes) does not regulate embryos, or objects, 
but the people who produce, use, and come into contact with them, these 
contexts are made possible through persons. This subsection focuses on 
the relational aspect of embryonic pathways. It does so because one of the 
key lessons from Part Two has shown us that a focus on embryos in vitro 
alone, as part of a broader network of actors, would be limiting.  
 
The above flowchart makes this evident for embryos, and accounts for the 
changing relations between ‘persons’, ‘things’, and ‘non-things’ in the 
variable pathways that an embryo can take. Depending upon the pathway 
an embryo takes; a different actor might lead it through its liminal state. A 
woman, for example, leads it through gestation, or a researcher through the 
research process. Both are essential to the respective processes; without 
these actors, the processes could not take place. Relatedly, at the point in 
time where the progenitors of an embryo make their decision, their intention 
begins to shape the legal status of any given embryo, thus indicating the 
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context within which its value (whether reproductive, therapeutic or other) 
will be determined. These actors are the vehicles that lead embryos through 
liminality. They are thus key players in embryos’ technologically produced 
biological processes. Moreover, as Squier has pointed out, liminal lives 
function relationally.675 In some ways, embryos may function “less as nouns- 
whether subjects of experience or objects of other’s actions- than they do 
as verbs, enacting a reciprocal exchange between science and culture.”676 
Embryos are a prime example of an entity caught between humanity’s sense 
of “tremendous possibility of the new biomedicine, and our purgatorial 
anxiety to account responsibility for its implications.”677  
 
The fluid quality of embryos, and those who lead them into, through, and out 
of liminality highlight this area of law as transgressing thresholds, 
boundaries, and time; the 1990 Act (as amended) regulates a space of 
uncertainty. In other words, there are things that have been (and can be) 
revealed by the lens of liminality that the law has yet to embrace fully. Yet 
why should the law do so? Ingram Waters points out that evolving scientific 
knowledge has come paired with an increased scientific awareness of the 
multiple ‘uses’ that embryos now have:  
 
Human embryos are no longer defined only as those things that 
become human; now, human embryos have the potential to become 
other things, such as research subjects, stem cell repositories, and 
facilitators of therapeutic cloning research. Their value is increased by 
their enhanced utility. For Squier, biotechnical innovations and their 
accompanying discursive constructions alter the liminal space in 
which science and human bodies interact. The liminal space can be 
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seen as a field of knowledge production where the contestation of 
claims happens in numerous ways ...678 
 
Embryos are paradigmatic of the scrutiny that the ontological status of novel 
entities undergo, in which “the near future and recent past”679 is a central 
feature.680 Here there is an inherent relation between our knowledge of 
embryos, their process of becoming, and the rules that society and the law 
applies to them. Liminality thus helps reveal the network of actors at play in 
the regulation of embryos, both in health research and in artificial 
reproduction. Embryos are a site of cross over for epistemology681 and 
ontology 682  (episteme and ontos), 683  where knowledge and existence 
intertwine. This framing further highlights that the outcome of these actors, 
interactions, exchanges, all facilitated in law, is that embryos in vitro now 
have the potential to be led through a number of paths, each variable in 
itself. On most paths, an embryo will reach some sort of end or telos, but 
they may also be frozen for periods. There is thus a distinction between: a) 
an embryo that is likely to emerge out of liminality, and b) an embryo that is 
‘permanently liminal’. While ultimately embryos may only ever be used for 
reproductive purposes or researched upon (and then disposed of), the 
liminal lens highlights a key aspect of embryonic ontology that the law does 
not articulate: their relationality.  
 
There are strong links between Quigley and Ayihongbe’s abovementioned 
analysis of law and the ‘everyday cyborg’, and law and embryos in vitro. As 
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they point out, while not all STS scholars agree,684 for some materiality is 
“relational, about the interrelationship between the material and the 
social.”685 Using this understanding of materiality, Quigley and Ayihongbe 
draw attention to relationality and process in their analysis of the interaction 
between ‘everyday cyborgs’ and law.686 They go on to comment:687 
 
…when we say that challenges arise because of the linking of the 
biological with synthetic materialities, we do so to highlight not only 
that materials (i.e. biological or synthetic) matter for law and law’s 
approach, but this mattering occurs as part of particular contexts, 
processes, and relations. For everyday cyborg technologies, and 
indeed everyday cyborgs themselves, the interrelationship is not only 
between the materials and the social, but also the legal, the 
conceptual, and the normative.688 
 
As previously discussed, the law’s boundary work is clear when it comes to 
most of the things it regulates, yet when it regulates embryos in vitro, not 
only are these boundaries unclear, but they come under immense pressure. 
To draw from the analysis above, this is arguably because of embryos’ 
changing materiality as they travel through legal processes, but these 
processes are all made (and broken) by their relations to persons, just as it 
is with implanted devices, per the analysis quoted above. 
 
Yet embryos pose further questions for law, not only whether or not they are 
‘matter’, but also, to use the word in another sense, how much they 
                                            
684 For discussion on this see Quigley and Ayohingbe (n395). Also see Estrid Sørensen ‘The 
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685 See Quigley and Ayohingbe (n395) 31; Sørensen (n684) 3. 
686 Ibid.  
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within STS, see Quigley and Ayihongbe (n395) 31-2, fn186; Sørensen (n684) 3.  
688 See Quigley and Ayohingbe (n395) 31-2. 





matter.689 This, as discussed in Chapter 3, was answered through the 1990 
Act’s (as amended) instantiation of a ‘special status’ for embryos. Of course, 
the answer to this question is not distinct from the above. It seems that for 
law, how much something matters has everything to do with the type of 
matter it is: 
 
For the law, the question of what matters and how when it comes to 
technologies is one which traditionally delineates persons from things 
along multiple dimensions (subject-object, internal-external, 
biological-synthetic).690 
 
To explore this further, one can see which of each of these binaries has 
been deemed to matter more to the law. For example, harsh sanctions have 
been imposed against bodily harm (all subject, internal, biological), yet less 
(generally speaking) per damage to personal property (object, and often 
synthetic and external).  
 
Yet what of embryos in vitro? It is clear it does not fit clearly within any of 
the three binaries Quigley and Ayihongbe mention in the above quote. This 
material binary, as this thesis has argued, is not necessarily problematic in 
and of itself,691 but is nonetheless a key component of the intellectual gap 
between the intellectual set up, and the ‘real effect’ of the 1900 Act, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Further, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, embryos’ 
legal straddling of the subject-object binary (and indeed other legal binaries) 
may be explained through their rapidly changing, processual nature and 
their gothic associations therein. Embryos’ gothic, uncanny nature have 
challenged law’s normative boundary-works, and placed them (as a liminal 
                                            
689 And to whom.  
690 See Quigley and Ayohingbe (n408) 32; Sørensen (n684). 
691 Again, the question of how we should treat embryos morally is not within this thesis’ 
ambit.  






entity), in a legally liminal space. Thus, to add to Quigley and Ayohingbe’s 
analysis, the law’s non-articulation of the multiple processes is 
unsatisfactory: it ignores either subject- or object- focused concerns, 
depending on the legal pathway an embryo is on. This is not to say that 
embryos should be viewed as one, or the other, within this binary, quite the 
opposite. This may be a way of navigating embryos’ in-between quality, 
recognising the processual as a key element of embryonic and legal 
processes here. Therefore, viewing embryos relationally helps reveal the way 
these pathways evolve and take place; after all law does not actually 
regulate embryos, but the people who produce and come into contact with 
them. These actors are thus, in some sense, the ones who lead embryos 
through liminality. Nonetheless, they do not get to determine completely 
what happens, as the state has an overarching protective role here, through 
the 1990 Act (as amended). 
 




The above analysis, and diagram, gives rise to at least two questions: (1) If 
these contexts are already available under the current framework, how does 
drawing them out add to contemporary literature and debate? and (2) What 
would the contours of a context-based approach be? Parts One and Two of 
this thesis have already answered the first in the following ways: 
 
• The intellectual basis of our framework is arguably not robust as 
there is a ‘gap’ between the intellectual set-up of the 1990 Act (as 
amended), under a singular ‘special status’, and the realities of the 
pathways embryos are led through under this framework; 





• This gap may be understood more deeply by better understanding 
the processes that are regulated, the dynamics of which (explored 
by gothic framing/liminal analysis) are not adequately recognised 
in law; therefore 
• An approach based on the findings of Chapters 2-6 could inform 
regulatory reform, if it were thought to be desirable, in a manner 
that reflects the above (again if thought to be desirable).  
 
The explorations in this section are made with a view to answering the 
second question, above.  
 
I argue that a context-based approach to regulation is required in order to 
move the lessons from Part Two from concept to ‘reality’,692 and to better fill 
the legal gap identified in Part One. This approach thus draws on the 
lessons from this work so far. While it does not claim to answer all perceived 
flaws with the 1990 Act (as amended) regulation of embryos in vitro, it is 
argued that it is more appropriate693 than the basis for our current framework 
because it addresses the above identified ‘legal gap’, and embraces 
processuality therein.  
 
In order to mark out the dimensions of this approach, this section first 
provides some background to this approach, briefly reiterating why I 
advocate that this approach. The next subsection then draws out the exact 
contours of a context-based approach, which emphasises embryonic 
processes through ‘pathways’ (5(a)-(d), and in the flowchart, both above). 
Finally, I respond to two possible criticisms of this approach: that it is an 
                                            
692 By ‘reality’, I do not mean to comment on what this might actually look like in statute, 
rather, providing framework for moving these concepts closer to being useable in 
contemporary legal discussions. 
693 As above, appropriate meaning apt for the embryonic pathways. 






approach based on intent; and that redefining ‘the embryo’ would serve the 
same purpose: notably, that this analysis does not go as far as to map out 
the practical application of this approach within statute (or guidelines). In 
sum, my contention is that this is not necessary for the purposes of the 
current exercise, the original contribution having been made in exposing the 
limits of law and thinking to date.   
 
7.4.2 Background  
 
The legal boundedness of ‘the embryo’ is contestable. It is important, at this 
stage, to recall that there has already been a call to analyse embryos on a 
contextual basis. Yet, also recall that these analyses are missing grounding, 
beyond the conceptual.  
 
Jacob and Prainsack describe the outcomes of the workshop entitled 
‘Embryonic Hopes’ (discussed in Chapter 6):  
 
In the interactions at our workshop…we found an unanticipated level 
of agreement across disciplines on the unbounded character of the 
concept of the embryo, on the need to analyse embryos in the 
context of networks of social and biological relations that they are 
embedded in, and even on which methods yielded the most 
meaningful insights into understanding the ways that embryos are 
enacted in social realities. At the same time, and despite this explicit 
reference to embryos-in-practice (to paraphrase Timmermans and 
Berg’s (2003) concept of technology-in-practice), the agreement 
remained at a conceptual level...In other words, when discussing 
definitions, definability, and even the possibility of the un-definability 
of concepts such as the embryo, agreement was easily achieved 
across disciplines. However, as soon as the discussions moved to 





how concepts could be mobilized towards something else – action, 
further analysis, etc. – mutual understanding proved more 
challenging.694 
 
This thesis does not (and, I would suggest, cannot) aim to provide a 
framework on which there might be mutual consensus. Instead, the aim is to 
provide a framework for discussion, underpinned by a robust intellectual 
framework that could potentially mobilise previous calls for a more context-
based approach.695  
 
As we also saw in Chapter 2, and built upon further in Chapter 5, embryos in 
vitro may be subject to two outcomes only: reproduction and research. 
Indeed, Sarah Devaney refers to the ‘dual reproductive identity’ of ‘the 
embryo’:  
 
Thus, at the point embryo progenitors make their decision; their 
intention helps to shape the embryo’s legal status, indicating the 
context within which its value (whether reproductive, therapeutic or 
other) should be determined. This has been termed the ‘dual 
reproductive identity’ of embryos consisting of past attempts to 
conceive a child and the future ‘capacity of science to transform the 
vital power of individual cells into colonies of regenerative cells.696 
 
There are thus currently two broad onto-teleological 697  options for an 
embryo: will it become a ‘research artefact’,698 or a (potential) ‘person’? This 
                                            
694 Jacob and Prainsack (n35) c497-8. 
695 A common thread between which being law’s inability, as it stands, to fully cope with 
embryonic uncertainty, discussed in Chapter 4. 
696 Devaney (n145) 15-16. 
697 I use this term to emphasise that how we categorise this entity is very much dependent 
on our intentions for its future (of course, not always, natural termination can occur at any 
stage).  






thesis argues, that emphasising this questions, and its answer(s) 
undoubtedly acts to further situate embryos within the technological, 
relational aspect of their existence.  
 
To explain further, the ‘reintegration’, or third stage of liminality, that we 
want (or at least expect, as the outcome we intend does not always come 
into fruition) for embryos impacts upon the ways in which we consider/use 
and/or store them at present. Each possible course is led by people, and to 
some extent, their intent towards a pre-defined endpoint.699 These intentions 
can of course change - for example, if an embryo is rejected for implantation 
but consented for research use - but then so does our present treatment of 
them in accordance with the new target that we have for its future use. The 
key point here, however, is that while it is indeed important to situate 
embryos in vitro as  technologically and relationally produced beings, we 
must move beyond thinking about them in terms of how they are produced 
or what they are as separate considerations (which the 1990 Act is rather 
focused on, particularly the latter). Instead, the intellectual set up of the 1990 
Act (as amended) must be brought beyond the ambit of production, through 
to how they are used, and what the legal results of that use will be. In this 
way, embryos’ technological and relational qualities would be more fully 
encompassed. In doing so, it does not necessarily take away from the 
original objective of attributing some sort of ‘respect’ for ‘the embryo’ as per 
the Warnock report. Instead, and in accordance with a later comment by 
Warnock herself (that you cannot ‘respect’ something that you end up 
throwing away), it better reflects and articulates not only current 
understandings of biological processes, but the ways in which the law has, 
and can continue to engage with them. I thus advocate a ‘context-based 
approach’ to human embryos in vitro. 
                                                                                                                           
698 Mason, Human Life (n45). 
699 This is of course limited by several factors, including other persons and law. 





7.4.3 The dimensions of a context-based approach 
 
This subsection draws out the exact contours of a context-based approach, 
which are based on the lessons from Part Two, and 5.2-3 above. This is 
done in order to show that there is a way law can navigate embryonic 
processes in a way that closes the gap between the intellectual set-up of 
Act and the ‘reality’ of the 1990 Act (as amended). With all of the above 
taken into account, the dimensions of this context-based approach may be 
summarised as recognising the following: 
 
• Our response to embryos in vitro has thus far been uncertainty, and 
not necessarily wrongly so. This uncertainty may be explained by the 
gothic origins, associations, and technological placement of embryos 
in vitro; 
• With this in mind, it is thus important to recognise the context from 
which embryos in vitro come into being, and the effects that they 
have on how we treat them; namely 
• The multiplicity of pathways law leads embryos through (see 
flowchart in 5.2 above); 
• At the end of these paths, there are only two possibilities: birth or 
destruction; 
• Importantly, there are several thresholds that embryos can cross in 
order to reach those pathways; therefore 
• If deemed a research ‘artefact’, there is only one telos, destruction; 
and 
• If on a ‘reproductive’ pathway, much has to happen for the original 
telos of that pathway (birth) to occur; and finally 
• These pathways are greatly affected by actors/persons, and are thus 
relational.  







Notably, this approach is not about giving embryos unitary symbolic status 
in law; indeed, depending on their path, their telos is going to be different, 
morally socially, and legally. In turn, the actors influencing their process 
towards their telos will also change. One might ask, then, if the contexts are 
there within law, why draw them out in this fashion? But the point being 
made is not to make the telos (more) explicit, per se, but rather to provide a 
way of thinking about embryos in vitro that focuses on process.700  
 
Overall, this has been proposed because analysis from Parts One and Two 
has shown that it is important to regulate embryos in vitro in a way that 
recognises their processes of becoming, (as opposed to regulating them 
based on what they could be).701  In this way, a regulatory framework could 
be constructed in a manner that recognises their relational properties, a key 
facet of making the ‘becoming’ happen. One might confuse this mode of 
thinking to mean: what matters are the intentions of the person(s) who 
created, or use an embryo. This is not the case. Intent is an important part of 
this approach, because actors’ intent affects embryonic telos, but is not the 
only part. To explain, the intent of people who put embryos on various 
pathways, whoever they are, shapes their travelling from the first stage of 
liminality, to the last. This approach arguably allows us to account for the 
flexibility, and changeability of intent (not consent, which is important, but 
outwith the ambit of this work). Intention alone is not sufficient as an 




                                            
700 See Chapter 1, section 4.3’s discussion of the normative element(s) of process, for this 
thesis. 
701 i.e. potentiality.  





7.4.4 More than intent 
 
It is important to clarify that the proposed approach (the contours of which 
are drawn out below), in its utilisation of telos, intends to better capture the 
entirety of embryonic processes, rather than focus on the proposed end 
point, which would be purely based on intent.  
 
Context here should not necessarily mean the given (static) state that an 
embryo is ‘in’ (i.e. ‘what it is’ and/or ‘where it is’), but rather a combination of 
these, and intention:  
 
…embryos are not fixed, universal biological entities but are defined 
by, and acted upon in relation to, their social context, that is, by their 
location in time and space.702 
 
As aforementioned, their intended destiny alone is insufficient to demarcate 
the status of embryos under law. This, again, is why context is so important, 
within which intention may be included as a consideration. This type of 
reasoning accepts that a process is yet to happen; whereas looking at 
intention alone almost skips the importance of biological process (and the 
mother) entirely and looks at the ‘end goal’ (a baby).703 An implanted embryo 
could thus be said to be different from a non-implanted embryo (although 
not necessarily in terms of legal definition, see below). 
 
 
                                            
702 Erica Haimes et al, ‘ “So, What Is an Embryo?’” A Comparative Study of the Views of 
Those Asked to Donate Embryos for hESC Research in the UK and Switzerland’ (2008) 
27(2) New Genetics and Society 113, 124. 
703 Arguably in a similar way to potentiality, although these two concepts are still different.  






The extent to which intent is problematic as a basis for treating something a 
certain way aside, legally speaking, it is important to clarify why intent is not 
practical; this, in turn, means that it is not the only consideration in this 
context-based approach.  
 
a) Intent does not account for the entirety of embryonic processes 
biologically and legally available (as revealed by a liminal analysis); 
This is because:  
b) It does not account for factors that influence reaching that intent; 
further,  
c) Basing an approach on intent raises the question of ‘whose intent?’; 
and  
d) Depending on the answer to (c), intent may also change throughout 
the process.  
 
Intent alone is thus not a starting point, for this thesis, because it is 
changeable.  
 
Overall, this highlights that intention alone does not provide a robust basis 
for a framework. For example, one can intend for an embryo (or group of 
embryos) to be successfully researched upon and yield useful results, but 
there are multiple things that have to take place between the creation of that 
embryo to become a useful, successful ‘research artefact,’ including (to 
name a few): people, time, the correct scientific conditions, and an element 
of luck. Ultimately, intention alone would ignore the various processes that 
need to take place, which are important. 
 
A context-based approach incorporates intent, by accounting for embryonic 
processes (of which intent nonetheless is a vital part) but also looks more 
holistically at the legal pathways available under the 1990 Act (as amended), 





which are changeable up to a point. The direction of these pathways will, as 
discussed above, depend on what it is, but there are still multiple 
possibilities beyond that.  
 
7.4.5 More than definition 
 
Another possible contention is that simply by redefining embryos we might 
solve the problem at the heart of this thesis. This has been partially 
disproved in Chapter 4,704 but it deserves further consideration here. While 
embryos in the UK are generally defined by what they are,705 this only affects 
potential embryonic processes in part. To explain, being ‘human’, ‘alive’, 
and ‘not admixed’, is a necessary ontological threshold for the law that 
embryos must pass in order to go through certain processes (e.g. 
implantation). In other words, in any particular situation what an embryo is, if 
it is human, does not tell us much more than whether or not it can legally be 
placed inside a woman’s womb. If an embryo is not purely ‘human’, then, of 
course, there is only one legislative option for it: research and eventual 
disposal.  
 
An analysis of law based on embryonic definition leaves elements of 
embryonic biological-legal processes unarticulated. The central concern of 
this thesis is not with defining, or redefining, embryos under the 1990 Act (as 
amended). Defining embryos, or categorising them, arguably does not 
account for the multiplicity of biological possibilities and pathways that are 
available under the 1990 Act (as amended). It is thus an important threshold 
for certain pathways (as the flowchart above demonstrates), but once that is 
met much more (in terms of actors, scientific processes, biological 
                                            
704 Section 4.3. 
705 See Françoise Baylis and Timothy Krahn, ‘The Trouble With Embryos’ (2009) 22(2) 
Science and Technology Studies 31. 






processes, etc.) has to occur in order to be able to see the process an 
embryo has/will go through as a whole. One could change embryonic 
definitions under the 1990 Act (as amended), or perhaps in a future Act, to 
account for the purpose for which embryos are created; but this would 
neglect the utility of ‘spare’ embryos originally created for fertility treatment 
services, the most common source of ‘research’ embryos. Indeed the latter 
could possibly be accommodated by a new doctrine, but if that is to be the 
case, a robust analytical framework should be behind any such definition. 
Further, definition and ‘legal status’ (admittedly both very loaded terms) are 
of course rather different. Regarding the latter, the predominant legislative 
attitude toward embryos in the UK may be described as recognising ‘the 
embryo’s’ potential, yet not treating this fact as sufficient to merit legal 
protection from research on, and destruction of, embryos (at least before the 
primitive streak). Further, definitions afforded under the 1990 Act (as 
amended) do not affect the ‘special status’ of regulated embryos. Limits that 
famously reflect this ‘status’ are the same for all ‘kinds’ of embryos, for 
example the 14-day rule. Legally defining, or redefining embryos, is thus not 




It is possible that failing to place liminality and uncertainty as central to the 
legal framework behind research and reproductive practice, the law is 
perpetuating a myth per the single ‘status’ of the human embryo in vitro. 
Thus, the variable, relational liminal states of embryos are important for the 
future of artificial reproduction and embryo research. Overall, this chapter’s 
analysis and approach is arguably problematic for the status of ‘the embryo’ 
under UK law. The above has thus attempted to demonstrate that it is 
flawed to conceive of ‘the embryo’ as a unitary entity. The disruptive 





potential of liminality has helped highlight the somewhat static scientific and 
ethical assumptions that the law has crystallised within the 1990 Act (as 
amended): 
 
Liminality forces us to recognize the differences in status that the 
embryo may experience depending on the paths upon which it is put. 
With changeable contexts come fluid boundaries. In particular, liminal 
boundaries are fluid because contexts can change.706  
 
We have seen, for example, that an embryo used in pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis may end up following one of several paths ending in reproduction 
or research and/or termination. The variable contexts that we apply to 
stages of embryonic process, whether in the lab or in the womb, are thus 
open to change. The term ‘embryo’ itself is a temporally based definition;707 
it denotes a particular demarcated point in early human development.  
 
Yet, how might the above affect our current framework? This, and other 
questions that a contextual approach raises, is the subject of the next, and 
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8.  Looking Forward: Potential 





This final Chapter discusses the potential implications for law of embracing 
a context-based approach, as drawn out in the previous Chapter. It 
considers ways in which this approach, based on a liminal lens, can help us 
to consider708 contemporary discussion surrounding embryos in vitro.  
 
The discussions in previous chapters have concluded that there are ways in 
which the law might better regulate for uncertainty in the context of embryos 
in vitro. Yet, how does a context-based approach do so? I posit that 
regulating for uncertainty does not entail a commitment to eradicating 
uncertainty, but rather to navigating it in a manner that addresses the multi-
faceted, uncertain, and potentially ever-changing nature of these regulated 
entities: there is no such thing as the bounded and fixed ‘embryo’ in law. 
Once law identifies and embraces the fact that what it is regulating is 
uncertain, it can be (re)formulated in a reflexive manner that also reflects the 
processes within.  
 
                                            
708 To be explicit, this Chapter (nor this thesis) is not discussing what we ought to do. 





At this point, it seems pertinent to return to one of the first points made in 
this thesis. In the Introduction, it was stated that the regulation of embryos 
in vitro affects at least three strands: 
 
1. Embryos in vitro themselves; 
2. Science (persons and practices e.g. research practices and 
researchers); and  
3. The family (in the broadest sense e.g. donors, potential parents, 
hypothetical mothers, and hypothetical children).  
 
This thesis primarily focused on the first, but thus far, we have seen that the 
effects that it can have on (2) and (3) are not irrelevant, for example, gothic 
literature’s discussion of embryos’ female origins and associations. This 
thesis’ enquiry shall remain with (1) for this last chapter, but notably its case 
study - the 14-day rule - also relates to (2). The second and third strands, 
science and family, are thus identified as future areas of enquiry (based on 
this research) in the conclusion to this thesis.  
 
The first section, below, discusses the potential effects of a context-based 
approach for the issues (i.e. the contours of the ‘legal gap’) discussed in 
Part One of this thesis (listed in 8.2.1 below). It suggests that a context-
based approach has the potential to justify affording embryos in vitro 
different ‘statuses’ depending on the relationally guided and defined 
pathway on which it is, or onto which it is put.  
 
The second section of this chapter goes on to discuss the effect of this 
change on research and science as a case study: the 14-day rule. This 
study has been selected, as it is perhaps the prime example of law’s 
reflection of ‘special status’, and because it reflects legal attempts to deal 
with embryonic processes, per Chapters 1-2s’ analyses. The discussion 






does not make any normative claims about what should be done with the 
rule itself. Rather, this example is used to examine what the context-based 
approach in this thesis could bring to debate and the nature of such a rule 
(and its retention or otherwise), and how it helps us to deepen and enrich 
our understanding of what this legislative attempt to engage with process 
might mean.  
 
Accordingly, this Chapter concludes that while a context-based approach 
does not necessarily provide a mode of ethical deliberation regarding 
embryos in vitro, it does provide the law with the tools to better embrace the 
processual, uncertain nature of embryos. It does so within a framework that 
can inform contemporary debates on what processual law could look like.  
 




This section argues that Chapter 7’s context-based approach may be used 
to close the ‘legal gap’ between the intellectual basis of the 1990 Act (as 
amended), and the realities of the pathways it has facilitated.  
 
As a reminder, the key facets of the ‘gap’ within the 1990 Act (as amended), 
as initially identified by Part One, and the nature of which explored more 
deeply in Part Two, are as follows:  
 
• Uncertainty surrounding embryos (in vitro and in vivo), for example 
with regards to a) how we feel about them and b) how we should 
treat them;  





• The 1990 Act’s ‘legal stasis’; in other words, the ossification of its 
legal development.  
 
A gothic framing, and liminal analysis in Part Two, revealed the nature of this 
gap even further: 
 
• These uncertainties derive from the contexts from which embryos 
are borne, are associated, and exist in (technology);  
• The relational nature of embryos affect (a) the way in which we 
view them, and (b) the pathways they are led along through law; 
• The above uncertainty, i.e. the gothic nature of embryos in vitro, 
has contributed to this ‘legal stasis’, discouraging revisitation;  
 
 
Building on the lessons from Part Two (see section 6.4 of this thesis), 
Chapter 7 advocated a context-based approach, which recognises: 
 
• The multiplicity of pathways law leads embryos along (see flowchart 
in 7.2 above); 
• At the end of these paths, there are only two possibilities: birth or 
termination. Importantly, there are lots of ways that embryos can 
reach those possibilities; therefore 
• If deemed a research ‘artefact’, there is only one telos, termination. 
• If on a ‘reproductive’ pathway, much has to happen for the original 
telos of that pathway (birth) to occur; and finally 
• These pathways are affected by actors, and are thus relational. 
 
In these ways, these parts/chapters have each respectively answered the 
four questions set in the Introduction of this work, namely:  
 






1. Part One: In what ways does UK law engage with embryonic 
processes, if at all? 
2. Part Two: How can we understand legal process, and legal regulation 
more deeply?  
3. Part Three: How can law better reflect the uncertain nature of 
embryonic processes, and the technologies that create them? 
4. Overall, does law reflect and embody processual regulation, if so, 
what does this look like?; and if not, what form could it take if reform 
were thought to be desirable?  
 
Yet in answering these questions, this work has left us with one final 
question: does all of this ‘bridge the gap’ between the intellectual basis of 
the law, and the realities of the processes it regulates? 
 
8.2.2 Does it close the gap?  
 
A context-based approach raises questions, regarding the extent to which it 
accounts for facets of the ‘legal gap’ articulated above. These facets are 
found within apparent special status of the unitary entity of ‘the embryo’ that 
is currently constructed in law. The below attempts to address some of 
these questions, which relate to the facets cited above, in brief.  
 
1. Does the approach of this thesis create more legal and/or moral certainty? 
If not, how does it embrace uncertainty?  
As a reminder, ‘uncertainty’, for this thesis pertains to two things: moral 
ambiguity and plurality towards embryos, and, relatedly, how to treat them 
(in law).  
 
Importantly, a context-based approach does not purport to dissolve 
uncertainty, nor provide certainty. As we have seen in in this thesis’ 





discussions, especially in Chapter 5, we may always have a degree of 
ambivalence when regarding embryos, in a morally pluralistic society. 
Relatedly, certainty does not necessarily ‘fit’ well with this thesis’ argument 
that we should be alive to the permanent liminality of law in this field. To 
borrow from Fox and Murphy, we might consider whether we should “ditch 
durability.”709  Thus, if we accept that as a society that we might always feel 
some degree of uncertainty regarding how we feel about, or how we should 
treat embryos,710 arguably what we need is a transparent, coherent and 
robust framework that is open to revisitation and which, to a large extent, 
embraces this ambiguity. In other words, to answer the above question, the 
aim of Chapter 7’s approach was to provide a framework for navigating  (not 
dissolving) that uncertainty which, as Chapter 5 has argued, we should 
accept if we want to provide a sound intellectual basis for our legal 
framework.  
 
But, relatedly, what does it mean to embrace uncertainty, and how can law 
do so in a new way? Without repeating the above (8.2.1), this approach 
accounts for parallels revealed through gothic framing, lessons from which 
show an innate sense of transformation and becoming. 711  Further, it 
highlights the relational aspects of embryonic development, which are 
arguably a key aspect of navigating these uncertainties. This has been 
shown, for example, in the debates surrounding abortion, where 
embryonic/foetal existence is entirely relational to the gestational mother.  
 
What has this thesis concretely added to our knowledge and understanding, 
here? Overall, this approach thus recognises that there is uncertainty here 
and accepts that embryo regulation has an inherent, prevalent element of 
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uncertainty. This work thus enquired how we might navigate that. Moreover, 
it has considered what it means to take a processual approach to regulation, 
which has revealed the importance of changing contexts over time (e.g. 
from being created as a ‘reproductive’ embryo, but moved to a research 
‘path’). That analysis requires us to ask: 1) which processes and telos(es) 
are at play in these contexts, and relatedly 2) how are these affected by 
what embryos are becoming?  
 
This has led this work to consider the mismatch between the language of 
the singular, all-encompassing ‘special status’ of ‘the embryo’ (which in 
some sense suggests something fixed and immutable), which sits in 
opposition to the sense of becoming and processes within the inexplicit 
pathways this the 1990 Act (as amended) regulates. Moreover, as this work 
has made clear, it is not that our values are necessarily any different, but 
that our frame of reference has. If we accept the latter, then this work’s 
analysis inherently disrupts the ‘special status’ of ‘the embryo.’  
 
2. Would this approach affect the singularity of the ‘special status’ underlying 
our current framework? 
This approach has the potential to disrupt the singular ‘special status’ of ‘the 
embryo’, in favour of an approach that more accurately reflects the 
multiplicity of processes (and thus inexplicit ‘statuses’) embryos are led into, 
through and out of. This work does not purport to envision every possibility, 
but to give some examples, but, if we accept that it dissolves the singularity 
of embryonic ‘specialness’ under law, then a context-based approach has 
the potential to capture the following: 
 
• A recognition of the multiplicity, and overlap of embryonic pathways 
through law; 





• This may justify affording embryos in vitro more than one ‘status’ 
depending on the pathway(s) they are on; rather than the singular, all-
encompassing ‘special status’ that (as we have seen) has come 
under much critique;712  
• 'Reproductive embryos', once implanted, may only ever be used for 
reproductive purposes (and this would hold true whether or not 
gestation was or was not ultimately successful); and  
• Embryos that have no distinct pathway as of yet (i.e. they are frozen, 
or undergoing the process of PGD) are neither, but may be treated as 
reproductive embryos (if that is the goal of their creation) until that 
path is evidently not an option anymore; and further that 
• 'Research embryos' may be either created specifically for research, 
or become so through becoming ‘spare’ when the reproductive 
pathway is no longer an option (and per appropriate parental consent).  
 
Equally, it does not necessarily follow that ‘research embryos’ are no longer 
subject to our moral value framework nor that regulatory carte blanche 
would apply to them. There remain very good reasons for considering what 
is at stake and permissible with research on the ‘research embryo’, but this 
context-based approach more overtly brings into the discussions the end 
points that are envisioned, as well as the fact of ‘use’ of the entity in 
question towards those ends. These value preferences become a separate 
consideration, and highlighted in the answer to the next question.  
 
3. If a ‘special status’ has meant that embryos do not fit into law’s normative 
subject-object, person-property binaries, etcetera, does this thesis’ 
approach affect these binaries?  
                                            
712 See Chapter 5. 






A context-based approach does not dissolve this binary, and this thesis is 
not necessarily arguing for or against such dissolution. Nonetheless, it does 
have the potential to disrupt the binary approach. For example, it may be 
decided that research embryos, as ‘artefacts,’ become clear objects, even 
though they are “not nothing”713 in moral and legal terms. Indeed, many legal 
objects and ‘artefacts’ have engendered considerable amounts of legal 
protection that reflects the ways in which we ‘value’ them, for example 
celebrated works of art. This is not to compare embryos to an object in the 
traditional sense of the word (as a mere thing, res or indeed property); rather 
it is to suggest that recognition of object-hood does not render embryo as 
‘nothing’, especially if it is deemed inappropriate to do so.   
 
Alternatively, this work’s analysis might raise discussions around the status 
of reproductive embryos as subject-objects. As discussed above, and 
touched upon below, this has the potential to provide a framework to 
embrace the relationality of embryos in vitro, per their telos of being placed 
in vitro. In other words, this thesis’ framework might help us to move away 
from the (much critiqued) notion of the ‘free floating embryo’ in law, towards 
embryos being reliant upon, and having an innately special and 
interconnected relationship with their intended and/or gestational mother(s).  
 
Yet, for this thesis, the importance of this framework does not lie in 
attempting to reach any of these ends per se, but informing our decisions 
about them in a manner that is coherent and transparent. Indeed, the 
relational focus of this thesis might also serve to highlight the importance of 
this with research embryos also. For example, donor couples might have 
more of a say in what kinds of research are done with their embryos and/or 
might have a stronger claim to know about the social value or other benefits 
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that came of donating their embryos for research. This is a possible 
consequence of a frame of analysis that focuses on the value of the telos 
and the interests that parties have in the achievement of that telos. We 
return to the feature of this point below.   
 
Whether we want to continue having what we have, or change it, can be 
informed by this approach, but the approach herein does not give any 
normative answers in that respect. To reiterate, the normative part of this 
thesis is that spaces in-between, and processes therein, need to be 
navigated by robust, coherent, defensible, and justifiable law.  
 
4. Would accounting for relationality actually have any practical effects?  
A context-based approach may have implications for actors on multiple 
levels, including donors, embryos, and parents, to name a few. For example, 
the liminal quality of embryos has the potential to greatly influence scientific 
researchers. A study by Svendsen and Koch challenges the idea that ‘spare’ 
embryos are a biological fact. They suggested, instead, that embryos are 
constituted by the decision making of researchers; this ‘ongoing fact-
making’ reveals a network of relationships and conflicts in which 
researchers are involved. 714 Further, this is not a thesis rooted in feminist 
theory (in the strict sense), but a context-based approach supports the 
growing argument in feminist literature that women are marginalised within 
our present frameworks. This is because this approach helps us to 
emphasise that actors, however involved in embryonic processes, have 
different relations with this entity. It might enable us to say, for example, that 
the prospective mother (and father) should have much more say in what 
happens than if an embryo was to be used for research purposes, as 
indicated above.  
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Further, this approach might also have implications in information disclosure 
practices regarding the (consented) use of ‘spare’ embryos for research. As 
Jonlin comments, there are some donors who: 
 
…firmly reject the option of donating their excess embryos to other 
infertile couples because they do not want ‘someone else raising our 
child’ and do not want their current children to have one or more 
siblings ‘out there’. Therefore, destruction is the only remaining 
option, and destroying them for research purposes is preferable to 
throwing them away.715 
 
Therefore, she adds, many of those who decide to donate: 
 
…hope that their embryos will do some good, and are relieved and 
even thankful there is a use for them. Some donors feel it is 
incumbent upon them to give back to research because research 
enabled them to have a family. Many donors ask scientific questions 
about stem cell research, including how tissues are made from 
pluripotent stem cells. Some want to know about the political climate 
for funding stem cell research. Occasionally, donors need assurance 
that their identities will not be made public. Although some donors 
seem to convey a sense of resignation, and comment on the finality 
of the decision to donate, others express their enthusiastic support 
for stem cell research and for science in general.716 
 
Given that this approach encourages transparency and coherency, including 
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regard for relationality and feedback loops,717 it might give reason to provide 
a framework that allows us to tell donors more accurately and clearly what 
will happen to their donated embryos. Some have described the voices of 
donors as having been ‘marginalised’ in the research process.718 Indeed, 
donors themselves could arguably be described as experiencing their own 
liminality. Yet, as abovementioned, liminality is not, and should not be used 
as a shorthand for marginality in the context of health research regulation. 
Here, the actions and decisions of donors are central to research practices, 
given that their donated embryos are the primary source of ‘research’ 
embryos in the UK. With a liminal framing in mind, a context-based 
approach could thus give donors more options for additional engagement in 
the research process, if they so wished, and might entitle them to find out 
more about the benefits and/or results from research carried out on their 
‘spare’ embryos.  
 
Ultimately, this might allow us to consider, more deeply, who has a say in 
embryonic processes, depending on what these processes are. Indeed, if an 
option for further donor involvement in research were deemed desirable, it 
might enable us to address, more fully, the critique that donors can feel as if 
they are on the side-lines, when it comes to research.719 In other words, 
perhaps it might enable some donors to ‘emerge’ out of their own 
experience of permanent liminality, with regards to their donated embryos. 
 
5. Does this context-based approach address the permanent liminality of law, 
identified in Chapter 6? 
As discussed in the conclusion to Chapter 5 (section 5.5), this analysis 
enables us to think about how we might move past our present legal 
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framework, if we decide that revisitation and/or renewal is something we 
want to do. It therefore enables us to move out of our unreflexive iteration of 
a singular ‘special’ (yet practically not special) status. Further, an 
acknowledgement of the permanent liminality of law, and indeed of some 
embryos in law, allows us to ask questions surrounding where they 
are/could be led after emerging out of that liminality: what is/are the telos(es) 
of embryos in vitro?  
 
6. What is the effect of the teleological aspect of the context-based 
approach?  
From this, three interrelated sub-questions arise:  
(a) When taking a teleological approach, is there a normative imperative to 
achieve best outcome possible?  
This question is for others to decide, but, for example, if the answer is yes, it 
might give us reason to revisit the 14-day rule. The questions arising from 
this particular example are discussed in the next section. A teleological 
approach, seen through a liminal lens, arguably encourages consideration of 
the full process. It helps us consider, not only that embryos are becoming, 
but what they are becoming, and asks us to contemplate whether we want 
to attach importance to that and who is implicated in the diverse processes 
of becoming. 
(b) If we decide that a particular embryo is bound for a reproductive pathway, 
what does that mean per its teleology? 
One might take a teleological approach to mean that I am arguing that we 
must follow that teleology’s imperative to the letter, i.e. that all ‘reproductive’ 
embryos should be implanted in a woman. This is not the case. As the 
flowchart in Chapter 5 has shown, an important part of a context-based 
approach is recognising that these pathways are not straightforward, and 
can overlap. To focus on ends alone would ignore importance of process, 
which is the central focus (and normative claim) of this work; arguably a 





focus on ends alone masks how we get there. Again, the utility of a liminal 
lens is that it does not give us any particular normative imperative, but also 
allows us to consider, more deeply, the dynamics of the variant 
transformations that embryos can go through. 
 
The above questions also give rise to another, similar question: If ‘research’ 
embryos might be subject to an argument that they should be the ‘best’ 
research embryos they can be, does this suggest that a 28, 60, or even 180 
–day rule could be defended? In short, this thesis’ answer is that this is not 
necessarily the case. The reasons for this answer are discussed in more 
detail in section 8.3, below.  
 
8.2.3 An approach that can inform contemporary ethico-legal 
debate 
 
A context-based approach, as described above, encourages thinking about 
processual nature of embryonic development, but arguably still allows us to 
‘value’ 720  embryos in a way that recognises the multiplicity of factors 
necessary for that process to take place (e.g. the mother, time, biology) for 
embryos to eventually become persons, or not.  
 
This is not necessarily the only potential outcome of a context-based 
approach, but it is one that would arguably address Part One’s ‘legal gap’, 
as it considers embryos in vitro more processually, and moves us beyond 
the incoherent framework we have at the moment.  
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8.3 The Potential Implications of a Context-based 





This section considers some of the questions raised by a context-based 
approach for the 14-day rule. It has been used here, because the rule is 
arguably one of the most recent/contemporary examples to which this 
approach might apply, as a debate that has the potential to open up 
discussions about the 1990 Act (as amended) more generally. Further, the 
14-day rule is also the key embodiment of the ‘special status’, and the 
attribution of legal boundaries at the early stages of human life, discussed 
throughout thesis. 
 
Recall that the 14-day time limit on embryo research, first recommended in 
the UK by the Warnock Committee721 is based upon the premise that around 
this stage in development, the 'primitive streak' tends to develop.722 It is also 
the approximate stage at which the embryonic cells can no longer split (and 
thus, produce twins, or triplets etcetera).723 Nonetheless, for 27 years this 
limit was 'largely theoretical';724 up until very recently no researcher has been 
able to culture an embryo up to this limit.725 In early 2016, for the first time, 
research published in Nature726 and Nature Cell Biology727 has reported the 
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successful culturing of embryos in vitro for 13 days. With the possibility of 
finding out more about the early stages of human life, beyond this two-week 
stage, calls have been made to revisit the 14-day rule.728 
 
It is important to note that this time limit was not intended to be “set in stone” 
at its inception.729 Indeed, almost no law in today’s society is intended to 
truly stand any test of time. All law should be open to discussion, if not 
revision, if it is to progress with society and societal interests. On the other 
hand, where an issue is controversial, as embryo research certainly is, “we 
still must consider whether shifting a limit in policy is an appropriate 
adjustment or instead implies a slip down the slope or the abandonment of 
moral principle."730  
 
So why consider revisiting it all? Aside from the arguments made in Part 
Two about permanently liminal law, it is also worth noting that arguing for 
revisiting does not imply arguing for change. The normative aspect of 
arguing for revisitation lies in the argument that law in this field should not 
be left untouched for extended periods. As Hyun et al comment: 
 
Revisiting the 14-day rule might tempt people to try to rationalize or 
attack the philosophical coherence of the limit as an ethical tenet 
grounded in biological facts. This misconstrues the restriction. The 
14-day rule was never intended to be a bright line denoting the onset 
of moral status in human embryos. Rather, it is a public policy tool 
designed to carve out a space for scientific inquiry and 
simultaneously show respect for the diverse views on human embryo 
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research…The alternatives at each extreme — banning embryo 
research altogether or imposing no restrictions on embryo use — 
would not have made for good public policy in a pluralistic society.731 
 
There has been much commentary since the possibility of revisiting the rule 
arose, with a range of responses.732 This rule was of course a reflection of 
the Warnock Committee’s emphasis on ‘compromise’, in the name of moral 
pluralism. In other words, it emerged as the Warnock Committee’s way of 
navigating the uncertainty/ambivalence surrounding how to treat embryos in 
vitro, legally. This thesis does not claim that the poles of opinion between 
which this compromise was set have changed.733 The rule, a reflection of 
this ‘compromise’ was, in many ways, a new boundary, and threshold akin 
to its historical counterparts (such as quickening). Yet if we decide that it is 
worth considering this boundary, and whether we want to change it, what 
might this thesis bring to the debate? As we have seen in Chapter 6, 
thresholds are a key feature of the liminal process,734 and the section below 
briefly considers what a focus on these key points in transition might bring 
to contemporary debates.   
 
8.3.2 How to revisit the 14-day rule: the importance of thresholds 
 
Attention to thresholds, per this thesis’ analysis, has highlighted the 
following thresholds in the framework we currently have:735 
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• Once an embryo created in vitro passes the threshold736 of being, 
determinedly, a ‘research’ embryo, it cannot (legally) be led back past 
the said threshold, and it can only come out this process as 
something to be disposed of after being utilised; 
• In contrast, there are lots of thresholds that embryos are led through 
for a ‘reproductive’ path, for example: (non)selection after PGD, 
implantation, freezing, and unfreezing, implantation, gestation 
etcetera – indeed, this includes the possibility of crossing the 
threshold from ‘reproduction’ to ‘research’ if, say, PGD tests suggest 
non-suitability for reproduction; and 
• Similarly, per the relational analysis above, when the progenitors of 
embryos are making decisions regarding what to do with their surplus 
embryos, they may cross various thresholds themselves.  
 
As we know, considerations for the actors around embryos can be different 
for each threshold, i.e. we may consider different sets of factors depending 
on which threshold any particular embryo is at. For example, at the third 
threshold above, many factors come into consideration for donors, including 
their attitudes towards research, and their feelings about and towards their 
surplus embryos and their future (non)uses.737  
 
When considering whether to alter the rule, multiple thresholds come into 
consideration.738 As we have seen, the Warnock Committee used ethical 
deliberation, and evidence available at the time to suggest this boundary, 
beyond which research could not pass. A key part of this deliberation, 
although not referred to in terms of ‘thresholds’ per se, were particular 
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(perceived) biological thresholds, such as the threshold for experiencing 
pain (which they associated with the start of the primitive streak), and 
thresholds for being able to cause harm therein. One might say then, that if 
the 14-day rule is a limit, or a boundary, then something that we may want 
to consider (if we deem it appropriate to revisit this rule) is the presence of 
thresholds therein, and the importance that we want to attribute to those 
thresholds. For example, if we decide it is appropriate to consider extending 
the rule, these types of thresholds (i.e. harm, or sentience, etcetera) may 
very well come into play again, for example if a ’28-day rule’ is proposed. 
Further, talks around extending it have already given rise to discussion 
surrounding another kind of threshold: would extending the rule be of 
adequate benefit to science? Some argue that there is much more that we 
can learn from extending the limit.739 Yet, what amount of benefit is enough 
benefit to justify extension, therein lies the threshold, a threshold of the 
reasonable prospect of sufficient scientific ‘benefit’. 
 
Yet there are even more thresholds at play here. These are not only 
biological or scientific thresholds, but also the thresholds that we (or law-
makers) have created for the law. To explain, as we have seen, our current 
framework may be described as permanently liminal, i.e. remaining on a 
threshold in many respects (see Chapter 6). The inexplicit construction of 
embryos in law as subject-objects has been a result of attempting to 
regulate an uncertain space. To illustrate my point: if we decide that we 
want to treat research embryos as objects, and law-makers decide to take 
the law on one route or another, with respect to the above, they are also 
taking the law across a threshold from one iteration, to another. This is not 
to say that everything under law’s ambit has to be either subject or object, 
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perhaps the ‘in-betweenness’ of the embryos in the current framework will 
remain.  
 
Thresholds (or indeed boundaries) are not necessarily ‘bad’ here, per this 
work’s analysis. Indeed, both moral and legal thresholds are of crucial 
importance. Rather, I suggest that we should be alive to their presence and 
their place amongst the broader network (of actors, or silos, etcetera) in 
order to ask questions about the conditions we want in order to cross those 
thresholds.  
 
Considering the multiplicity, variability, and in many ways, subjectivity of 
these thresholds might enable us to regulate in a more flexible and context-
specific way that allows us to recognise the multiplicity of processes 
occurring within the framework of the 1990 Act. Neither a liminal lens, nor 
this thesis, can necessarily say how any revisitation might turn out if a 
context-based framework were used. However, the contributions herein 
help our thinking about all of the above, by highlighting the following 
question: what are the conditions for crossing each of these thresholds, and 




The above is not challenging the pros and cons of the 14-day rule, or 
research and reproductive practices in vitro more generally per se, but rather 
exploring the ways in which law could engage with embryonic (and legal) 
processes through attention to thresholds (as a key facet of these 
processes).  
 
Overall, this framing has the potential to justify extension, but not without 
proper public deliberation, and subject to sound scientific objections, and 






perhaps most importantly, subject to a prevalent moral concern that we 
would not be harming a sentient being if we were to conduct research at 
later stages of development. The deliberation and revisitation (not 
necessarily the revision) of the law is the key part to this liminal analysis.  
 
8.4 The added value of a context-based approach  
 
Overall, if one accepts that the UK’s approach is processual and morally 
relative, this thesis has argued that there are ways in which might better do 
so, and has thus offered a context-based approach. This approach, as I 
have argued, has the potential to inform the provision of a more robust 
intellectual basis, and suggested framework to inform contemporary 
debates on what processual law could look like. 
 
With the above in mind, the following highlights some of the possible 
questions that a context-based approach (rooted in the analytical framework 
laid out in Part Two) might raise: 
 
• If there are thresholds within reproductive and/or research processes 
beyond which embryos cannot be returned (to another pathway), 
should we more explicitly delineate ‘research’ embryos from 
‘reproductive’ embryos in law? If so, how might this be done?; 
• Relatedly, if ‘research embryos’ are only ever going to be as such 
once given that label, as the previous chapter has argued, then law 
can only ever lead them to disposal.740 Does this mean that they 
should be given a different status from reproductive embryos? If so, 
would this support extending the rule, and if so, to what extent?  
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• Further, would it support treating research embryos (once on that 
pathway) as ‘objects’? If so, what would that entail? Would it 
necessarily mean abandonment of the moral meaning attached to 
‘research embryos’? A relational view of this liminal entity would 
suggest not.   
• If we deem it appropriate to bring research embryos out of liminality, 
is there an imperative to assiduously pursue something valuable for 
scientific reasons? Should law lead embryos out of liminality as 
‘valuable’ research objects in themselves?  
• What conditions do we consider important enough to cross (or not 
cross) a particular legal, biological, and moral threshold, e.g. the 14-
day rule? 
• All of the above of course leaves another key question, which is 
perhaps objectively unanswerable: when exactly is the right time to 
re-open this debate? 
 
The ways in which these questions were framed was not intended to 
indicate any particular answer; the point of this thesis is not to affirm or deny 
these questions, yet these questions, amongst many others that this 
analysis might raise, have the potential to act as the basis for my future 
research (see the Conclusion to this thesis).  
 
A context-based approach allows us to consider how we can embrace the 
potential for legal change through explicitly distinguishing between embryos 
that are to be used for reproduction, and embryos that are to be used for 
research. If we want law to reflect process and change, in a way that 
continues to be morally relative, then we cannot expect or want law to be 
durable in its embodiment of a set of rules that fail to reflect the processual 
and practical realities of what currently happens with and to human 






embryos.741 This approach embraces the potential for change by introducing 
a nuanced, yet important demarcation between ‘types’ of embryo that the 
law has already created and facilitated. In vitro embryos are quintessentially 
liminal beings. This thesis has explored and unpacked the truism coined by 
Thomassen that “liminality is”742 and what this means for embryos that are 
subject to the legal architecture that is the 1990 Act (as amended). It has 
suggested that the reality of liminality still has much to say about the way we 
regulate in vitro embryos. The overarching contribution is to provide the 
reader with ways to think way, about and through liminality that brings 
greater insights into the sensitive enterprise of regulating for uncertainty 
when our focus of attention is an entity as fluid and remarkable as the 
human embryo. 
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The conclusion to this thesis does the following:  
1. Recaps and draws together the main conclusions from each part;  
2. Lays out the original contribution of this thesis; and 
3. Considers future directions for research, based on this thesis’ 
findings.  
 
9.1 Thesis Summary 
 
This thesis, which was concerned with the regulation of human embryos in 
vitro, and their use for reproduction and research, has explored the ways in 
which law does, and can regulate processually. As we have seen, the 1990 
Act (as amended) is static and unchanging with respect to the moral status 
of ‘the embryo’, yet our societal understandings and perceptions of embryos 
are not. The 1990 Act (as amended) is, as we have seen, permanently 
liminal.743  A ‘gothic’ framing of embryos and the use of a liminal lens have 
each revealed a key facet of embryo regulation. All of the practices that law 
currently allows, are, in essence, regulating for: uncertainty, process, and 
change. The area of enquiry, for the first part of this thesis was, therefore: In 
what ways does UK law engage with embryonic processes, if at all? 
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9.1.1 Part One 
 
Part One of this thesis explored the extent to which law governing the early 
stages of human life (which for a long time, could only be in vivo) accounted 
for the processual nature of these stages.  
 
Chapter 2 provided an analysis of historical developments in the regulation 
of the early stages of human life, in order to firmly emphasise the 
importance of process for regulations up to (and later, including) the 1990 
Act’s regime. Key elements emerge from law’s evolution in this field, 
including the moving of legal-ontological boundaries surrounding when life 
begins to matter (for law) These elements are reflected, to some extent, in 
the regime that we have today. Ultimately, this chapter showed that process 
has been historically important for the regulation of embryos/foetuses. This 
historical appreciation of process is not, of course, determinative going 
forward. However, to the extent that this is a positive facet of law making in 
this area, which enables the symbiotic relationship between law, science, 
and society, then this thesis suggests that appreciation of the role of 
process is to be encouraged. 
 
Chapters 3 then traced some of the key contours of the regulatory 
framework that we have today, before going on to explore the ways in which 
literature has responded to this in Chapter 4, particularly relating to 
embryonic process (although not always explicitly mentioned). This chapter 
found that the intellectual basis of the law treats embryos singularly as ‘the 
embryo’, by virtue of according one ‘special status.’ In reality, the 1990 Act 
(as amended) creates multiple categories of embryos with seemingly 
multiple statuses. Importantly, this chapter did not claim that there is a 
disjunct between the 1990 Act (as amended) and the historical development 
of the early stages of human life. Instead, the analysis from both chapters 






showed that there is cause to embody process within law, and move 
beyond its original iteration, as law has done in the past. On this basis, this 
chapter finished by identifying a ‘legal gap’ between a key facet of the 
intellectual basis for this framework, ‘the embryo’s’ ‘special status’, and the 
practical realities of the processes it regulates.  
 
Overall, this Part acted to set up the ‘problem’ for this thesis, namely the 
existence of a  ‘legal gap’. Yet, if this gap is caused by inadequate reflection 
of process (as the above argued), then it finished by asking: How can we 
understand legal process, and legal regulation more deeply? 
 
9.1.2 Part Two 
 
Part Two of this research provided a frame of analysis that explored the 
nature of the previously articulated gap between the intellectual aims of the 
1990 Act (as amended) and the reality of the processes it leads embryos 
into, through and out of.744 
 
Chapter 5 argued that drawing parallels between regulated embryos in vitro 
and gothic literature helps to reveal the law's inadequate engagement with 
this uncertainty. In other words, analysis from a gothic perspective reveals 
the nature of law’s response to embryos, as such transformative, and 
processual entities. We have seen that in regulating for uncertainty (with 
regards to how we ought to legally treat embryos) in a static, unmoving 
manner the law has produced uncertainty surrounding the law itself. To 
explain: while we (mostly)745 know what the law is and what it restricts (the 
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1990 Act (as amended) is very clear on this in many respects), the law's fit 
and place in science and society today is increasingly uncertain with respect 
to how we should treat embryos within law, and to some extent where they 
fit within law.746 Overall, I argued there are parallels between gothic literature, 
and embryos in vitro (as regulated in law), namely that embryonic ontologies 
provide a challenge to conventional legal subjecthood. In turn, these 
analyses promoted a deeper understanding of Part One’s ‘legal gap.’ This 
challenge is made all the more acute by the gap between the intellectual 
basis of the 1990 Act (as amended), and the practical implications of its 
framework. Using ‘the gothic’ as a frame of analysis, it revealed the nature 
of and reasons for this ‘gap’. Nonetheless, I also concluded that a gothic 
analysis alone does not provide an answer as to how law should navigate 
this gap.  
 
 
If a gothic analysis helps us to identify the nature of and the reasons for the 
‘problem’ per se, then what helps us identify the solution? In Chapter 6, it 
was argued that in regulating the liminal, we are also regulating processual, 
ever-changing entities that are very much in between. This begs the obvious 
question of ‘in between what?,’ that is it leads us to ask what are the 
beginning and end points of any (regulatory) process of which embryos are 
a central part. Also, recall that being in this stage does not imply the 
marginality of that person, object, or entity- in fact, the opposite. Liminality 
is central to the regulation of reproduction and research practices. Embryos 
are central to the law, central to the mother who guides an embryo through 
reproductive process, central to the research practices carried out in 
laboratories, and central to medicine and society more generally, which 
                                            
746 As for particular elements of the law itself, we have also seen , for example, that: It is 
uncertain in that it places the embryo in between the legal binary of subject and object 
(Marie Fox); That the embryo's 'special status' is unclear in nature, source and extent' (Mary 
Ford); and  






benefits from therapeutic advances made possible by the embryo. Chapter 
6 has also shown, through their discussion of liminality, that a distinct 
feature of process is that, more often than not, that process has more than 
one potential end (even if one particular end is likely). Liminality, in its 
application as an analytical lens, makes evident that process is central to 
everyday life, as is change and uncertainty, albeit in varying degrees.  
 
Overall, this conjoined analysis in Part Two articulated, and navigated the 
contours of this gap, as drawn out in Part One, where law has struggled to 
capture the uncertain, processual nature of embryos in vitro. The next step 
for this thesis was to ask, therefore: How can law better reflect the uncertain 
nature of embryonic processes, and the technologies that create them? 
 
9.1.3 Part Three 
 
To paraphrase the question above, Part Two left us asking: how might Part 
Two’s articulation and navigation take place in order to lead embryos out of 
liminality? In answer to this, Chapter 7 advocated a context-based approach 
to embryo regulation, which embraced the nuanced differences between 
embryonic 'pathways' through the law. The contours of the approach may 
be summarised as follows: 
 
• There are a multiplicity of pathways that law leads embryos through 
(see flowchart in 7.2 above); 
• At the end of these paths, there are only two possibilities: birth or 
termination. Importantly, there are lots of ways that embryos can 
reach those pathways; therefore 






• If on a ‘reproductive’ pathway, much has to happen for the original 
telos of that pathway (birth) to occur; and finally 
• These pathways are affected by actors, and are thus relational. 
 
If we take a context-based approach, separating reproductive and research 
embryos out as separate regulatory subject/objects, what practical legal 
implications might this have? Chapter 8 explored the possible answers to 
this question by a) considering whether this approach adequately addresses 
the contours of the above identified ‘legal gap’; and b) briefly discussing a 
current example, contemporary debates surrounding the 14-day rule. One of 
the key implications of this approach, as Chapter 8 discussed, is that it 
implies a plurality of pathways through the law, and therefore a plurality of 
‘embryos.’ Notably this chapter did not intend to identify all potential future 
implications, but merely discuss some key implications that relate to the 
problems drawn out by this thesis in Part One.    
 
9.2 Key Aspects of this Thesis’ Original Contribution 
 
The original contribution of this thesis is determinedly not to make any 
particular normative claim about embryos. Rather, its original contribution 
lies in its claim to provide a deeper understanding of law and society’s 
relationship with embryos in vitro, set against historical legal developments, 
and a greater appreciation of the processes to which embryos are subjected, 
both biologically as well as relationally. Thus, the claim in this thesis is not to 
prefer any particular telos over any another – that is a value judgment for 
others to make – rather, it is to suggest that the telos of this human entity 
known as “embryo” is crucial and indivisible from how we see it, and 
therefore from how we justify our treatment of it. If there is any normative 






claim, it is that our treatment of embryos must recognise this, and our law 
ought to reflect this in practice.  
 
The bullet points below briefly draw out and explain this thesis’ original 
contributions to the literature on law, embryos, and liminality:  
 
• A consideration of the extent to which historically, and presently, the 
regulation of embryos (especially embryos in vitro) is a regulation of 
process; 
• The linking of parallels between the ‘gothic self’, as a frame of 
analysis, and the literature on liminality, of which there are at least 
two: a sense of being between boundaries, and a sense of becoming; 
• The positive potential of ‘permanent liminality’ with regards to the 
regulation of emerging technologies and scientific processes; 
• The centrality of relationality and experiences of regulated embryos 
(by persons) as subject-object, and embryonic processes as the 
embryo travels through legally and scientifically produced ‘pathways’; 
• The liminality of law itself, permanently in a state where it does not 
renew, or emerge out of this state to a new one; and given all of the 
above 
• A consideration, and answer (in the form of a context-based 
approach) to what form(s) processual regulation can take, and the 
consequences therein.   
 
9.3 Future Directions for Research 
 
Now that this research’s findings and contribution have been summarised, 
the last step for this chapter is to consider the potential future directions for 






highlighted in the Introduction to this thesis (namely on embryos in vitro, 
science, and the family) there are many possible areas of future enquiry. I 
believe that this work’s next logical step would be to return to the three 
strands identified in introduction, and explore each, particularly (2) and (3), 
more deeply:  
 
• With regards to the second, this work could explore the capturing 
of process of family within structures, gender, and other things 
outside of, but greatly affected by, the regulation of reproduction. 
For example, the notion of becoming a family, introducing a child, 
or becoming a donor in of itself are all processual in their own 
right; further 
• The extent to which feminist literature, especially feminist legal 
theory, maps on to the above analysis, with regards to the 
portrayal of women in law, and its portrayal of their social roles; 
and  
• As for the third, ‘science’, one field of enquiry could be a further 
exploration of how the above analysis and approach can inform 
current debates about the 14-day rule, or ectogenesis.  
 
Of course, future areas of enquiry are not limited to the above. The 
processual, changing and uncertain nature of the first strand, as the subject 
of this thesis, is perhaps most obvious. These themes are evident in the 
second strand, too. Science contains a juxtaposition of certainty and 
uncertainty. On one hand, it provides us with explanations for almost 
everything; it organises our knowledge through research and evidence that 
assures us of how our world was, how it is, and in some cases how it might 
be in the future. The future is uncertain, however, as is the ‘true’/objective 






nature of how things are, and our knowledge of how things once were.747 
Public wants and needs from science are not always unified, and 
furthermore, these wants are also evolving, changing, pluralistic, and often 
uncertain too.  
 
Overall, the above conceptualisations of embryos in law have the potential 
to inform reform. The law has fixed the embryos in time, and in some ways 
in substance. All embryos in vitro fall under the Warnock Report’s ‘special 
status’; they are thus conceptually severed from the multiplicity of futures 
that the law has regulated for. Conceptually disconnecting them from these 
possible, legally provided destinies 748  is not only confusing, but also 
intellectually indefensible. Notwithstanding the intellectual disconnect 
between legal concept and reality, fixing embryonic status in such a way 
does indeed rule out, in essence, potential legal futures or legal approaches 
that might benefit from the placement of the embryo in the realm of object. 
This would not necessarily require huge moral overhaul, or require 
‘Frankenstein’-esque research on the early stages of human life; to reiterate, 
practically speaking  (not conceptually speaking) the law already treats 
research embryos as objects.   
 
New ontological boundaries (not only scientific, but social and moral) require 
the law to re-orient itself. The embryo in vitro thus required significant 
reconfiguration of the law. Not only did it have to provide a framework for 
the use of embryos for reproduction and/or research, but construct it in a 
manner that was morally, intellectually, and legally defensible. As this thesis 
                                            
747 Science as ‘fact’ is contested. Latour, for example, has famously questioned the 
reliability and authority of scientific knowledge. See for example Bruno Latour, Science in 
action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society (Harvard university press, 
1987); and Bruno Latour, Pandora's hope: essays on the reality of science studies (Harvard 
university press, 1999).  
748 For discussion of this in context of implanted devices, and blurring subject-object 






has argued, embryos in vitro are thus disruptive for the law’s normative 
boundaries “not only to the practical approach of the law, but with respect 
to its conceptual and normative underpinnings.”749 If the law is to adequately 
and justifiably “deal with the challenges wrought by advancing technology 
generally,” 750  it must evolve in order to cope with the normative and 
conceptual challenges that transgressive entities such as embryos in vitro, 
(or indeed ‘everyday cyborgs’) pose for it. Contrary to the legal climate of 
the past 10 years or so, the law must directly confront embryos in vitro, 
rather than “tinker at the margins”751 in order to better understand the 
challenges that they provide, and consider legal futures that can navigate 
these new boundaries. This is important, for not only the improvement of 
human health as it relates to embryos in vitro or embryos more generally, 
but for the multiplicity of legally liminal persons, objects, and subject-objects 
in the field of health research as a whole. 
                                            
749 Quote in reference to ‘everyday cyborgs’, but as discussed in previous chapters, 
analysis has a lot of paralells as a disruptive, liminal legal subject-object, Quigley and 
Ayihongbe (395); see also Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung, ‘Law, 
regulation, and technology: The field, frame, and focal questions’ in Roger Brownsword, 
Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung (eds) Oxford Handbook of the Law and Regulation of 
Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 3-38. 
750 Quigley and Ayihongbe (n395) 33.  
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